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Within the present work, we will introduce the concept of embodied cognition, 
an approach that considers the role of the body in cognitive processing. General 
findings of this approach and particularly those studies that could have intersections or 
implications for applied clinical psychology will be reviewed. We will also focus on 
models which either have included the body as a significant factor in their explanation 
of psychological disorders or have been directly inspired by the embodied cognition 
account. Moreover, we will introduce some psychological interventions that include the 
body as a significant part of the therapy. This empirical work includes three experiments 
aimed to examine the role of the body on mood regulation processes that will be 
described and discussed. Finally, we draw some conclusions and assess the implications 
which these experiments and, more generally, embodied cognition may have for clinical 
psychology.   
 The repercussion of embodied cognition on scientific research and the interest 
of authors of different fields on this topic have increased exponentially in the last ten 
years, especially in cognitive neuroscience, social neuroscience, cognitive psychology, 
social psychology, and developmental psychology, but also in robotics, cognitive 
ecology, psycholinguistics and cognitive linguistics (Barsalou, 2010). The embodied 
cognition account has revealed the enthusiasm of some researchers, up to a point that 
some authors have proposed that embodiment may be the appropriate framework for 
unifying psychological science (Schubert & Semin, 2009), as well as the skepticism of 
some others (e.g., Adams, 2011). 
In our opinion, embodiment may actually enrich the knowledge we have about 
psychological processes. Concepts, ideas and experimental results of embodiment have 
had an impact on modern psychology. One of the most important outcomes derived 
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from embodiment is that more researchers have directed their attention to the influence 
of bodily states on abstract cognitive and emotional processes. The role of the body has 
been restituted, and the importance and influence of sensorimotor processes and bodily 
states in cognition and emotion is increasingly attracting research. Some previously 
mentioned results can have potential implications, both theoretical and applied, but 
indeed, more research focusing on the influence of bodily states in mental processes 
involved in or partially responsible for psychological disorders is needed. We believe 
that there is a lack of studies addressing this question, and therefore revealing influences 
of bodily states in psychological processes related to mental disorders can be of interest 
for both experimental and clinical psychologist. For the former, this could form an 
interesting and highly unexplored field of research, for the later, this could increase the 
motivation of these psychologists to include the body in therapy, and to develop 
bottom-to-top intervention strategies complementary to the most employed top-to-
bottom, which could eventually improve the outcomes of psychotherapy. Moreover, it 
could help to bridge both disciplines, making results from experimental psychology 
more directly applicable for clinicians. Although it may be theoretically plausible to 
propose that bodily states can influence the course of a certain disorder, evidence of this 
influence on psychological processes crucial for the disorder is essential in maintaining 
this hypothesis. Therefore, the aim of the present study is to test whether some of the 
motor processes that are reported in the revised literature as influencing cognitive or 
affective processes, may have an influence on psychological processes considered to be 
involved in the maintenance of disorders.  
For the aim of the present study we considered that mood regulation was a 
suitable target process, as it is a perfect intersection between the ultimate function of 
emotions (Koole, 2009) and a diversity of implicit and explicit operational modes 
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(Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011). Thus, in the next sections of the present work, general 
information concerning mood regulation will be provided. In addition, three 
experiments, conducted to experimentally explore the influence of bodily states on 
mood regulation, will be reported. 
As we have seen within the present work, the embodiment account could have 
important theoretical and practical implications in the field of clinical psychology. On 
the one hand, considering the role of bodily states on mental processes could help 
psychologists to have a more holistic view of individuals’ cognitive and emotional 
functioning, as stated by Damasio (1994, p.118) “the separation between mind and body 
is probably just fictional. The mind is embodied, in the full sense of the term”. The 
Lindeman and Abramson (2008) model suggests that simulation of motor incapacity 
could be responsible for motor symptoms of depression. This model has directly 
emerged from some theoretical principles of the embodiment account, and represents an 
example of how embodiment could help to enrich the way we understand psychological 
disorders. Although Lindeman and Abramson’s model only refers to symptoms of 
motor incapacity, providing theoretical basement in support of their hypotheses, it does 
not constrain the possible influence of bodily states on motor symptoms of depression. 
In fact, the results obtained in the present work suggest that the influence of bodily 
states goes beyond symptoms of motor incapacity. At least in subclinical samples, 
vertical head movements in combination with positive images seem to improve the 
mood regulation ability of dysphoric individuals. Bodily states could interact with 
internal and external information influencing other emotional processes related to 
depression (e.g., emotional processing of bereavement). Thus, the simulation of motor 
incapacity could account for the motor symptoms of depression, but the contribution of 
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bodily states to other higher order processes involved in depression is still rather 
unexplored.  
The embodiment account reflects the idea that multimodal information is 
reenacted producing higher order cognitive and emotional processes. This is a notion in 
line with the cognitive and emotional functioning proposed by multi-level models of 
emotion (Philippot, Baeyens, Douilliez, & Francart, 2004; Power & Dalgleish, 1997; 
2008; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). Despite their interest, these models have generated a 
small amount of research, probably due to their complexity. Studies based on paradigms 
with an origin on the embodiment approach, such as those included in this work, could 
help to add more evidence in support of the notions proposed by multi-level models of 
emotion. 
It is important to note that some of these paradigms have been successfully 
employed to modify bias towards alcohol (Wiers et al., 2011) and that the combination 
of cognitive bias modification based on approach and avoidance movements with CB 
interventions improved the percentage of relapse in alcoholic patients. This is an initial 
step that signals how the embodiment approach can help to enrich interventions by 
including the body in therapeutic practice. Future research may also address the 
question whether bodily states that are associated with approach or avoidance could be 
manipulated in order to improve treatments in which exposure is the main component. 
Moreover, these results may also encourage us to devote more efforts to the study of the 
efficacy of psychological interventions that include somatic elements as central in 
psychological therapy. 
In our view, the most important contribution of the embodiment approach is the 
restitution of the role of the body in psychological processes. The body is not only the 
primary tool that individuals have to interact with the environment, but also a source of 
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information and the substrate in which abstract cognitive and emotional processes have 
their origin. Taking into account the tight link existing between bodily states and 
emotion and also the suggested link between bodily states and cognitive processes, it 
seems that incorporating the body into clinical practice may open a bottom-up way of 
intervening in dysfunctional psychological processes, complementary to the more 
frequent top-bottom interventions, emanating from traditional cognitive approaches. 
The inclusion of the somatic path as a research topic common to all psychological 









 La llamada revolución cognitiva (e.g., Chomsky, 1964) sacudió los cimientos de 
lo que hasta entonces era considerado el modelo psicológico dominante, el de la 
psicología conductual (e.g., Skinner, 1956). Al contrario que la psicología conductual, 
más enfocada en el principio de acción-reacción y en los modelos de estímulo-
respuesta, la psicología cognitiva concedía un importante papel a todos los procesos que 
sucedían internamente en un individuo y que en multitud de ocasiones condicionaban 
las respuestas que se daban a los estímulos. El creciente desarrollo de la informática y la 
expansión tecnológica permitió a los teóricos de entonces equiparar el funcionamiento 
del sistema cognitivo humano con el de un ordenador. La metáfora del ordenador 
permitía resaltar la importancia de los procesos cognitivos (el software) frente a lo que 
había sido el objeto de estudio hasta entonces, el input (estímulo) y el output 
(respuesta). El código binario, lenguaje primario de estos aparatos, consistente en 
señales amodales de activación/ no-activación, alentó la equiparación del 
funcionamiento del cerebro, donde las neuronas se comunican entre ellas mediante 
impulsos eléctricos (e intercambios bioquímicos), con el del ordenador. Así, se 
estableció que los procesos como el pensamiento, la imaginación o la percepción de las 
distintas sensaciones debían pasar por un proceso de transformación a códigos amodales 
que serían interpretados por un “ejecutivo central” ubicado en el cerebro. Conceptos y 
procesos como los pensamientos, los estilos atribucionales, los sesgos atencionales y de 
memoria, la preocupación o la rumiación, que durante la vigencia del modelo 
conductual tradicional no habían atraído el interés de los investigadores, por el hecho de 
no ser observables y difícilmente cuantificables, cobraron especial relevancia en esta 
nueva etapa de la psicología. La metáfora del ordenador ofrecía multitud de 
posibilidades y había mucho campo que explorar en torno a la gama de procesos 
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cognitivos de los que el ser humano es capaz. A la vez que cobraban importancia en la 
investigación, los procesos cognitivos y los conceptos de la psicología cognitiva se 
fueron paulatinamente incorporando a los modelos psicopatológicos y de intervención 
clínica (e.g., Beck, 1976). En una suerte de efecto rebote, debido seguramente a la falta 
de atención que estos procesos habían recibido durante años, los nuevos modelos 
cognitivos enfatizaban el papel de los esquemas, las creencias, los pensamientos 
distorsionados, o los estilos atribucionales en el desarrollo y mantenimiento de los 
distintos trastornos. El nuevo enfoque cognitivo amplió el espectro de procesos que 
serían a partir de entonces objeto de estudio de la psicología, y ha contribuido al 
desarrollo de modelos psicológicos y psicopatológicos más complejos, que integran 
cada vez más elementos intervinientes y que, por lo tanto, reflejan con mayor precisión 
la complejidad de la psicología humana (e.g., Vázquez, Hervás y Romero, 2010). Sin 
embargo, los modelos cognitivos no están exentos de críticas que señalan algunas de sus 
flaquezas, como el exceso de “cognitivización”, el difícil encaje de elementos 
emocionales y motivacionales en algunos de sus modelos, o la falta de atención a otros 
procesos más elementales, como los procesos corporales, a los que se relega a un papel 
cuasimarginal en la mayoría de estos modelos. Haciendo una analogía algo metafórica, 
podríamos comparar la psicología cognitiva con los homúnculos sensorial y motor 
descubiertos por el neurofisiólogo estadounidense Wilder Penfield (1891 - 1976) en el 
córtex cerebral. Al igual que los homúnculos no son fieles representaciones del cuerpo 
humano ya que, atendiendo únicamente a su representación neural, zonas del cuerpo 
como las manos o los labios tendrían un tamaño exageradamente más grande del que en 
realidad tienen, mientras que otras zonas como la espalda o los muslos disminuirían, del 
mismo modo, en la imagen que tendríamos de la psicología humana a partir del cuadro 
dibujado por la psicología cognitiva, los procesos cognitivos, en especial los procesos 
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superiores conscientes y los relacionados con el lenguaje, a los que se ha dedicado 
mucha atención, estarían sobrerrepresentados, mientras que otros que no han recibido 
tanto interés por parte de los investigadores estarían infrarrepresentados. Haciendo esta 
vez una analogía con la medicina tradicional china (MTCH), mientras el común de los 
occidentales sabemos tomarnos el pulso con dos dedos en la muñeca o en el cuello, los 
expertos en MTCH distinguen un mínimo de 19 tipos de pulsos, en una suerte de 
sensibilidad táctil desarrollada a lo largo de milenios de aplicación. Del mismo modo, la 
ciencia psicológica se ha hiperespecializado en los procesos cognitivos, acuñando 
conceptos parcialmente superpuestos que difieren en pequeños matices como por 
ejemplo rumiación, con sus variantes de brooding o reflection, obsesión o 
preocupación, que la mayoría de los legos podrían identificar como procesos de 
pensamiento con un componente emocional negativo, pero que un psicólogo cognitivo 
experto podría escribir un libro hablando de las diferencias entre uno y otro, aunque 
tuviera que admitir que existe un cierto solapamiento entre ellos.  
En definitiva, como ya sucedió anteriormente con los procesos emocionales y 
motivacionales, que gracias al esfuerzo de numerosos investigadores han ido cobrando 
importancia y relevancia dentro del modelo vigente, en los últimos 20 años la corriente 
del embodiment o la embodied cognition, (un término acuñado por Valera, Thompson y 
Rosch en 1991 y que ha sido traducido a veces como “cognición encarnada” otras veces 
como “cognición incorporada” y algunas también como “cognición corpórea”, de las 
cuáles ninguna parece tan precisa como el original inglés, que por tanto se seguirá 
empleando), ha revitalizado el interés de los estudiosos por el papel del cuerpo en los 
procesos mentales superiores. La postura de Varela y sus colaboradores rechaza las 
ideas de las teorías cognitivas más tradicionales que conceptualizan el conocimiento 
como un logro abstracto y meramente intelectual, que tiene lugar gracias a procesos 
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análogos a la computación pasiva y que relega a un papel secundario a las acciones que 
los individuos ejecutan en el proceso de formación de sus experiencias. En su lugar, 
estos autores proponen un modelo de continuidad entre la vida y la mente en el que se 
resalta el papel de la acción, el cuerpo, o las habilidades sensoriomotrices para explicar 
la actividad cognitiva. Desde entonces, se han incrementado sustancialmente las 
investigaciones sobre embodiment, no sólo en el ámbito de la psicología y ciencia 
cognitiva (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; 2008) sino en otros ámbitos como la robótica (e.g., 
Brooks, 1991) la psicología social (e.g., Meier, Schnall, Schwarz, y Bargh, 2012), la 
psicolingüística (e.g., Glenberg y Kaschak, 2001) o las neurociencias (e.g., Damasio, 
1994), al mismo tiempo que su influencia ha ido calando en estas disciplinas. La 
corriente del embodiment contrapone la filosofía de Heidegger a la tradicional 
mecanicista cartesiana. Si para Descartes la cognición, como cualquier otro fenómeno 
observable, es el resultado de una relación estática y predeterminada de una serie de 
elementos atómicos e irreductibles componentes de un fenómeno, para Heidegger la 
actividad cognitiva se arraiga en aquella disposición que es constante, que no es otra 
que el propio cuerpo, para responder en cada instante a las demandas de un mundo 
exterior en constante cambio que además es experimentado como un todo significativo e 
indivisible, que no puede ser reducido a elementos más básicos. El cuerpo, con sus 
acciones y sus habilidades sensoriomotrices se convierte en el soporte de la cognición. 
Esta idea se ve plasmada perfectamente en el trabajo de Barsalou (2008), ya que este 
autor propone que la cognición no consiste en la computación de símbolos amodales, 
sino en la reactivación de las representaciones modales que son componentes de la 
experiencia. Estos elementos modales no son otros que las sensaciones y las 
percepciones que un objeto y la interacción con el mismo, producen en nuestro cuerpo y 
también en nuestras redes neurales. 
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Como decía, los trabajos de estos autores, entre otros, han inspirado una cascada 
de estudios dirigidos a comprobar este enraizamiento de la cognición en el cuerpo o, 
una vez que el cuerpo se redefine como un elemento constituyente de los procesos 
cognitivos, muchos investigadores han tratado de dilucidar el papel que juegan las 
sensaciones, movimientos y gestos corporales en la cognición. Sin embargo, la 
exploración de la literatura disponible que se llevó a cabo al comienzo de este trabajo, 
reveló que el ámbito de la psicología clínica era uno de los que, dentro de la psicología, 
menos se había visto influido por esta corriente de pensamiento. Se podían hallar pocos 
estudios encaminados a dilucidar la influencia del cuerpo en procesos cognitivos 
relacionados con el desarrollo y mantenimiento de trastornos psicológicos. De manera 
que, por una parte, existía una corriente teórica que estaba reivindicando el papel del 
cuerpo en la cognición y por otra, existían algunas propuestas de intervención que se 
vienen aplicando en el tratamiento de diversos trastornos psicológicos, en especial en 
países germánicos, pero también, aunque en menor medida, en culturas anglosajonas e 
hispanohablantes; si bien es cierto que, en general, cuentan con poca evidencia 
científica (en algunos casos, ninguna) que las avale. Este trabajo es un intento de tender 
puentes entre dos disciplinas, la básica y la clínica, que en algunos casos discurren 
paralelamente, como por las dos orillas de un río, sin a veces apercibirse de la presencia 
de la otra. He llevado a cabo este trabajo en la creencia de que tan de utilidad puede ser 
para un clínico el tener conocimiento de la teoría y resultados que avalan la corriente 
teórica del embodiment, porque puede enriquecer tanto la manera en la que se 
conceptualizan los trastornos como los mecanismos que se utilizan en la intervención; 
como para un investigador básico saber de qué manera se viene utilizando el cuerpo en 
la terapia psicológica, y en la convicción de que es necesario reivindicar el papel del 
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cuerpo dentro de la psicología y explorar las posibilidades que ofrece como contrapunto 
al diálogo y a la conversación en psicoterapia. 
El trabajo está dividido en cuatro estudios, el primero de ellos consistente en una 
revisión teórica del estado de la cuestión en el embodiment, con especial hincapié en 
aquellos resultados que pueden ser más relevantes desde el punto de vista de un 
psicólogo clínico, además de revisar aquellos modelos psicológicos que otorgan un 
papel al cuerpo y un repaso de las intervenciones más relevantes y con mayor respaldo 
científico que utilizan el cuerpo como uno de los ejes fundamentales de la intervención. 
Los tres siguientes son estudios experimentales que tratan de explorar inicialmente el 
papel que juega el cuerpo en procesos psicológicos muy relacionados con la 
psicopatología. En concreto, se describen una serie de tres experimentos en los que el 
objetivo era explorar si la ejecución de distintos movimientos corporales, asociados en 
la literatura con aproximación o rechazo (i.e., asentir o denegar con la cabeza, extender 
o encoger el brazo) podían jugar un papel en la regulación emocional de participantes a 
los que previamente se había inducido un estado de ánimo triste. A continuación, el 
lector podrá encontrar el resumen en castellano de cada uno de los cuatro estudios. Al 
final de los cuatro resúmenes se ha incluido un epígrafe con la discusión general de los 




En este primer estudio, el objetivo general es acercar al lector al estado del arte 
en el embodiment, resumiendo los resultados fundamentales que sostienen la 
aproximación teórica y muy en especial aquellos que pudieran resultar de interés desde 
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una perspectiva clínica. Además, se introducirán tanto modelos teóricos con aspectos 
comunes con la teoría del embodiment, como intervenciones clínicas en las que el 
cuerpo juega un papel destacado. 
Una de las aportaciones del embodiment es la idea de que la cognición se basa en 
representaciones de las distintas modalidades sensoriales (e.g., visual, auditiva, táctil, 
cenestésica) y no en la computación de símbolos amodales. Un ejemplo puede ayudar a 
ilustrar esta idea. En cualquier situación (p.ej., estar tumbado en la cama) el cerebro 
recibe información multimodal (i.e., perceptiva, proprioceptiva, motora) y la integra 
como una representación global en la memoria (i.e., el aspecto de la cama, la sensación 
en la espalda, los movimientos necesarios para tumbarse). Posteriormente, cuando se 
quiere acceder al contenido “cama” en la memoria, estas representaciones modales se 
reactivan simulando la activación cerebral ocurrida durante la experiencia anterior. 
Según esta aproximación, los estados corporales son constituyentes de la cognición y, 
por lo tanto, estados corporales pueden desencadenar estados cognitivos y viceversa 
(Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, y Ruppert, 2003; Smith, 2005). Esta idea se ve 
refrendada por varios estudios neurocientíficos que han hallado las denominadas 
neuronas espejo (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, y Fogassi, 1996), un mecanismo neural 
común en simios e humanos que reveló que las mismas neuronas implicadas en la 
ejecución de una acción se activaban también cuando se percibía la misma acción 
realizada por otro individuo. Estos circuitos de neuronas duales, activas tanto en la 
acción como en la representación de la misma, sirven como base al concepto de 
simulación. La simulación es la reactivación en ausencia de acción u objeto de los 
circuitos neurales activos durante la acción o la interacción con el objeto. Autores como 
Damasio (1994), Barsalou (1999) o Gallese (2010) comparten la idea de que la 
simulación es la base de los procesos mentales superiores. Gallese además sostiene que 
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la comprensión interpersonal se basa en la simulación, que es la mayor fuente de 
conocimiento de los demás. Por su parte, Gallese y Lakoff (2005) afirman que las 
simulaciones sensoriomotrices, muchas veces de forma metafórica están involucradas 
en la elaboración y comprensión de conceptos abstractos. Con matices según los 
distintos autores, una idea común es que los componentes sensoriomotrices de la 
experiencia forman parte de los procesos mentales superiores. Son muchos los estudios 
que han encontrado evidencia en favor de esta idea. A continuación haremos referencia 
a los más importantes desde el punto de vista del embodiment, con especial hincapié en 
los estudios que pudieran ser más relevantes desde la perspectiva de un clínico. 
 
Estudios empíricos relevantes para el embodiment 
  
En la última década, el número de estudios relacionados con el embodiment ha 
aumentado considerablemente. Hemos tratado de organizarlos en secciones en función 
de la parte del cuerpo involucrada en el estudio y dentro de cada sección, hemos tratado 
de ir de lo más general a lo particularmente interesante para la psicología clínica. Sin 
tratar de ser una revisión exhaustiva, sí se ha intentado al menos incluir los estudios de 
revisión o, en su caso, meta-análisis existentes.  
El interés en la relación entre el cuerpo y los procesos mentales superiores se 
remonta a los inicios de la ciencia moderna. Charles Darwin (1872) definió la actitud 
como el conjunto de conductas motoras que reflejan la evaluación que un organismo 
hace de un objeto. Por su parte, William James defendía la idea de que las emociones 
son desencadenadas por cambios corporales. Según James (1884,1890) los cambios 
corporales siguen directamente a la percepción del hecho excitador, y la emoción es la 
forma de sentir esos cambios cuando tienen lugar. Los estudios de Guillaume Duchenne 
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(1862) combinaban la estimulación eléctrica con las incipientes técnicas fotográficas 
para mostrar que la contracción de ciertos músculos faciales determinaba las 
expresiones emocionales. Más recientemente, Robert Zajonc (1980) reflexionaba sobre 
la naturaleza no cognitiva del afecto y las preferencias. Zajonc hizo hincapié en la 
estrecha relación entre el sistema motor y el afecto, sosteniendo que el afecto no 
siempre se transforma en contenidos semánticos, sino que muchas veces es codificado 
en patrones viscerales o motores. En un estudio experimental, Zajonc y Marcus (1982) 
volvían a sugerir que las expresiones motrices de la respuesta afectiva (visceral, 
fisiológica y facial) podrían influir los procesos evaluativos de los individuos. 
   
Gestos faciales y emociones. 
 
La mímica y la expresión facial es probablemente uno de los temas que más 
atención ha recibido por parte de los investigadores interesados en las influencias 
corporales en procesos mentales superiores. La universalidad de las expresiones faciales 
emocionales y la habilidad humana de reconocer los estados internos de otras personas a 
partir de su expresión facial, convirtió la investigación sobre gestos faciales en una de 
las principales vías de estudio de la relación entre los procesos sensoriomotrices y otros 
procesos cognitivos y emocionales. Se puede encontrar una revisión de los estudios 
clásicos sobre gestos faciales en la revisión de Adelmann y Zajonc (1989). 
  La investigación en este terreno propició una controversia entre los autores que 
proponían un mecanismo cognitivo de auto-monitorización subyacente a la influencia 
del feedback facial en la experiencia emocional y aquellos autores que sostenían que la 
mediación cognitiva no era necesaria para que se diese esa influencia y que la activación 
de los mecanismos fisiológicos involucrados en gestos como las expresiones faciales 
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serían suficientes para provocar reacciones afectivas. En el estudio de Strack, Martin y 
Stepper (1988) se trataba de resolver esta polémica. Para ello, los autores manipularon 
de forma encubierta la expresión facial de los participantes, de manera que se evitaba la 
interpretación cognitiva del gesto facial, evaluando posteriormente cómo el mantener 
distintos gestos afectaba al juicio de los participantes. En concreto, los autores 
solicitaron a los participantes que leyeran una serie de tiras cómicas mientras mantenían 
un lápiz sujeto sólo con sus labios (para lo cual tenían que mantener un gesto 
incompatible con la expresión de la sonrisa) o sólo con sus dientes (para lo cual tenían 
que mantener un gesto que se asemejaba a una sonrisa). Conforme a las hipótesis de los 
autores, los participantes que sostuvieron el lápiz con los dientes evaluaron las tiras 
como más divertidas que los que lo sostuvieron con sus labios, demostrando que la 
evaluación cognitiva no era necesaria y que la activación fisiológica de ciertos músculos 
puede tener una influencia en las evaluaciones. 
Estudios posteriores confirmaron y ampliaron estos resultados (p.ej., Larsen, 
Kasimatis, y Frey, 1992; Soussignan, 2002). Usando una metodología similar, Havas, 
Glenberg y Rink (2007) encontraron que los participantes de su estudio tenían mayor 
facilidad para comprender el contenido de una frase cuando el contenido afectivo de la 
misma era congruente con la expresión facial del participante. Por su parte, Duclos y sus 
colaboradores (1989) observaron que la manipulación de los músculos faciales 
involucrados en las expresiones de tristeza, miedo, asco o ira, conducía a los 
participantes a un incremento subjetivo de la emoción expresada (en comparación con 
otras). En otro estudio, Niedenthal, Winkielman, Mondillon, y Vermeulen (2009) 
hallaron que, lejos de ser un efecto colateral de presenciar información emocional, la 
mímica facial ejercía un papel causal en el procesamiento de conceptos emocionales. 
Cuando se inhibía la activación de ciertos músculos faciales, los participantes 
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mostraban menor precisión a la hora de relacionar conceptos con emociones que 
involucrasen la actividad de esos músculos. De igual modo, Oberman, Winkielman y 
Ramachandran (2007) encontraron que impedir la activación de algunos músculos 
faciales dificultaba el reconocimiento de emociones en cuya expresión se vieran 
implicados, Duclos y Laird (2001) hallaron que la supresión de las expresiones 
emocionales afectó a la intensidad emocional de sus participantes, y, 
complementariamente, Niedenthal, Brauer, Halberstadt, e Innes-Ker (2004) encontraron 
que la habilidad de detectar cambios en caras emocionales de los participantes de su 
estudio se veía afectada por sus estados emocionales internos.  
Desde un punto de vista clínico, el estudio de Teasdale y Bancroft (1977) es de 
particular relevancia. En este estudio, los autores emplearon un electromiograma (EMG) 
para comparar, en una pequeña muestra de participantes deprimidos, la actividad del 
músculo corrugador mientras los participantes mantenían pensamientos felices o 
infelices. Los pensamiento infelices produjeron un incremento tanto en la actividad del 
corrugador como en los síntomas de depresión, y lo que aún es más importante, se halló 
una elevada correlación entre la actividad del músculo corrugador y el estado de ánimo 
deprimido. Otro estudio importante desde una perspectiva clínica lo llevaron a cabo 
recientemente Kraft y Pressman (2012). En este estudio, se dividió a los participantes en 
tres grupos. Se instruyó a los participantes para que sujetaran con la boca unos palillos 
chinos de forma que la expresión facial resultaba neutra en el primer grupo, una sonrisa 
estándar en el segundo y una sonrisa de Duchenne en el tercero. Los autores 
encontraron que mantener una expresión análoga a la sonrisa afectaba al estado físico de 
los participantes. En concreto, después de pasar por una tarea estresante, los sujetos de 
los grupos de sonrisa estándar o sonrisa Duchenne manifestaron un descenso menor del 
afecto positivo que los sujetos del grupo que mantuvo una expresión facial neutra. 
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También algunos procesos perceptuales y de memoria parecen verse influidos 
por la activación de los músculos faciales. En un estudio reciente, Susskind, Lee, Cusi, 
Feiman, Grabski y Anderson (2008) hallaron que adoptar una expresión de miedo o 
asco afectaba a la capacidad sensorial de los participantes de su estudio. En concreto, se 
instruyó a los participantes para que adoptaran una expresión de miedo, de asco o una 
expresión neutral durante el estudio. Mientras mantenían una expresión de miedo, los 
participantes incrementaron su capacidad de inspiración nasal, aceleraron sus 
movimientos sacádicos e incrementaron su campo visual, mientras que al adoptar una 
expresión de asco disminuyeron todos estos parámetros con respecto a los obtenidos 
cuando los sujetos mantuvieron una expresión facial neutral. Los autores concluyeron 
que las expresiones faciales no sólo son señales de las emociones correspondientes, sino 
que pueden alterar la predisposición del individuo para la percepción y la acción. 
Siguiendo con procesos de memoria, Riskind (1983) encontró que sonreír facilitaba el 
acceso a recuerdos autobiográficos positivos.  Más recientemente, Topolinski (2012) 
encontró que la inhibición del componente motor en el procesamiento de palabras 
afectaba a la familiaridad y a la memoria implícita, pero no al recuerdo de las palabras 
presentadas. En este estudio, el autor encontró que al ejecutar tareas motoras que 
interfirieran con la simulación motora de las palabras (i.e., masticar chicle) influía 
sistemáticamente en la familiaridad y la memoria implícita (medida mediante la 
preferencia que los individuos muestran por estímulos previamente presentados), 
mientras que las medidas de recuerdo explícito no se vieron alteradas. El hallazgo de 
este inusual efecto, ya que es mucho más frecuente hallar el efecto contrario, es decir 
que sea la memoria explícita la más afectada, hace que este estudio pueda ser 
especialmente relevante, ya que un patrón similar solo se ha encontrado con 
anterioridad en algunos individuos con lesiones cerebrales o en trastornos disociativos 
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como el síndrome de Capgras. Este resultado sugiere que las sensaciones motrices 
pueden jugar un papel en la memoria implícita.  
En resumen, los gestos faciales pueden modular la experiencia emocional, 
facilitar la aparición de estados de ánimo y recuerdos congruentes además de que 
parecen tener una influencia sobre procesos perceptuales y de memoria. 
           
Movimientos del brazo 
 
Uno de los primeros estudios que revelaron influencias corporales en procesos 
cognitivos fue llevado a cabo por Cacioppo, Priester y Bernston (1993). En este estudio, 
los participantes visionaron ideogramas chinos aleatoriamente seleccionados mientras 
ejecutaban un movimiento de aproximación o rechazo con los brazos. Los autores 
encontraron que los ideogramas que habían sido visionados mientras se realizaban 
movimientos de aproximación (i.e., tirar de algo hacia sí) eran evaluados como más 
positivos que los que se visionaron mientras se realizaba un movimiento de evitación 
(i.e., empujar algo). En un estudio complementario al anterior Chen y Bargh (1999) 
encontraron que los participantes reaccionaban más rápidamente cuando tenían que 
responder a palabras negativas con un movimiento de extensión y a palabras positivas 
con un movimiento de flexión, que cuando la asociación entre palabras y movimientos 
de respuesta era la inversa. Estos resultados han sido corroborados y extendidos en 
varios estudios posteriores, que en general apuntan a que los movimientos del brazo 
pueden afectar a la evaluación y viceversa (para un resumen de resultados ver por 
ejemplo Phing, Dhillon, & Beilock, 2009). Phing y colaboradores (2009) sugieren que 
la dificultad del movimiento afecta a las preferencias de los individuos. En su estudio, 
encontraron que, entre dos objetos idénticos colocados en distintas posiciones, los 
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participantes elegían más frecuentemente el más fácil de alcanzar cuando se les 
preguntaba por el objeto que más les gustaba, pero no cuando se les preguntaba por el 
que más les disgustaba. Los autores concluyeron que las preferencias que establecemos 
en nuestro día a día están íntimamente ligadas al sistema motor y que tanto las 
preferencias como la percepción se cimentan en las acciones.  
En el ámbito de la psicolingüística también se ha encontrado evidencia que 
sugiere una influencia de los movimientos del brazo, en este caso en el procesamiento 
del lenguaje. Glenberg y Kaschak (2002) llevaron a cabo un estudio en el que sus 
participantes tenían que decidir si unas frases tenían sentido o no presionando uno de 
dos botones que estaban colocados cerca y lejos del cuerpo, respectivamente. Las frases 
incluían verbos que indicaban acciones o movimientos dirigidos hacia el individuo (p.ej. 
recibir) o desde el individuo hacia fuera (p.ej. dar). Los autores hallaron que las 
respuestas eran más rápidas cuando el movimiento que había que realizar para apretar el 
botón de respuesta era congruente con la direccionalidad del verbo y denominaron a 
este fenómeno con el nombre de “efecto de compatibilidad entre frase y acción” (ACE, 
por sus siglas en inglés). Un efecto que parece ser robusto, ya que ha sido corroborado y 
ampliado en otros studios (p.ej., Taylor y Zwaan, 2008; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). 
De especial relevancia desde el punto de vista de la psicología clínica, es el 
estudio de Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker y Lindenmeyer (2011). En este estudio, llevado 
a cabo con pacientes alcohólicos los investigadores utilizaron una tarea de modificación 
de sesgos hacia el alcohol que consistía en realizar movimientos de extensión del brazo 
en respuesta a imágenes de bebidas alcohólicas y movimientos de flexión del brazo en 
respuesta a imágenes de bebidas no alcohólicas. En comparación con los controles, se 
observó que los sujetos que fueron asignados a la condición experimental habían 
revertido su sesgo inicial favorable al alcohol, convirtiéndose en un sesgo de ligera 
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aversión. Más importante aún, tras pasar por un tratamiento psicológico cognitivo-
conductual, y después de un año de seguimiento, los investigadores comprobaron que la 
tasa de recaída entre los pacientes del grupo experimental era significativamente menor 
(46%) que la del grupo control (59%). Estos resultados sugieren cómo una intervención 
involucrando elementos motores relacionados con aproximación y rechazo puede 
ayudar a mejorar los resultados de las terapias. 
  
Movimientos de la cabeza. 
 
Uno de los primeros estudios en este campo lo llevaron a cabo Wells y Petty 
(1980). En ese trabajo, los autores estudiaron si realizar movimientos de cabeza tenía 
influencia en la actitud del individuo hacia la información que se le presentaba. En 
concreto, los autores pidieron a los participantes que hicieran movimientos verticales o 
laterales de cabeza mientras escuchaban un programa de radio. Independientemente de 
la ideología de los participantes y del contenido del programa, los autores observaron 
que los participantes que asintieron mostraron un mayor acuerdo con el contenido que 
los que denegaron con la cabeza. 
 Por su parte, Briñol y Petty (2003) llevaron a cabo un estudio para estudiar la 
influencia de los movimientos de cabeza en la persuasión. Estos autores observaron que 
la fuerza de los argumentos interactuaba con los movimientos de cabeza, de manera que 
cuando se le presentaba a los sujetos argumentos de peso, asentir con la cabeza 
facilitaba la persuasión, mientras que denegar la dificultaba. Por el contrario, cuando los 
argumentos no eran sólidos, el efecto del movimiento de cabeza era el opuesto. Los 
autores concluyeron que los movimientos de cabeza afectaban a la confianza que el 
individuo tiene en sus propios pensamientos. 
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El  estudio de Tom, Peterson, Lau, Burton y Cook (1991) se centró en la 
influencia de los movimientos de cabeza en las preferencias. Los autores enmascararon 
el estudio como si fuera una prueba de la comodidad de unos nuevos auriculares para 
utilizar durante la práctica de ejercicio físico. A una parte de los participantes se le pidió 
que se pusieran los cascos y moviesen la cabeza de arriba abajo, como sucedería si 
estuviesen corriendo. A la otra mitad se les pidió que moviesen la cabeza lateralmente, 
como si montaran en bicicleta. Durante el experimento, los participantes estuvieron 
expuestos a un bolígrafo que luego serviría para comprobar su preferencia. Al final del 
ejercicio, los autores les informaron de que la marca estaba pensando en realizar una 
campaña promocional, parte de la cual era regalar un bolígrafo. Pidieron a los 
participantes que decidiesen qué bolígrafo preferirían ellos recibir, y les dieron a elegir 
entre el bolígrafo que habían estado viendo y uno nuevo que no habían visto. Dos 
tercios de los participantes que movieron verticalmente la cabeza eligieron el bolígrafo 
que habían visto. La misma proporción de los que habían movido lateralmente la cabeza 
eligieron el nuevo.  
Por último, Forster y Strack (1996) estudiaron la influencia de los movimientos 
de cabeza en la memoria. En una serie de tres experimentos, estos autores encontraron 
que asentir con la cabeza, en comparación con realizar movimientos de denegación, 
facilitaba el recuerdo de memorias positivas.  
  
Posturas corporales y locomoción. 
 
Numerosos estudios sobre embodiment postural, siguiendo la terminología de 
Niedenthal y cols. (2005), han encontrado relaciones entre los movimientos corporales y 
los procesos cognitivos y emocionales. Uno de los primeros estudios en este ámbito lo 
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llevaron a cabo Riskind y Gotay (1982). Encontraron que la postura afectaba tanto a los 
autoinformes del estado de ánimo que los participantes estaban completando, como a la 
ejecución de una tarea. Los participantes que mantenían una postura encorvada 
(slumped) refirieron peor estado de ánimo y eran más proclives a abandonar una tarea 
cuando estaban teniendo éxito. Por el contrario, los participantes que mantuvieron una 
postura erguida mostraron un estado de ánimo más positivo y se mostraron más 
proclives a abandonar una tarea en la que no estaban teniendo éxito. Cuando la postura 
era congruente con el resultado, los participantes permanecían haciéndola durante más 
tiempo. 
En el segundo experimento de su estudio, Duclos y cols. (1989) comprobaron la 
influencia de la postura en los autorregistros emocionales. En su experimento, se 
instruyó a los participantes para que mantuvieran posturas de miedo, ira o tristeza. 
Posteriormente, se les preguntó en qué medida habían sentido ocho posibles emociones. 
Los resultados mostraron que al adoptar cada postura, los participantes incrementaron la 
emoción expresada con respecto a las demás. Estos resultados fueron corroborados y 
extendidos en el estudio de Flack, Laird y Cavallaro (1999). Estos autores pidieron a sus 
participantes que adoptaran gestos faciales, posturas corporales, o ambas 
simultáneamente, que evocaban ira, tristeza, miedo o alegría. Encontraron que tanto las 
posturas como los gestos relativos a una emoción potenciaban su presencia en los 
participantes, y que los efectos provocados por posturas y gestos eran aditivos. 
Complementariamente, otros estudios han encontrado que mantener posturas 
incompatibles con una emoción reducen la respuesta neural asociada (p.ej., Harmon 
Jones y Peterson, 2009). La influencia de los estados corporales en las emociones 
parece ser mayor en aquellas personas que son más sensibles a claves personales que a 
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situacionales (Duclos y Laird, 2001; Herbert, Herbert, y Pollatos, 2011; Herbert y 
Pollatos, 2012). 
Volviendo a los aspectos más clínicos, Ramseyer y Tschacher (2011) estudiaron 
la influencia de la coordinación de movimientos entre terapeuta y paciente en los 
resultados de la terapia. Encontraron una sincronía de movimientos entre paciente y 
terapeuta por encima del nivel de azar. Además, el tipo de sincronía estaba relacionado 
con aspectos interpersonales de la terapia. Cuando el terapeuta se sincronizaba con los 
movimientos del paciente, se incrementaba el nivel de autoeficacia percibida por parte 
del paciente. En cambio, cuando era el paciente el que se sincronizaba al terapeuta, 
mejoraba la relación terapéutica a los ojos del paciente. Estos resultados indican que 
tanto la relación psicológica como los estados internos de dos personas que interactúan 
se reflejan en sus cuerpos, que juegan un papel importante en el mantenimiento de las 
relaciones. 
Complementariamente, el estudio de Butler y cols. (2003) examinó las 
consecuencias personales y sociales de suprimir la expresión emocional durante una 
cconversación. En la condición de supresión emocional se instruyó a uno de los 
participantes (i.e., el regulador) para que no expresara sus emociones, mientras que en la 
condición de control no se le dio instrucciones a los participantes. En comparación con 
la condición de control, la supresión emocional produjo un incremento en la presión 
arterial de ambos interlocutores, incrementó el nivel de distracción del regulador 
durante la conversación y disminuyó en el otro interlocutor el sentimiento de rapport y 
la voluntad de desarrollar una amistad posteriormente. 
También hay estudios sobre la forma de andar que contribuyen a la idea de que 
los estados corporales influyen en procesos superiores. Por ejemplo, el estudio de 
Michalak, Troje, Fischer, Vollmar, y Schulte (2009) encontró que la manera de andar de 
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individuos deprimidos o a los que se había inducido un estado de ánimo triste difería de 
la del grupo control, y además estas diferencias se ven atenuadas con la terapia 
(Michalak, Troje, y Heidenreich, 2010). Recíprocamente, inducir una manera de andar 
afecta, por ejemplo, a procesos de memoria. En un estudio de Rohde, Troje, y Michalak, 
(2012) se halló que los participantes a los que se indujo a mantener una forma de andar 
“triste” mostraron un sesgo más negativo en una tarea de memoria autorreferente. 
En resumen, los estudios sobre embodiment postural han encontrado que la 
postura corporal puede afectar estados emocionales, así como también a procesos 
motivacionales, perceptuales y de memoria.  
  
Metáfora conceptual y representación de conceptos. 
  
La última fuente de evidencia de las influencias del cuerpo en procesos 
cognitivos que vamos a citar en el presente trabajo se refiere a los estudios sobre 
metáforas conceptuales. El término metáfora conceptual fue acuñado por Lakoff y 
Johnson (1980, 1999) y hace referencia a la idea de que los conceptos abstractos están 
basados en dimensiones más básicas. Estas metáforas nos capacitan para pensar sobre 
conceptos abstractos ligándolos a sensaciones físicas. De acuerdo con estos autores, sin 
esas relaciones, los conceptos abstractos carecerían de referencia en el mundo físico y 
nos dificultaría la tarea de compartirlos con los demás. 
Parte de estos estudios se han ocupado de estudiar la relación entre dimensiones 
espaciales básicas (i.e., izquierda-derecha, delante-detrás, arriba-abajo) con conceptos 
abstractos como los números (p.ej. Dehaene, Bossini, y Giraux, 1993; para una revisión 
ver Fias y Fischer, 2005) el tiempo (p.ej., Boroditsky, 2000, Santiago, Lupiañez, Pérez, 
y Funes, 2007; Torralbo, Santiago, y Lupiañez, 2006) o el afecto (p.ej., Meier y 
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Robinson, 2004; para una revisión ver Crawford, 2009).  Entre estos estudios, uno de 
especial relevancia para el presente trabajo es el que llevaron a cabo Meier y Robinson 
(2006). En ese estudio, los autores observaron que los participantes que referían un 
mayor número de síntomas depresivos mostraban sesgos atencionales hacia las zonas 
inferiores del campo visual.  
Además de estos estudios, muchos otros han encontrado evidencia de que ciertas 
metáforas comunes en nuestro lenguaje pueden estar asociadas a sensaciones físicas 
(para una revisión mirar Gibbs, 2006; Isanski y West, 2010; Landau, Meier, y Keefer, 
2010; Meier y cols., 2012). Por ejemplo, ha habido trabajos que estudiaron y 
comprobaron la comúnmente usada metáfora de asociar amabilidad con calidez y 
rudeza o aislamiento con frialdad (p.ej., Ijzerman y Semin, 2009; Zhong and 
Leonardelli, 2008). Otros autores han estudiado la metáfora de relacionar la importancia 
de un argumento con su peso (Jostman, Lakens y Schubert, 2009) o la asociación entre 
luminosidad y bondad (Meier, Robinson y Clore, 2004). 
De especial interés para la conexión entre psicología experimental y clínica son 
los estudios sobre la relación entre el concepto de moralidad y pureza con sensaciones 
físicas de limpieza (ver Schnall, 2011). Algunos estudios han encontrado que hacer un 
priming con limpieza puede en ocasiones atenuar los juicios morales y en otras 
exacerbarlos. Parece que los comportamientos de limpieza disminuyen la culpa que 
producen las transgresiones morales (Zhong y Liljenquist, 2006) y además parece que la 
parte con la que se comete la transgresión es la parte que se desea limpiar (Lee y 
Schwarz, 2010). Hay autores que han propuesto que tal y como el asco es una emoción 
en principio asociada a los alimentos y probablemente con posterioridad adquirió 
connotaciones morales, del mismo modo la necesidad de limpieza y orden ha podido 
evolucionar en un contexto social específico en el que terminó adquiriendo un tinte 
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moral e incluso ir más allá y servir de bálsamo tras tomar decisiones difíciles (Lee y 
Schwarz, 2010). Parece plausible que exista un vínculo entre estas cogniciones 
incorporadas y algunos trastornos psicológicos como el trastorno obsesivo-compulsivo. 
Un aspecto común en estos trastornos es que los pacientes muestran su preocupación 
por aspectos relacionados con la limpieza y la pureza moral. Hay cierta evidencia que 
indica que inducir experiencias de asco endurece los juicios morales de los individuos 
(Schnall, Haidt, Clore, y Jordan, 2008), mientras que experiencias de pureza los atenúa 
(Helzer y Pizarro, 2011; Schnall, Benton, y Harvey, 2008). El hecho de que este tipo de 
representaciones estén corporeizadas puede abrir vías de investigación interesantes para 
estudiar la ideación obsesiva y mejorar su tratamiento. 
 
Modelos psicológicos y psicopatológicos que le dan un papel al cuerpo. 
  
Modelos multinivel de emoción. 
  
El aspecto común de estos modelos es que tienen como premisa que la 
información emocional se procesa a diferentes niveles. El papel del cuerpo en estos 
modelos es doble. Por una parte, estos modelos lo conciben como un sistema de 
respuesta que ejecuta las reacciones elicitadas por otros sistemas. Por otra parte, se le 
suponen una serie de vínculos automáticos con el sistema perceptual (lo que Damasio -
1994. conceptualiza como emoción primaria) y la capacidad de poner en marcha 
esquemas. 
 




En este modelo, los autores proponen la existencia de subsistemas interactivos 
que están especializadas en el procesamiento de cierto tipo de información. Estos 
subsistemas están organizados en función de su nivel de abstracción en un modelo de 
jerarquía semántica.  
En el nivel sensorial, el subsistema acústico codifica la información relativa al 
sonido, el subsistema visual la información visual y el subsistema de estado corporal 
codifica las entradas sensoriales de dentro del cuerpo, como las sensaciones de presión o 
dolor, la posición de las partes del cuerpo, así como olores y sabores. 
En el nivel intermedio, el subsistema morfonoléxico codifica la descripción 
estructural de los elementos y las relaciones del espacio acústico, mientras que el 
subsistema de objeto codifica la descripción estructural de los elementos y las relaciones 
del espacio visual. 
En el nivel de significado, el subsistema proposicional integra la información de 
los subsistemas morfonoléxico y de objeto en conocimiento descriptivo, mientras que el 
subsistema implicacional integra la información sensorial con el conocimiento 
descriptivo, y las entidades mentales resultado de las regularidades del entorno y el 
cuerpo pueden entenderse como modelos esquemáticos de la experiencia. 
Finalmente, este modelo propone un nivel ejecutor con tres subsistemas, el 
articulatorio, el límbico y el somático-visceral, que implementan los resultados de los 
subsistemas de los niveles intermedio y de significado.  
De especial importancia para este trabajo es que este modelo propone que los 
estados corporales y la retroalimentación corporal influyen en los procesos cognitivos 
del nivel implicacional, que está conformado por esquemas, conceptos, normas, valores 
y otros conocimientos implícitos que no son necesariamente verbales pero que se 




Modelo de Lindeman y Abramson 
                      
Recientemente, Lindeman y Abramson (2008) han propuesto un modelo teórico 
que describe los mecanismos causales por los que podrían relacionarse elementos 
somáticos y cognitivos dentro de la depresión. En concreto, estas autoras hacen un 
resumen de resultados en embodiment y sugieren que la desesperanza está 
conceptualizada metafóricamente como incapacidad motriz y que la simulación de esta 
incapacidad motriz da lugar a la aparición de síntomas fisiológicos periféricos como el 
retardo psicomotor o la baja energía. 
El modelo propuesto por estas autoras sostiene que algunas emociones aparecen 
como consecuencia de la simulación de experiencias corporales que integran la 
conceptualización metafórica de ciertas situaciones (p.ej., sentir opresión en el pecho 
como consecuencia de la presión social). Los concomitantes fisiológicos de estas 
emociones derivarían de estas experiencias sensoriomotrices. Aplicado a la depresión, el 
modelo de simulación metafórica sugiere que la incapacidad de evitar los resultados 
indeseados o de lograr los deseados está metafóricamente conceptualizada como una 
incapacidad motriz y que la simulación de esta incapacidad motriz se convierte en un 
componente sustancial de la desesperanza, dando lugar a sensaciones subjetivas de 
letargia e inmovilidad y a resultados fisiológicamente objetivables como baja energía o 
retardo psicomotor.  
El modelo propuesto por Lindeman y Abramson (2008) tiene importantes 
implicaciones para la práctica clínica. Por un lado, la actividad central y periférica 
puede considerarse como simulaciones metafóricas de ciertos conceptos y cogniciones. 
Este hecho abre nuevas vías para la identificación de esquemas no adaptativos y sugiere 
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vías de intervención alternativas que estén menos mediadas por procesos cognitivos 
abstractos. Por otro lado, el modelo implica que las experiencias corporales de 
competencia motora pueden resultar útiles para aliviar los síntomas de la depresión. En 
consonancia con esta última implicación, hay resultados que señalan que el ejercicio 
físico puede reducir la desesperanza (Hembree, 2001) así como las cogniciones 
negativas asociadas a la depresión (Lash, 2000). Además, los ejercicios que implican un 
mayor nivel de competencia motora, como las artes marciales, incrementan las 
emociones positivas y la autoeficacia de los pacientes en mayor medida que otros 
ejercicios como pedalear en una bicicleta estática (Bodin & Martinsen, 2004). Puede 
que el desarrollo de claves que subrayen la competencia motora del sujeto ayude a 




Este modelo fue inicialmente propuesto por Haken (1977) en el ámbito de la 
física. Recientemente, Haken y Tschacher han transferido algunos de sus principios al 
campo de la psicología, con el objetivo de desarrollar un modelo teórico que pueda 
explicar el comportamiento intencional y las dinámicas neurales (Haken & Tschacher, 
2010), la actividad cerebral (Haken, 1996) o el funcionamiento cognitivo y 
comportamental humano (Haken y Tschacher, 2011). Concretamente, estos autores 
consideran que el comportamiento humano es un ámbito al que se puede aplicar su 
modelo, ya que, según ellos, los patrones organizativos del comportamiento emergen 
espontáneamente. De acuerdo con su modelo, el entorno, incluyendo en el mismo los 
estados y las posturas corporales, constriñen el rango de posibles estados psicológicos 
de un individuo dado. El comportamiento puede ser entendido como una función de los 
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cambios en el espacio personal (i.e., variables cognitivas y emocionales de la persona) 
que está a su vez condicionado por las variables del entorno. De importancia para este 
modelo es la idea de que para que tenga lugar la aparición espontánea de patrones 
organizativos estos no pueden estar preinstalados en el sistema, sino que aparecen 
cuando los mismos patrones son empleados para la percepción y para la categorización 
de los eventos (en otras palabras, la forma de explicar el comportamiento inteligente y 
resolver el problema de la intencionalidad es asumir que la cognición es modal). De 
acuerdo con el modelo de synergetics, las variables corporales deben ser entendidas 
como parámetros de control de los procesos cognitivos. 
 
Psicoterapias que involucran el cuerpo. 
 
  Aunque el presente trabajo se puede encuadrar en la psicopatología 
experimental, el motivo último del mismo es servir de base para generar nuevas 
estrategias psicoterapéuticas en el futuro. En este sentido, puede ser interesante 
examinar el estado de la cuestión en intervenciones psicoterapéuticas, con mayor o 
menor nivel de validación según el caso, que utilizan el cuerpo como herramienta 




La psicorterapia corporal es considerada como una rama principal de la 
psicoterapia. El término se utiliza generalmente para denominar un compendio de 
métodos y técnicas cuyo denominador común es que el cuerpo juega un papel 
importante en la práctica psicoterapéutica. Röhrcih (2009, p. 139) define este tipo de 
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intervenciones como “una perspectiva holística dentro de la estrategia de intervención 
terapéutica que trabaja explícitamente con técnicas corporales, no verbales”. El 
paraguas terminológico de psicoterapia corporal recoge diversos enfoques e 
intervenciones. Si bien la proliferación de términos y técnicas no está muy justificada, 
habida cuenta del solapamiento conceptual y la similitud en la práctica de algunas 
intervenciones, los métodos y técnicas de la psicoterapia corporal pueden dividirse en 
dos grupos. Por un lado, aquellas técnicas e intervenciones orientadas a modificar el 
comportamiento o a dotar de una mayor capacidad de introspección al paciente (p.ej., 
Terapia de danza y movimiento, Análisis Bioenergético) y por el otro aquellas técnicas 
y enfoques cuyo objetivo principal es la relajación y la homeostasis (p.ej., Relajación 
funcional, Hakomi). 
 
Terapia de danza y movimiento (DMT) 
 
De acuerdo con la definición de la Asociación Británica de Terapia de Danza y 
Movimiento, “La DMT es el uso en psicoterapia del movimiento y la danza a través del 
cual el individuo pueda involucrarse de forma creativa en un proceso que facilite la 
integración de sus áreas emocional, cognitiva, física y social. La DMT se fundamenta en 
la premisa de que el movimiento refleja la manera de pensar y sentir de la persona”. 
La danza es un arte que se practica como una forma de expresión emocional, interacción 
social y que está presente tanto en rituales litúrgicos como de seducción en diferentes 
culturas en todo el mundo. Se desconoce el momento exacto en el que la danza comenzó 
a formar parte de la cultura humana, pero algunos de los yacimientos arqueológicos más 




         Entre los beneficios de la danza se incluyen la mejora de la condición física, la 
coordinación, mejora en la expresión rítmica, en la confianza en uno mismo y en la 
imagen social (p.ej., Alpert, 2011). La DMT se basa en la idea de que el cuerpo y la 
mente trabajan juntos y de que bailar es una forma de expresar los sentimientos más 
íntimos de la persona, que a su vez ayuda al individuo a ser consciente de lo que siente a 
través de las sensaciones y los movimientos. 
La evidencia a favor de esta intervención es aún escasa. El metaanálisis de  
Ritter y Low (1996) hizo una revision de los studios cuantitativos sobre la eficacia de la 
DMT y estimó el tamaño del efecto de esta intervención. Los autores encontraron 
tamaños del efecto de pequeños a medianos, concluyendo que la DMT podía ser un 
tratamiento efectivo para pacientes con sintomatología diversa y en especial para 
trastornos de ansiedad, si bien reconocieron la necesidad de realizar más estudios con 
grupo control y utilizar medidas más fiables. Con posterioridad, se han realizado 
algunos estudios tratando de superar estas limitaciones. Por ejemplo, el estudio de  
Jeong, Hong, Lee, Park, Kim y Suh (2005) evaluó la salud psicológica y los cambios en 
el nivel de ciertas neuro-hormonas en un grupo de adolescentes moderadamente 
deprimidos que siguieron un programa de intervención con DMT durante 12 semanas. 
Después de 12 semanas, se redujeron todos los indicadores de distrés psicológico en el 
grupo de DMT y además este grupo mostró mayor concentración de serotonina y menor 
concentración de dopamina en plasma que los sujetos del grupo control.   
   
Mindfulness 
 
El mindfulness o conciencia plena es una técnica de intervención que se basa en 
las prácticas de meditación orientales. La técnica consiste en dirigir la atención 
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deliberadamente hacia el instante presente, tratando de no juzgar y en una actitud de 
aceptación de los pensamientos, emociones y sentimientos que pudieran aparecer en la 
conciencia. Es además un estado de conciencia que permite darse cuenta de las 
sensaciones y experiencias mentales y corporales que tienen lugar en el momento 
presente. 
En mindfulness, la respiración se utiliza como anclaje para el foco atencional. 
Como la respiración es un proceso automatizado que hacemos en todo momento, se 
utiliza como un suceso que nos ayuda a focalizar nuestra atención en el cuerpo, sin 
tratar de controlarla. 
En la práctica informal del mindfulness, la respiración también puede ser el foco 
de atención que nos traiga al momento presente mientras se realizan otras actividades 
como caminar, escuchar música o esperar a que un semáforo se ponga en verde. El 
dirigir la atención hacia otras sensaciones corporales, como la fuerza con la que 
agarramos un vaso o el impulso de las piernas mientras caminamos, también se puede 
utilizar para estar más consciente del momento presente. En los ejercicios de escaneo 
corporal la atención se va desplazando por las distintas sensaciones corporales, 
desarrollando una mayor conciencia de las mismas y permitiendo, mediante la práctica 
regular, que esta mayor conciencia de las sensaciones corporales se integre en nuestras 
rutinas diarias. 
  A lo largo de las últimas décadas, el mindfulness ha llamado la atención tanto de 
investigadores como de terapeutas como técnica de intervención en trastornos 
psicológicos. De hecho, aunque el mindfulness puede considerarse por sí mismo como 
un tipo de intervención, son varios los enfoques que han incorporado prácticas de 
mindfulness o que están directamente basados en el midfulness (p.ej., Baer, 2003; 
Germer, Siegel, y Fulton, 2005).  
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Una de las intervenciones más destacadas que utiliza el mindfulness es la 
Terapia Cognitiva basada en Mindfulness (MBCT, por sus siglas en inglés; Segal, 
Williams, y Teasdale, 2002) que se centra en la prevención de recaídas de pacientes que 
sufren episodios depresivos recurrentes. Además de las técnicas clásicas de intervención 
cognitivo-conductual, la MBCT utiliza técnicas de mindfulness que incluyen el cuerpo 
como un elemento que facilita la interrupción de los procesos cognitivos automáticos 
que pueden desencadenar un nuevo episodio depresivo mayor. La eficacia de la MBCT 
en el tratamiento de la depresión es similar a la de continuar con la medicación 
antidepresiva (p.ej., Kuyken y cols., 2009) y también ha demostrado su eficacia en el 
tratamiento de trastornos de pánico (p.ej., Kim y cols., 2009) de ansiedad social (p.ej., 
Kocovski, Segal, y Battista, 2009) o de ansiedad generalizada (p.ej., Evans y cols., 
2008). 
Otra de las intervenciones psicológicas que usa mindfulness es el Programa de 
Reducción del estrés basado en Mindfulness  (MBSR, Kabat-Zinn, 1979). El MBSR se 
centra en la reducción del estrés para la mejora del bienestar físico y mental en diversos 
cuadros clínicos. Estudios recientes señalan que la MBSR incrementa la calidad de vida 
y el bienestar físico en una amplia gama de trastornos. En concreto el entrenamiento en 
MBSR mejora la capacidad de afrontamiento tanto en situaciones cotidianas como en 
presencia de trastornos de estrés severo (p.ej., Chang, 2004), adicciones (Altner, 2002), 
ansiedad (Miller, Fletcher, y Kabat-Zinn, 1995) y también en enfermedades físicas 
como el cáncer (p.ej., Carlson, 2004) o el dolor crónico (p.ej., Kabat-Zinn, 1982; para 
un metaanálisis de los beneficios del MBSR en la salud ver Grossmann, Niemann, 






La psicoterapia sensoriomotriz es un modelo de intervención desarrollado por 
Pat Ogden y sus colaboradores (Ogden, Minton, y Pain, 2006) para el tratamiento de 
pacientes con trastorno de estrés post-traumático. En comparación con otras 
intervenciones psicológicas, la terapia sensoriomotriz subraya la importancia de 
intervenir en el nivel somático, ya que las sensaciones corporales que permanecen 
activas durante el procesamiento cognitivo constituyen un sesgo que afecta al 
funcionamiento del individuo, especialmente los procesos de toma de decisiones. 
Cuando los patrones sensoriomotrices alterados se consolidan, es difícil que las 
intervenciones cognitivas puedan modificar con éxito las reacciones asociadas a la 
sobreactivación fisiológica. 
Entre otras habilidades, los terapeutas sensoriomotrices se forman en detectar y 
reconocer micromovimientos corporales y otras señales físicas que indican cambios en 
las sensaciones corporales o en la activación del sistema nervioso autónomo de los 
pacientes, con el objetivo de ser capaces de verbalizar estos cambios del mismo modo 
que reflejan contenidos verbales o emocionales del paciente.  
Según estos autores, durante el tratamiento de los pacientes con estrés post-traumático 
es importante trabajar con sus reacciones defensivas para restablecer un funcionamiento 
flexible y adaptado. Sufrir un acontecimiento traumático a veces implica que la 
experiencia de que las reacciones defensivas de la persona no lograron garantizar su 
seguridad. Durante algunas experiencias traumáticas, las personas se ven forzadas a 
interrumpir sus reacciones defensivas movilizadoras, adoptando en su lugar defensas de 
inmovilización y paralizándose. Sin embargo, las reacciones defensivas más activas 
están aún presentes en los pacientes con trauma, y pueden ser redescubiertas y 
revitalizadas si se le presta atención al lenguaje corporal de los pacientes, restaurando 
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con ello su sentimiento de competencia. Un elemento esencial en la psicoterapia 
sensoriomotriz es identificar y resolver la secuencia de reacciones defensivas que están 
contribuyendo al mantenimiento de los síntomas. Durante el proceso terapéutico, 
mediante la observación de las reacciones corporales que se producen cuando se evoca 
la situación traumática, aparece la posibilidad de reaccionar de forma diferente. Esta 
respuesta, incipiente en el suceso traumático, se reafirma y se convierte en una respuesta 
más flexible y adaptada a la circunstancia actual de la persona. Es por tanto de enorme 
importancia que el terapeuta sea capaz de identificar esas acciones incompletas o no 
expresadas para ayudar a los pacientes a completarlas y facilitar el desarrollo de nuevas 
capacidades. 
La intervención de la psicoterapia sensoriomotriz está dividida en tres fases. La 
primera fase del tratamiento tiene como objetivo identificar las reacciones somáticas 
vinculadas a la hiperactivación o a la hipoactivación, explorar los recursos somáticos 
actuales y desarrollar nuevos recursos que permitan mantener el nivel de activación 
dentro de los umbrales de tolerancia de la persona. Durante la segunda fase del 
tratamiento, las situaciones traumáticas son recordadas mientras se ponen en marcha los 
recursos aprendidos en la fase anterior. Los objetivos de esta fase son reducir la 
evitación y las reacciones fóbicas de los pacientes a los recuerdos traumáticos, así como 
explorar y activar tendencias de acción que estuviesen ocultas, además de implementar 
los recursos somáticos que permitan regular las respuestas fisiológicas autónomas 
producidas por las reacciones defensivas inapropiadas que la persona sigue 
manteniendo. La tercera fase del tratamiento está encaminada a la normalización del 
funcionamiento cotidiano del paciente en aquellas áreas que pudieran haberse visto 
afectadas en el curso del trastorno, usando las estrategias y los conocimientos 
adquiridos en las fases anteriores. 
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La principal contribución de este modelo de intervención es la de equiparar la 
relevancia de las intervenciones en el nivel somático a las que se realizan en las áreas 
emocional y cognitiva del paciente, igualando en importancia las vías de intervención 
ascendentes y las descendentes. Mediante la inclusión del cuerpo como una vía de 
intervención en el reprocesamiento de la situación traumática, los terapeutas consiguen 
actuar directamente sobre las sensaciones y los movimientos corporales, modificando 
con ello los síntomas de los pacientes y facilitando que estos puedan cambiar sus 




La repercusión del embodiment en la investigación científica y el interés 
suscitado en autores de diferentes disciplinas ha aumentado de forma exponencial en los 
últimos diez años, especialmente en áreas como la neurociencia cognitiva, neurociencia 
social, la psicología cognitiva, social y evolutiva, la robótica o la psicolingüística 
(Barsalou, 2010). Aunque no exento de críticas (p.ej., Adams, 2011), el embodiment ha 
sido acogido con entusiasmo por algunos investigadores, hasta tal punto que algunos se 
han aventurado a afirmar que el embodiment puede ser un marco apropiado que permita 
la unificación de la ciencia psicológica (p.ej., Schubert y Semin, 2009) 
En nuestra opinión, y de acuerdo con la evidencia recogida en este repaso 
general del estado de la cuestión, el embodiment puede ser un enfoque útil para 
enriquecer el conocimiento que se tiene actualmente de los procesos psicológicos. Los 
conceptos, ideas y resultados experimentales del embodiment han tenido un notable 
impacto en la psicología moderna. Uno de las principales contribuciones de este 
enfoque ha sido el de redirigir la atención de los investigadores hacia la influencia que 
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los estados corporales pueden tener en procesos cognitivos y emocionales. Algunos de 
los resultados anteriormente mencionados tienen implicaciones potenciales, tanto 
teóricas como prácticas, pero no cabe duda de que es necesario llevar a cabo más 
investigaciones sobre las posibles influencias de los estados corporales en procesos 
mentales que estén involucrados o sean al menos parcialmente responsables del 
desarrollo y mantenimiento de trastornos psicológicos. Consideramos que existe una 
carencia de estudios en este ámbito y por lo tanto puede resultar de enorme interés tanto 
para la psicología experimental como para la clínica el tratar de revelar qué influencias 
pueden tener los estados corporales en los procesos psicológicos relacionados con los 
trastornos mentales. Además, consideramos que estudios de este tipo pueden ayudar a 
tender puentes entre ambas disciplinas, haciendo que los resultados de la investigación 
básica sean más fáciles de trasladar a la práctica clínica. A pesar de que puede ser 
plausible sugerir que los estados corporales pueden influir el curso de un determinado 
trastorno, para mantener esta hipótesis es necesario encontrar evidencia que la soporte. 
Por lo tanto, el objetivo del presente trabajo es explorar si algunos de los movimientos 
que la literatura señala que pueden afectar a procesos cognitivos o afectivos, pueden 
influir en procesos psicológicos que se considera que están involucrados en el 
mantenimiento de trastornos psicológicos. 
Para ello, buscamos en primer lugar un proceso psicológico que reuniese tres 
requisitos importantes. En primer lugar, el proceso diana, o una disfunción del mismo, 
debía haber sido relacionado en estudios anteriores con el inicio o el mantenimiento de 
uno o más trastornos psicológicos. En segundo lugar, como uno de los requisitos del 
presente trabajo es que la contribución al área de conocimiento debe ser novedosa y 
original, consideramos que se debía cumplir la condición de que la influencia de los 
estados corporales en el proceso diana hubiera recibido hasta el momento poca o 
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ninguna atención por parte de los investigadores. Finalmente, como existen varios 
procesos psicológicos que podrían cumplir ambas condiciones, tuvimos en cuenta la 
experiencia previa de nuestro grupo de investigación a la hora de seleccionar el proceso 
diana, considerando que nuestra experiencia previa podía resultar útil para avanzar un 
paso más en una línea de investigación ya existente. Por lo tanto, teniendo en cuenta  y 
estos tres pre-requisitos, consideramos que el proceso de regulación anímica era un 
candidato idóneo para el objetivo del presente trabajo. En consecuencia, en las 
secciones de este trabajo que vienen a continuación vamos a proporcionar información 
general sobre la regulación emocional, así como la descripción de tres estudios 
realizados para explorar experimentalmente la influencia de los estados corporales en la 
regulación del estado de ánimo.  
 
Estudio 2.1 
 Este estudio es el primero de una serie de tres experimentos encaminados a 
comprobar si determinados movimientos corporales pudieran jugar un papel en la 
regulación anímica individuos a los que previamente se les indujo un estado de ánimo 
triste. En este primer experimento tomamos como referencia los resultados de los 
estudios de Tom, Petersen, Lau, Burton y Cook (1991) Briñol y Petty (2003), Forster y 
Strack (1996) o Wells y Petty (1980) que previamente habían documentado la influencia 
de movimientos verticales o laterales de la cabeza (i.e., asentir o denegar) en otros 
procesos psicológicos como la formación de preferencias, la seguridad en las creencias 
propias y la facilitación de la persuasión, o la memoria. Ningún estudio previo había 
tratado de comprobar si los movimientos de cabeza, que en nuestra cultura tienen una 
clara implicación positiva (verticales) o negativa (horizontales) podían afectar a un 
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proceso tan estrechamente relacionado con los trastornos psicológicos como es la 
regulación emocional. Esta relación cuenta con evidencia robusta que la soporta, por 
ejemplo Hervás y Vázquez (2013) afirman que el mal funcionamiento de los 
mecanismos de regulación del estado de ánimo puede jugar un papel importante en el 
inicio de la depresión así como puede contribuir al mantenimiento de los síntomas 
depresivos a lo largo del tiempo. Algunos estudios han comprobado que las personas 
que permanecen un mayor intervalo de tiempo en un estado de ánimo triste tras una 
inducción tienen más probabilidades de desarrollar síntomas depresivos con el tiempo 
(Beevers y Carver, 2003). Otros, han documentado que pacientes con depresión 
permanecen durante más tiempo en un estado de ánimo triste ante los sucesos negativos 
cotidianos (Peeters, Nicolson, Delespaul, y deVries, 2003) o tras una inducción de 
estado de ánimo triste (Gilboa y Gotlib, 1997). Incluso los niveles de disforia en 
personas sin trastornos anímicos se relacionan con una incapacidad para mantener 
estados de ánimo positivos (McMakin, Santiago, y Shirk, 2009) o para regular los 
negativos (p.ej., Williams, Fernández-Berrocal, Extremera, Ramos, & Joiner, 2004). 
En el presente estudio, hemos explorado si los movimientos de la cabeza, 
mencionados en la literatura como componentes somáticos de las emociones, pueden 
modular la influencia de la disforia en la efectividad de las estrategias de regulación 
emocional. En concreto, tras una inducción de estado de ánimo triste, los participantes 
fueron aleatoriamente asignados a una de las dos condiciones experimentales. En una de 
las condiciones, los participantes ejecutaron movimientos verticales de la cabeza, 
mientras que en la otra ejecutaron movimientos laterales. Se tomaron medidas de los 
niveles de disforia y ansiedad al comienzo del experimento, así como del estado de 




Dos son las hipótesis que planteamos en el presente estudio. En primer lugar 
esperamos que, después de la inducción de estado de ánimo triste, aquellos participantes 
que habían referido unos niveles de disforia más elevados al inicio del experimento 
muestren peor capacidad de regulación que los participantes con bajos niveles de 
disforia. La segunda hipótesis que se planteó es que aquellos participantes que 
ejecutaran movimientos verticales de cabeza verían facilitada su capacidad de regular su 
estado de ánimo en mayor medida que aquéllos que hubieran ejecutado movimientos 
laterales de cabeza. 
Método 
Participantes.  
42 estudiantes universitarios de primeros cursos de la licenciatura en psicología 
(24% hombres, M = 21.4 años). 
Estímulos y aparatos. 
Para la inducción de estado de ánimo negativo se empleó un procedimiento 
idéntico al utilizado por Hervás y Vázquez (2013), consistente en la presentación de una 
pieza musical de Profokiev (Rusia bajo el yugo mongol) y tres escenas negativas que el 
participante debía imaginar. 
Para ayudar a la regulación, se seleccionó una muestra de 25 fotografías del 
sistema internacional de imágenes afectivas (IAPS, por sus siglas en inglés; Lang, 
Bradley, y Cuthbert, 2008) que contaban con valencia positiva (M = 7.4 en una escala 
que va de 0 a 10) y un nivel de activación (arousal) medio (M = 4.9 en una escala que 
va de 0 a 10). 
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Cuatro referencias visuales consistentes en un cuadrado verde (23 x 23 mm) en 
el centro de un rectángulo amarillo (38 x 51mm) fueron emplazados en la sala 
experimental. Dos enfrente del participante, a unas alturas aproximadas de 1.80 m y 0.8 
m respectivamente, y las otras dos a ambos lados del participante, a una altura de 1.2 m. 
Medidas.  
Se tomaron medidas del estado de ánimo positive y depresivo (EVEA; Sanz, 
2001), disforia (Beck Depression Inventory-II; BDI-II; Beck, Steer y Brown, 1996) y 
ansiedad (Beck Anxiety Inventory; BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown y Steer, 1988). Los 
indices de consistencia interna de las escalas en el presente estudio fueron de α = .91, α 
= .88, α = .83 y α = .93, respectivamente.  
Diseño y procedimiento.  
Se utilizó un diseño inter-sujeto, en el que se manipuló el movimiento de la 
cabeza como variable independiente y se utilizó como variable dependiente la eficacia 
en la regulación emocional, entendida como el cambio en el estado de ánimo. La Figura 
1 esquematiza el diseño del experimento y de un ensayo experimental. Una vez 
completados los cuestionarios, los participantes pasaron por la tarea de inducción de 
estado de ánimo triste y acto seguido fueron aleatoriamente asignados a una de las dos 
condiciones experimentales. En las instrucciones de la tarea experimental se solicitó a 
los participantes que miraran alternativamente dos veces a las referencias visuales 
situadas frente a ellos arriba y abajo (i.e., condición de asentimiento) o a las situadas a 
su derecha e izquierda (i.e., condición de denegación) cada vez que una cruz de fijación 
“+” apareciese en el centro de la pantalla. En ambas condiciones se instruyó a los 
participantes a que mirasen la imagen que aparecería en la pantalla hasta que apareciese 
la cruz de fijación. El experimento se presentó en condiciones de ciego experimental, a 
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los participantes se les informó de que el estudio pretendía examinar cómo influía 
dirigir la atención hacia zonas periféricas en la memoria visual. Con posterioridad se 
preguntó a los participantes por cuáles eran, en su opinión, los objetivos del estudio y se 
comprobó que ninguno fue capaz de adivinar los objetivos del mismo.  
El bloque experimental consistía en 50 ensayos. En cada ensayo, una pantalla 
vacía (1,500 ms) era seguida por una cruz de fijación (4,000 ms), seguida por una de las 
imágenes afectivas (3,500 ms) y terminando con otra pantalla vacía (2,500 ms). 
 Finalmente, los participantes pasaron por una inducción de estado de ánimo 
positivo y se les informó del objetivo del experimento a modo de debriefing. 
Análisis de datos.  
Los análisis de datos se llevaron a cabo utilizando el paquete estadístico SPSS 
(Chicago, Illinois). 
Se llevaron a cabo una serie de pruebas de t de medidas independientes para la 
comparación de medias para comprobar que ambos grupos no diferían 
significativamente en las medidas iniciales.  Del mismo modo, se utilizó una prueba de t 
de medidas relacionadas, comparando las puntuaciones en el EVEA antes y después de 
la inducción del estado de ánimo para corroborar la eficacia de la misma. 
Los cambios en las puntuaciones del EVEA antes y después de la tarea 
experimental se utilizaron como variable dependiente en el modelo de regresión. Para 
evitar el problema común a las comparaciones entre el pre y el post de la variabilidad en 
las puntuaciones iniciales, se construyeron indicadores residuales de cambio en el 
EVEA. Para ello se introdujo en un modelo de regresión simple las puntuaciones en la 
post-inducción como variables predictoras y las puntuaciones tras la tarea experimental 
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como variables criterio. Los tres indicadores residuales de cambio en el estado de ánimo 
(positivo, depresivo y total (positivo - depresivo)) fueron utilizados como variable 
dependiente en los análisis de regresión múltiple.  
Posteriormente, siguiendo los principios estándar para el análisis de moderación 
de Baron y Kenny (1986), se centró la variable predictora continua (disforia) y se 
codificó la variable categórica en formato binario (0 = asentir; 1 = denegar). Acto 
seguido se introdujeron las variables en un modelo polietápico de regresión lineal. 
Finalmente se llevaron a cabo análisis de pendientes simples. Estos análisis y sus 
gráficos correspondientes son recomendados para comprender mejor la interacción entre 
una variable continua y otra categórica en los análisis de moderación  (e.g., Frazier y 
cols. 2004) 
Resultados 
 Al comienzo del estudio, los participantes de ambas condiciones experimentales 
no difirieron entre sí en ninguna de las variables observadas (BDI-II, BAI, estado de 
ánimo positivo, negativo y total, todas las p> .11). 
 La inducción de estado de ánimo triste produjo un descenso significativo de las 
puntuaciones en ánimo positivo (MT1-T2 = -8.90, p<.001) y total (M T1-T2 = -16.57, 
p<.001), así como un incremento significativo en las puntuaciones de ánimo depresivo 
(M T1-T2 = 7.56, p<.001). 
 Los resultados de los análisis de regresión se presentan en la Tabla 1. 
Tabla 1 Análisis polietápico de regresión sobre los cambios en estado de ánimo 
positivo, negativo y total tras la tarea experimental (T3).  
  β t ΔR2 





 Paso 1   .10* 
 Disforia .32 2.10*  
     
 Paso 2   .00 
 Disforia .31 2.04*  
 Movimiento -.05 -.32  
     
 Paso 3   .07† 
 Disforia .11 .59  
 Movimiento -.04 -.29  
 Disforia*Movimiento .33 1.78†  
Ánimo 
Positivo (T3) 
    
 Paso 1   .01 
 Disforia -.11 -.68  
     
 Paso 2   .01 
 Disforia -.12 -.73  
 Movimiento -.10 -.62  
     
 Paso 3   .13* 
 Disforia .16 .82  
 Movimiento -.11 -.72  
 Disforia*Movimiento -.45 -2.36*  
Ánimo Total 
(T3) 
    
 Paso 1   .10* 
 Disforia -.31 -2.05*  
     
 Paso 2   .00 
 Disforia -.31 -2.02*  
 Movimiento -.002 -.01  
     
 Paso 3   .13* 
 Disforia -.04 -.20  
 Movimiento -.01 -.08  
 Disforia*Movimiento -.45 -2.48*  
 * p < .05; † p < .10 
  Como se puede observar en la Tabla 1, la disforia predijo significativamente los 
cambios en el estado de ánimo depresivo y total, pero no en el estado de ánimo positivo. 
Todavía más importante,  la interacción entre la disforia y el movimiento fue el único 
predictor significativo de cambio en el estado de ánimo positivo y total, y 
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marginalmente significativo del cambio en estado de ánimo depresivo. Este resultado 
nos indica que el tipo de movimiento ejecutado ejerció como moderador de la influencia 
de los niveles de disforia en la capacidad de regulación emocional.  
 Los análisis de pendientes simples nos aclaran esta moderación. Entro los 
participantes que asintieron, el nivel de disforia no apareció como predictor significativo 
de cambios en el estado de ánimo negativo (β=.14, p=.54), positivo (β=.17, p=.47), o 
total (β=-.04, p=.87), mientras que entre aquéllos que denegaron con la cabeza, la 
disforia fue un predictor significativo de cambios en estado de ánimo negativo (β=.50, 
p=.02), positivo (β=-.52, p=.02), y total (β=-.69, p<.001). Como se había hipotetizado, 
los movimientos de cabeza moderaron la influencia de la disforia en la regulación 
emocional. Mientras que entre los participantes que denegaron, altos niveles de disforia 
se asociaron con peor estado de ánimo tras la tarea experimental, no sucedió así entre 
aquéllos que asintieron con la cabeza.   
Discusión 
En congruencia con otros estudios y confirmando la primera hipótesis de éste, 
hemos encontrado que el nivel de disforia se asocia con dificultades en la regulación del 
estado anímico. En general, los participantes con un nivel de disforia mayor mostraron 
menor capacidad de regulación del estado de ánimo que los participantes con un nivel 
de disforia menor. Todavía más importante, los movimientos de la cabeza moderaron 
esta relación. Este resultado confirma nuestra segunda hipótesis. Concretamente, la 
asociación entre niveles de disforia y regulación emocional solo se observó en aquellos 
participantes que denegaron con la cabeza. El acto de asentir parece que contrarresta el 
efecto de la disforia en la regulación anímica, mejorando la capacidad regulatoria de los 
participantes con niveles elevados de disforia.  
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En este estudio se confirma que algunos movimientos corporales pueden afectar a 
procesos de orden superior implicados en el desarrollo y mantenimiento de trastornos 
psicológicos, como es la regulación emocional. Estos resultados son pioneros en la 
aplicación de los postulados del embodiment en ámbitos más cercanos a la psicología 
clínica. De consolidarse esta línea de investigación en población clínica, podría servir 
para enriquecer las aproximaciones terapéuticas, mediante la inclusión de componentes 
corporales y motores en la terapia con el objetivo de modificar la información 
proprioceptiva, pudiendo con ello conseguir terapias más completas y efectivas.  
  
Estudio 2.2 
En el Estudio 1 se ha recogido la evidencia existente acerca de la influencia que 
tienen algunos movimientos, posturas y gestos corporales en distintos procesos 
emocionales y cognitivos. En el Estudio 2.1 se ha descrito la importancia de la 
regulación emocional en relación con el desarrollo y mantenimiento de algunas 
patologías, además de cómo los movimientos de cabeza pueden estar ejerciendo un 
papel en el proceso regulatorio, especialmente cuando los participantes presentan 
niveles altos de disforia. El objetivo del presente estudio es el de ampliar el espectro de 
movimientos que puedan afectar a la regulación del estado de ánimo. Como hemos visto 
anteriormente, la literatura del embodiment está llena de ejemplos de movimientos y 
posturas con una influencia en procesos superiores (p.ej., Niedenthal, Barsalou, 
Winkielman, y Krauth-Gruber, 2005). Al margen de los gestos faciales, uno de los 
movimientos más estudiados es el de flexión y extensión del brazo. En concreto, estos 
movimientos de flexion y extension han sido comúnmente asociados con actitudes de 
aproximación y rechazo hacia distintos objetos, ya que solemos flexionar el brazo para 
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atraer objetos de nuestro interés, mientras que solemos extenderlo para apartar objetos 
que nos desagradan. Por ejemplo, en el estudio de Cacioppo, Priester y Bernston (1993) 
los participantes evaluaron símbolos Chinos mientras mantenían activos bien los 
músculos flexores o bien los extensores del brazo. Los participantes evaluaron los 
símbolos como más positivos cuando tenían los músculos flexores activados, que 
cuando tenían los músculos extensores activados, lo que fue interpretado por los autores 
como una influencia de las señales corporales asociadas con aproximación y rechazo en 
la evaluación de caracteres inicialmente neutros. En un estudio complementario al 
anterior, Chen y Bargh (1999) comprobaron que la relación inversa también se cumplía. 
Es decir, estos autores observaron que a los participantes de su estudio les era más 
sencillo flexionar el brazo tras atender a estímulos positivos y extenderlos tras observar 
imágenes negativas que al revés. Pero aún más relevante para el presente trabajo son los 
resultados del estudio que llevaron a cabo Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker y Lindenmeyer 
(2011). En este estudio, los movimientos de flexión y extensión del brazo fueron 
empleados como parte de un modulo de modificación de sesgos cognitivos (MacLeod, 
Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, y Holker, 2002) destinado a modificar el sesgo 
positivo que los pacientes con alcoholismo presentaban hacia bebidas alcohólicas. En el 
estudio, los participantes fueron aleatoriamente asignados bien a un grupo experimental 
en el que se les instruyó para que empujaran una palanca en respuesta a imágenes de 
bebidas alcohólicas y a que tiraran de la palanca ante imágenes de bebidas no 
alcohólicas, bien a un grupo control en el que no se les dieron instrucciones o recibieron 
un entrenamiento ficticio. Los autores observaron que los participantes en la condición 
experimental mostraron un cambio en su sesgo hacia el alcohol, que pasó de una leve 
atracción a un moderado rechazo; mientras que los participantes en la condición de 
control no mostraron cambios en sus tendencias hacia el alcohol. En un seguimiento 
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posterior un año después de terminar el tratamiento, los investigadores descubrieron que 
la tasa de recaída de los pacientes en la condición experimental era más baja (46%) que 
los de la condición de control (59%). 
Por lo tanto, como la influencia de los movimientos de flexión y extensión del 
brazo en otros procesos cognitivos se encuentra bien documentada en la literatura y 
además hay estudios que indican que su aplicación en intervenciones clínicas puede ser 
de utilidad para mejorar el resultado de las mismas, se ha considerado que estos 
movimientos son un candidato perfecto para tratar de extender los resultados hallados 
en el Estudio 2.1. En este caso, las hipótesis de este estudio son idénticas a las del 
anterior. Esto es, esperamos que los niveles de disforia afecten a la capacidad de 
regulación del estado de ánimo y, además, que aquellos participantes que flexionen el 
brazo vean facilitada su capacidad de regular el estado de ánimo en mayor medida que 
aquéllos que extiendan su brazo. 
Método 
Participantes.  
40 estudiantes de psicología (35 women, 5 men) con una edad media de 22.3 
años. 
Estímulos y aparatos.  
Tanto la inducción de estado de ánimo como las imágenes positivas de la tarea 
experimental fueron idénticas a las del estudio anterior.  Una palanca con tres 
posiciones, idéntica a la utilizada en el estudio de Ulrich, Eikmeier, de la Vega, Ruiz 
Fernández, Alex-Ruf, y Maienborn (2012) fue empleada para que los participantes 




Las medidas recogidas fueron las mismas que las del estudio anterior. 
Procedimiento y diseño. 
El diseño y el procedimiento fueron idénticos a los del estudio anterior, con la 
salvedad de las instrucciones que se dio a los participantes. A los participantes en la 
condición de extensión (flexión) se les instruyó a que empujaran (tiraran de) la palanca 
hasta el extremo distal (proximal) del aparato cuando apareciese una cruz en la pantalla 
y la mantuvieran en esa posición hasta que desapareciese la imagen que aparecería en la 
pantalla. Una vez la imagen hubiera desaparecido, los participantes debían retornar la 
palanca al centro del aparato. 
Análisis estadísticos. 
Todos los análisis del Estudio 2.2 son análogos a los que se llevaron a cabo para 
el Estudio 2.1. 
Resultados 
Los participantes de ambas condiciones no difirieron al comienzo del estudio en 
ninguna de las variables recogidas (BDI-II, BAI, EVEA positivo, negativo y total, todas 
las p> .31). 
La inducción de estado de ánimo triste produjo un descenso significativo de las 
puntuaciones en ánimo positivo (MT1-T2 = -10.05, p<.001) y total (M T1-T2 = -20.27, 
p<.001), así como un incremento significativo en las puntuaciones de ánimo depresivo 
(M T1-T2 = 10.22, p<.001). 
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Los análisis de regresión arrojaron resultados que contrastan con los obtenidos 
en el Estudio 2.1. En primer lugar, no se pudo confirmar la hipótesis de que los niveles 
de disforia afectasen a la regulación emocional, ya que los niveles de disforia no 
predijeron cambios en el ánimo depresivo (β=.18, p=.26) y tan solo predijeron de forma 
marginalmente significativa cambios en el ánimo positivo (β= -.28, p=.08) y total (β=.-
29, p=.07), si bien es cierto que en la dirección adecuada. El análisis se completó 
igualmente, ya que cabía la posibilidad de que la ausencia de significación se debiese a 
una interacción entre el tipo de movimiento y el nivel de disforia. Los resultados de los 
análisis de moderación se muestran en la Tabla 2. Como se puede observar, ni el nivel 
de disforia, ni el tipo de movimiento ni la interacción entre ambas resultó ser un 
predictor significativo de la capacidad de regulación anímica. La segunda hipótesis del 
presente estudio, que los movimientos de flexión y extensión del brazo pudieran 
moderar la influencia de los estados disfóricos en la regulación emocional no pudo ser 
confirmada.  
Tabla 2. Análisis polietápico de regresión sobre los cambios en estado de ánimo 
positivo, negativo y total tras la tarea experimental (T3). 




    
 Paso 1   .03 
 Disforia .18 1.16  
     
 Paso 2   .04 
 Disforia .18 1.15  
 Movimiento -.19 -1.21  
     
 Paso 3   .00 
 Disforia .24 1.14  
 Movimiento -.11 -.41  
 Disforia*Movimiento -.12 -.41  
Ánimo 
Positivo (T3) 
    
 Paso 1   .08† 
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 Disforia -.28 -1.81†  
     
 Paso 2   .00 
 Disforia -.28 -1.78†  
 Movimiento .03   .20  
     
 Paso 3   .01 
 Disforia -.19 -.93  
 Movimiento .17 .64  
 Disforia*Movimiento -.19 -.65  
Ánimo Total 
(T3) 
    
 Paso 1   .08† 
 Disforia -.29 -1.86†  
     
 Paso 2   .01 
 Disforia -.29 -1.85†  
 Movimiento .12   .75  
     
 Paso 3   .00 
 Disforia -.27 -1.30  
 Movimiento .15 .56  
 Disforia*Movimiento -.04 -.13  
† p < .10 
 
Discusión 
 El Estudio 2.2 tenía como objetivo extender los resultados del estudio anterior a 
otro tipo de movimientos corporales, en este caso, movimientos de flexión y extensión 
del brazo. Los resultados obtenidos no han permitido confirmar las hipótesis propuestas 
al inicio del estudio. A pesar de haber encontrado una tendencia, los niveles de disforia 
al inicio del estudio no predijeron significativamente la capacidad de regulación de los 
participantes. La no significancia de este resultado puede ser debida a diferencias en la 
composición de la muestra. Si en el Estudio 2.1 cerca de la mitad de los participantes 
(47,6%) obtuvieron puntuaciones iguales o mayores a 10, en el Estudio 2.2, solo un 
22,5% obtuvieron puntuaciones similares. Los individuos disfóricos parecen estar 
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infrarrepresentados en este último estudio y este hecho puede explicar que los resultados 
no alcanzaran la significación estadística. 
 La segunda hipótesis no se vio respaldada por los resultados. Los movimientos 
de flexión y extensión del brazo no desempeñaron ningún papel en la regulación 
emocional de los participantes bajo las condiciones experimentales descritas. Una 
posible explicación para la falta de resultados es que la asociación flexión-aproximación 
y extensión-rechazo es culturalmente dependiente, dándose en poblaciones anglosajonas 
pero no en población española. Hasta donde sabemos, no existe un estudio que haya 
replicado los resultados de, por ejemplo, Cacioppo y cols. (1993) con muestra española. 
Además, algunos estudios sugieren que ciertos elementos contextuales, como la 
valencia del estímulo al que se reacciona,  pueden afectar al sentido que tiene un 
movimiento de flexión y extensión del brazo (p.ej., Centerbar y Clore, 2006). En este 
caso, el hecho de solo haber utilizado estímulos positivos, puede haber afectado a la 
forma en que el movimiento repercute en otros procesos. Otra posible explicación es 
que los movimientos de cabeza del Estudio 2.1 tengan una asociación mucho más 
unívoca con la aceptación y el rechazo que los movimientos del brazo del Estudio 2.2. 
En resumen, en el estudio 2.2 se encontró una tendencia en la dirección 
pronosticada indicando que los niveles de disforia al inicio del experimento predecían 
de forma marginalmente significativa la capacidad regulatoria de los participantes. Sin 
embargo, no se encontró evidencia que apoyase la hipótesis de que los movimientos del 





Si en el Estudio 2.2 se pretendió ampliar el catálogo de movimientos que 
pudieran estar implicados en la regulación emocional, sustituyendo los movimientos de 
cabeza por movimientos de flexión y extensión del brazo, el presente estudio tiene como 
objetivo estudiar los mecanismos a través de los cuáles los movimientos de cabeza 
influyen en la regulación emocional.  
Si bien la mayoría de la literatura previa sobre la influencia de los movimientos 
de cabeza en procesos psicológicos provienen del ámbito de la persuasión (p.ej., Briñol 
y Petty, 2003; 2007; Briñol, Petty, y Wagner, 2011; Förster, 2004; Förster y Strack, 
1996; Neumann y Strack, 2000; Tom, Petersen, Lau, Burton, y Cook, 1991; Wells y 
Petty, 1980), han sido propuestos varios mecanismos a través de los cuáles se produce 
dicha influencia. Algunos autores proponen un mecanismo directo de influencia de los 
movimientos de cabeza en los cambios de actitud, pudiendo servir los movimientos 
como una clave para el cambio (Tom et al., 1991). Otros autores proponen un 
mecanismo más indirecto para explicar esta influencia. Por ejemplo, Wells y Petty 
(1980) proponen que los movimientos verticales (laterales) de la cabeza facilitan la 
aparición de pensamientos positivos (negativos) y dificultan la aparición de 
pensamientos negativos (positivos). Briñol y Petty (2007), por su parte, proponen cinco 
posibles mecanismos, algunos de ellos indirectos, otros más directos, mediante los 
cuales los movimientos de cabeza pueden influir en el cambio de actitud. Aunque los 
resultados de la investigación en persuasión no puedan ser directamente extrapolables a 
la investigación en regulación emocional, sí es plausible el pensar que algunas de las 
vías de influencia mediante las que los movimientos de cabeza afectan a la persuasión, 
puedan ser lo suficientemente amplias como para tener repercusión en otros procesos 
psicológicos como la regulación emocional. 
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En el estudio 2.1 se halló una influencia indirecta de los movimientos de cabeza 
en la regulación emocional. En concreto, los movimientos de cabeza moderaron la 
relación entre el nivel de disforia y la capacidad de los participantes de regular las 
emociones. Sin embargo, en el estudio 2.1 no se halló evidencia a favor de una 
influencia directa de los movimientos de cabeza en la regulación emocional. Los 
resultados de algunos estudios sugieren que la variación de algunos de los parámetros 
del experimento (p.ej., la valencia de la información presentada) pueden modular la 
influencia que ciertos estados corporales tienen sobre las actitudes de los individuos 
(p.ej., Briñol y Petty, 2003; Centerbar y Clore, 2006). En el estudio 2.1 se presentaron 
imágenes positivas a los participantes mientras ejecutaban los movimientos de cabeza. 
Bajo estas condiciones, se encontró una influencia indirecta, que no directa, de los 
movimientos de cabeza en la regulación emocional. No obstante, los resultados de 
varios estudios previos indican que prestar atención a información positiva mejora la 
capacidad de los individuos de regular sus estados de ánimo (p.ej. Fredrickson y 
Levenson, 1998; Sánchez, Joormann, Marker, LeMoult, y Vázquez, 2013). Por lo tanto, 
al mejorar la capacidad regulatoria de los sujetos debido a la presencia de estímulos de 
valencia positiva, es posible que se haya producido un efecto techo que haya 
enmascarado una posible influencia directa de los movimientos de cabeza en la 
regulación emocional. 
El objetivo del presente estudio es el de tratar de revelar si los movimientos de 
cabeza pueden, bajo otras circunstancias, tener una influencia directa sobre la 
regulación emocional. Para ello, en este estudio se sustituyeron las imágenes positivas 
de los estudios 2.1 y 2.2 por imágenes de caras neutrales extraidas de la base de datos 
FACES (Ebner, Riediger, y Lindenberger, 2010). 
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Además, se introdujeron dos cambios con respecto a los estudios anteriores. En 
primer lugar, al observarse que el número de sujetos disfóricos afectaba a la 
significación estadística de los contrastes, se aumentó el tamaño muestral en un 30% 
respecto a los estudios anteriores (N = 52). En segundo lugar, se recogieron medidas 
adicionales de cambio emocional mediante el uso de la escala de afecto positivo y 
negativo (PANAS; Positive and Negative Affect Scales; Watson, Clark, y Tellegen, 
1988). 
La primera hipótesis del estudio coincide con la de estudios anteriores. Esto es, 
esperamos que los niveles de disforia de los participantes afecten a su capacidad de 
regular el estado anímico. La segunda hipótesis que planteamos es que las nuevas 
condiciones experimentales facilitarán la aparición de una influencia directa de los 
movimientos corporales en la capacidad de regulación emocional de los participantes. 
Por último, esperamos hallar una interacción entre los niveles de disforia y el 




52 estudiantes de psicología (40 mujeres, 12 hombres) con una edad media de 
20,77 años. Un participante (0,5%) no completó el estudio y fue excluido y otros tres 
(1,5%) adivinaron el propósito del experimento y fueron igualmente excluidos de los 
análisis. Los análisis se hicieron sobre los 48 casos válidos. 
Estímulos y aparatos.  
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La inducción de estado de ánimo fue idéntica a la de los estudios anteriores.  En 
lugar de las 25 imágenes positivas del IAPS, se emplearon en la tarea experimental 25 
imágenes de caras neutrales de la base de datos FACES (Ebner, Riediger, y 
Lindenberger, 2010). Las referencias visuales fueron las mismas que las utilizadas en el 
Estudio 2.1. 
Medidas. 
Las medidas recogidas fueron las mismas que las de los estudios anteriores, 
añadiendo la medida de las escalas de afecto positivo y negativo (PANAS; Positive and 
Negative Affect Scales; Watson, Clark, y Tellegen, 1988). La PANAS es una escala que 
contiene 20 ítems, divididos en dos subescalas. Una de ellas con 10 ítems referentes a 
emociones positivas (p.ej. Ilusionado, Inspirado) y la otra con 10 de emociones 
negativas (p.ej., Avergonzado, Irritable), que el sujeto debe contestar en qué medida 
siente en ese mismo momento de acuerdo a una escala tipo likert de 5 puntos, de “Muy 
ligeramente o nada” a “Mucho”. 
Procedimiento y diseño. 
El diseño y el procedimiento fueron idénticos a los del Estudio 2.1, con la 
salvedad antes mencionada de las imágenes de la tarea experimental.  
Análisis estadísticos. 





Los participantes de ambas condiciones no difirieron al comienzo del estudio en 
ninguna de las variables recogidas (BDI-II, BAI, EVEA negativo y total, y PANAS 
todas las p> .23), salvo en la puntuación en la subescala positiva del EVEA que fue 
significativamente mayor [t(46)= 2,38; p= .02] en los participantes del grupo de 
movimientos verticales (27.52) que en el de movimientos horizontales (22.52).  
La inducción de estado de ánimo triste produjo un descenso significativo de las 
puntuaciones en afecto positivo [MT1-T2 = -7.46; t(46)= 6.49; p<.001], estado de ánimo 
positivo [MT1-T2 = -10.88; t(46)= 9.76;  p<.001] y total [M T1-T2 = -20.94; t(46)= 9.97;  
p<.001], así como un incremento significativo en las puntuaciones de afecto negativo 
[M T1-T2 = 6.46; t(46)= -5.91; p<.001] y ánimo depresivo [M T1-T2 = 10.06; t(46)= -7.65; 
p<.001]. 
Los resultados obtenidos en los análisis de regresión, recogidos en la Tabla 3, 
contrastan con los hallados en el Estudio 2.1. En primer lugar, no se pudo confirmar la 
hipótesis de que los niveles de disforia afectasen a la regulación emocional, ya que los 
niveles de disforia, entendidos como la puntuación en el BDI-II al inicio del 
experimento, no predijeron cambios ni en el afecto ni en el estado de ánimo (Todas las β 
entre .14 y -.08, con p> .33 en todos los casos). El movimiento realizado tampoco 
mostró tener una influencia en el cambio afectivo ni en el del estado anímico (ps> .19). 
Y tampoco se encontró una interacción significativa entre el movimiento y el nivel de 
disforia (ps > .69), salvo en el caso del afecto negativo, donde apareció una interacción 
marginalmente significativa [t(46)= -1,75, p= .09]. Al no encontrarse efecto de 
moderación, no se realizaron los análisis de pendientes.  
Tabla 3. Análisis polietápico de regresión sobre los cambios en afecto positivo y 
negativo, y estado de ánimo positivo, negativo y total tras la tarea experimental (T3). 






    
 Paso 1   .02 
 Disforia .14 .97  
      
 Paso 2   .02 
 Disforia .15 1.01  
 Movimiento -.15 -1.04  
     
 Paso 3   .00 
 Disforia .13 .63  
 Movimiento -.15 -1.03  
 Disforia*Movimiento .02 .12  
Ánimo 
Positivo (T3) 
    
 Paso 1   .00 
 Disforia -.01 -.08  
      
 Paso 2   .04 
 Disforia -.01 -.04  
 Movimiento -.20 -1.33  
     
 Paso 3   .004 
 Disforia .05 .26  
 Movimiento -.20 -1.32  
 Disforia*Movimiento -.08 -.41  
Ánimo Total 
(T3) 
    
 Paso 1   .01 
 Disforia -.10 -.65  
     
 Paso 2   .002 
 Disforia -.09 -.63  
 Movimiento -.04 -.27  
     
 Paso 3   .003 
 Disforia -.04 -.19  
 Movimiento -.04 -.27  




    
 Paso 1   .005 
 Disforia .07 .46  
     
 Paso 2   .004 
 Disforia .07 .47  
 Movimiento -.06 -.41  
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 Paso 3   .07† 
 Disforia .32 1.57  
 Movimiento -.06 -.41  
 Disforia*Movimiento -.36 -1.75†  
Afecto 
Positivo (T3) 
    
 Paso 1   .006 
 Disforia -.08 -.54  
     
 Paso 2   .003 
 Disforia -.08 -.55  
 Movimiento .05 .35  
     
 Paso 3   .002 
 Disforia -.04 -,18  
 Movimiento .05 ,35  
 Disforia*Movimiento -.06 -,30  
† p < .10 
 
Discusión 
En el Estudio 3 no se halló evidencia en favor de la hipótesis que sostenía que 
los niveles de disforia afectarían a la capacidad de regulación emocional y del estado de 
ánimo de los participantes. En presencia de imágenes neutrales, los participantes 
disfóricos se recuperaron de la inducción de estado de ánimo triste tan bien como los no 
disfóricos. Este hallazgo resulta muy interesante, ya que parece que la influencia que los 
síntomas de disforia tienen sobre la regulación anímica está restringida al efecto 
incremental que se da cuando se presenta información positiva. Esto sugiere que los 
mecanismos responsables de la recuperación del estado de ánimo que se activan en 
presencia de información neutral son, al menos parcialmente, diferentes de aquéllos que 
se ponen en funcionamiento ante información positiva. Además, parece que solo éstos 
últimos están afectados en individuos con niveles subclínicos de depresión.  
Tampoco se halló evidencia de que los movimientos de cabeza tuvieran una 
influencia directa sobre la regulación emocional. Junto con los resultados de los 
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experimentos 2.1 y 2.2, este resultado sugiere que los estados corporales parecen influir 
de forma indirecta, aunque no directa, en los procesos de regulación emocional.  
Por último, tampoco se halló interacción significativa entre los movimientos de 
cabeza y los niveles de disforia. Este resultado sugiere que el mecanismo a través del 
cual los estados corporales ejercen su influencia, solo parece estar activo en presencia 
de información positiva. Junto con el resultado del Estudio 2.1, este resultado sugiere la 
existencia de un vínculo entre los estados corporales y sesgos de atención o de 
interpretación (Hertel & Mathews, 2011) o con el funcionamiento del BAS (Hervás & 
Vázquez, 2013), apoyando la idea de que los estados del cuerpo tienen una influencia 
indirecta sobre los procesos de regulación anímica.  
 
Discusión general 
En los apartados anteriores se ha introducido el marco teórico del embodiment, 
la literatura científica que lo delimita, así como tres estudios encaminados a examinar la 
influencia de los movimientos corporales en la regulación anímica. En esta sección 
trataremos de resaltar las implicaciones de los resultados de los tres estudios y la 
influencia que pensamos que la perspectiva del embodiment puede tener sobre la 
psicología clínica. 
En el Estudio 2.1 se confirmaron ambas hipótesis. Por un lado, hallamos que los 
niveles iniciales de disforia se relacionaron con la capacidad de regulación anímica de 
los participantes. Aunque esta relación ya ha sido sugerida por otros autores (p.ej., 
Teasdale, 1988), aún son pocos los trabajos que han aportado evidencia en esta 
dirección (p.ej., McMakin, Santiago, y Shirk, 2009; Peeters, Nicolson, Delespaul, y 
deVries, 2003). Nuestro estudio aporta evidencia en favor de la idea que sostiene que las 
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personas con altos niveles de disforia presentan mayores dificultades a la hora de 
regular su estado anímico.  
Particularmente relevante y novedoso es el resultado hallado en el Estudio 2.1 
que sugiere que los movimientos de la cabeza pueden ejercer un papel moderador en la 
relación entre los niveles de disforia y la capacidad de regulación anímica de los 
individuos. Si bien los movimientos de cabeza no parece que afectaran a aquellos 
participantes con bajos niveles iniciales de disforia, no sucedió igual entre aquellos 
participantes que reportaron niveles iniciales de disforia más elevados. Entre los 
participantes inicialmente disfóricos, aquellos que ejecutaron movimientos verticales de 
cabeza mientras veían imágenes con valencia positiva, mostraron una capacidad 
regulatoria similar a la de los participantes no disfóricos. Por el contrario, los 
participantes disfóricos que ejecutaron un movimiento lateral de la cabeza mientras 
veían las mismas imágenes con valencia positiva no regularon su estado anímico de 
forma tan eficiente como el resto.  
 Los resultados del Estudio 2.1 son contribuciones originales y novedosas a la 
literatura ya existente. Los estudios 2.2 y 3 tuvieron como objetivo ampliar los 
resultados del estudio anterior. En concreto, el Estudio 2.2 tenía como objetivo explorar 
otros movimientos asociados con aproximación o rechazo que pudieran ejercer una 
influencia similar a la de los movimientos de cabeza en la regulación emocional. El 
Estudio 3, por su parte, tenía como objetivo esclarecer si la influencia de los 
movimientos de cabeza en la regulación emocional pudiera ser directa, si es sólo 




 En el Estudio 2.2 encontramos una tendencia en la dirección esperada, apoyando 
la hipótesis de que el nivel inicial de disforia está relacionado con la dificultad de los 
participantes de regular su estado de ánimo. El hecho de que los participantes disfóricos 
estuvieran infrarrepresentados en este estudio en comparación con el anterior puede 
explicar la disminución en la significación estadística.  
 La segunda hipótesis del estudio, sin embargo, no halló respaldo en los 
resultados obtenidos. Los movimientos del brazo no afectaron directamente ni 
moderaron la influencia de los niveles de disforia en la regulación del estado de ánimo. 
Aunque exento de significación estadística, el resultado no está exento de significado. 
Este resultado puede indicar que solo movimientos de elementos corporales centrales 
(como los movimientos de cabeza), no los periféricos (como los movimientos del brazo) 
tienen suficiente repercusión como para modificar la capacidad de regular el estado de 
ánimo. Haciendo un breve repaso a la literatura, hay muchos más estudios que 
encuentran una influencia de elementos corporales centrales en procesos emocionales 
(p.ej., Briñol y Petty, 2003; 2007; Duclos y Laird, 2001; Harmon Jones y Peterson, 
2009; Niedenthal, 2007; Wilson y Pepper, 2004), que de elementos periféricos (p.ej., 
Cacioppo y cols., 1993; Maxwell y Davidson, 2007) y entre estos últimos, los resultados 
no son siempre unívocos (e.g., Centerbar y Clore, 2006; Rottevel y Phaf, 2004). Otra 
explicación podría ser que solo aquellos estados corporales ontológicamente 
relacionados con las emociones (como los gestos faciales o la postura) o aquellos con 
una asociación unívoca con aceptación o rechazo (como los movimientos de cabeza), 
son capaces de influir, al menos de forma indirecta, en la regulación anímica. La mayor 
parte de los movimientos son actos contextualizados, y las condiciones del contexto 
pueden afectar a cómo esos movimientos afectan a las actitudes (Centerbar y Clore, 
2006). Con independencia del contexto, en nuestra cultura los movimientos verticales 
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de cabeza implican aprobación o aceptación mientras que los laterales implican 
negación o rechazo. Por el contrario, aunque los movimientos del brazo pueden estar 
relacionados con atraer hacia uno objetos deseados, como sugieren Cacioppo y 
colaboradores (1993), es fácil encontrar ejemplos en los que se flexiona el brazo con 
otra intención, como la de evitar dolor o la de protegerse de un golpe. Y lo mismo 
sucede con el movimiento de extensión del brazo, que según el contexto puede implicar 
evitación (apartar algo indeseable) o aproximación (dar un regalo). En este caso, la 
influencia del contexto es mayor que en el caso de los movimientos de cabeza. 
 Aunque en el Estudio 2.2 solo se encontrasen resultados marginalmente 
significativos en favor de la primera hipótesis, en nuestra opinión el volumen de 
investigación que esta línea puede dar es bastante extenso. Son muchos los movimientos 
y posturas cuya influencia puede estudiarse y, además de la regulación emocional, son 
muchos los procesos emocionales implicados en el mantenimiento de los trastornos en 
los que merece la pena estudiar las influencias de los movimientos y estados corporales. 
 En el Estudio 3 se sustituyeron las imágenes positivas de los estudios 2.1 y 2.2 
por estímulos neutrales, con la expectativa de que este cambio revelase, en caso de 
existir, una influencia directa de los estados corporales en la regulación anímica que 
hubiera estado oculta en los estudios previos debido a un efecto techo provocado por la 
presencia de estímulos positivos.  
 La primera hipótesis del Estudio 3 preveía encontrar una relación entre los 
niveles iniciales de disforia de los participantes y su capacidad de regular el estado de 
ánimo. En comparación con los resultados obtenidos en los estudios 2.1 y 2.2, en el 
Estudio 3 no se encontró esta relación. Este resultado indica que no hay diferencias en la 
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capacidad de regular el estado de ánimo entre sujetos disfóricos y no disfóricos cuando 
los participantes observan material neutral tras una inducción de estado de ánimo triste.  
Junto con los resultados del Estudio 2.1, estos resultados sugieren que la 
influencia que los movimientos de cabeza pueden tener en la regulación anímica no es 
directa. Tal vez se obtuviese un resultado distinto manipulando estados corporales que 
aparecen espontáneamente con los estados de ánimo tristes (como las expresiones 
faciales o la postura cargada de hombros), aunque esta es una cuestión para una futura 
investigación.  
Por tanto, el efecto encontrado de los movimientos de cabeza no se produce 
directamente sobre el estado de ánimo, sino a través de una vía alternativa que parece 
requerir de la presencia de información positiva. Una cuestión de gran interés que tal 
vez futuros estudios puedan resolver es cuál es esta vía alternativa, o de otra forma, el 
mecanismo o mecanismos psicológicos involucrados en este efecto. Nosotros 
proponemos tres posibles vías alternativas de influencia, siendo éstas no excluyentes. La 
primera, de acuerdo con los modelos multinivel de emoción y en especial con el modelo 
de Teasdale y Barnard (1993), es que existe una influencia recíproca entre los estados 
corporales y el sistema implicacional que es en parte responsable del mantenimiento de 
los síntomas depresivos (Estados corporales Sistema Implicacional Efectos 
corporales y somático-viscerales Estados corporales; Teasdale y Barnard, 1993, p. 
127). Una explicación, por tanto, podría ser que ejecutar movimientos verticales 
(laterales) de cabeza produjese una retroalimentación corporal positiva (negativa), 
incongruente (congruente) con la información operativa en el nivel implicacional, que 
interrumpe (mantiene) el bucle somático-implicacional negativo, en parte responsable 
del mantenimiento de los síntomas de depresión.  
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La segunda vía de influencia alternativa por la que proponemos que los 
movimientos de cabeza pueden ejercer su papel moderador, es mediante su repercusión 
en el sistema de aproximación conductual (BAS, por sus siglas en inglés). La activación 
del BAS se asocia con conductas de aproximación hacia objetivos deseables y búsqueda 
de refuerzo (Hervás y Vázquez, 2013). Varios son los autores y los modelos que 
relacionan una baja activación del BAS con la depresión unipolar (p.ej., Clark y 
Watson, 1991; Depue e Iacono, 1989; Pinto-Meza et al., 2006). Algunos estudios han 
encontrado que los pacientes con depresión muestran una baja reactividad general tanto 
a estímulos positivos (p.ej., Berenbaum y Oltmanns, 1992; Rottenberg, Kasch, Gross, y 
Gotlib, 2002) como a recompensas  (Henriques y Davidson, 2000; Henriques, 
Glowacki, y Davidson, 1994; McFarland y Klein, 2008). Hallazgos similares se dan 
cuando las muestras se componen de participantes con disforia subclínica, lo que apoya 
la idea de que el reducido interés en experiencias positivas puede ser el elemento que 
condicione la desregulación del estado anímico y el mantenimiento de la anhedonia 
(Hervás y Vázquez, 2013). En el Estudio 2.1, los participantes realizaron movimientos 
verticales o laterales de cabeza mientras veían imágenes de contenido positivo. Realizar 
movimientos verticales de cabeza está comúnmente asociado con aceptación o 
aproximación, mientras que relalizar movimientos laterales está asociado con negación 
o rechazo (e.g., Fusaro, Harris, y Pan, 2012). Por lo tanto es posible que la información 
proprioceptiva producida por los movimientos verticales de cabeza haya podido activar 
el BAS, hipoactivo en los pacientes disfóricos, propiciando una mejor respuesta a la 
información positiva y, como consecuencia, una mejor regulación anímica. La tercera 
vía de influencia que proponemos es que los movimientos de cabeza puedan contribuir a 
la modificación de sesgos cognitivos. Es conocida la contribución que ciertos sesgos 
atencionales, de interpretación o de memoria tienen en el desarrollo y mantenimiento de 
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trastornos emocionales (Hertel y Mathews, 2011; Mathews y MacLeod; 2005; Matt, 
Vázquez y Campbell, 1992). Por ejemplo, en comparación con individuos con baja 
ansiedad, las personas con elevada ansiedad tienden a dirigir su atención hacia 
estímulos amenazantes más que a estímulos neutrales (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Baker-mans-Kranenburg, y van Ijzendoorn, 2007). Análogamente, mientras los sujetos 
sin síntomas de depresión atienden mayoritariamente a estímulos positivos, los sujetos 
deprimidos muestran sesgos hacia información congruente con su estado de ánimo 
(p.ej., Hankin, Gibb, Abela, y Flory, 2010; Joormann y Gotlib, 2007). De hecho existe 
una línea de investigación (modificación de sesgos cognitivos, CBM por sus siglas en 
inglés; Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009) que examina la utilidad de emplear tareas 
cognitivas cuya práctica reiterada conduzca a una modificación de dichos sesgos en 
sujetos vulnerables a trastornos emocionales o de ansiedad. Alguno de estos estudios ha 
demostrado la utilidad de incluir en estas tareas elementos corporales relacionados con 
la aproximación o la evitación. Por ejemplo, en el estudio de Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, 
Becker, y Lindenmeyer (2011) los participantes, en este caso pacientes alcohólicos, que 
ejecutaron movimientos de rechazo (aproximación) ante imágenes de bebidas 
alcohólicas (no alcohólicas), no sólo presentaron un sesgo menos positivo hacia al 
alcohol, sino que su tasa de recaída seis meses después fue menor que la del grupo 
control. Los resultados del Estudio 2.1 pueden reflejar una modificación de los sesgos 
cognitivos de los participantes disfóricos. En concreto, sugieren la posibilidad de que 
los pacientes disfóricos, que tienen menor tendencia a prestar atención a información 
positiva (p.ej.,  Joormann y Gotlib, 2007), hayan modificado sus sesgos como 
consecuencia del movimiento de aproximación ejecutado (i.e., movimiento vertical de 
cabeza), bien prestando más atención a la información positiva, bien cambiando su 
actitud hacia la misma, bien una combinación de ambas.  
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En conjunto, estos resultados son acordes con algunas propuestas teóricas. Por 
ejemplo, la hipótesis del marcador somático de Damasio (1994, p. 199) sostiene que 
“cuando distintos marcadores somáticos se yuxtaponen a diferentes combinaciones de 
imágenes, modifican la manera en que el cerebro las manipula, y de este modo opera 
como una predilección o sesgo.” Tanto esta propuesta como nuestros resultados están 
de acuerdo con la hipótesis de la ‘embodied validation’. Como sugieren Briñol, Petty y 
Wagner (2011, p.1043) "...la confianza que emerge del propio cuerpo y de su posición y 
sus movimientos puede magnificar el efecto de cualquier información que actualmente 
esté presente en la mente, incluyendo […] cogniciones, emociones, metas y demás. Esto 
es, la confianza se aplica a cualquier contenido mental que esté disponible y sea 
prominente en un momento determinado”. Ambas propuestas sugieren que los estados 
corporales pueden alterar la influencia que el procesar cierta información puede ejercer 
sobre la cognición o la emoción. De acuerdo con nuestros resultados, los movimientos 
de cabeza realizados interactúan con el tipo de información presentada y con el estado 
de disforia inicial de los individuos, dando lugar a un aumento o una disminución de la 
capacidad del individuo de regular su estado de ánimo.  
Contribuciones del embodiment a la psicología aplicada. 
Como se ha descrito a lo largo del presente trabajo, el embodiment  puede tener 
importantes implicaciones, tanto teóricas como prácticas, en el campo de la psicología 
clínica. Por una parte, considerar el papel que el cuerpo puede ejercer en distintos 
procesos mentales puede ayudar a los psicólogos a adoptar un enfoque más integrador y 
holístico a la hora de analizar el funcionamiento emocional y cognitivo de las personas. 
El modelo de Lindeman y Abramson (2008) es un claro ejemplo de la aportación del 
embodiment a la psicología clínica. Este modelo, que sugiere que la simulación de 
incapacidad motriz puede subyacer a los síntomas motrices que muestran algunos 
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pacientes con depresión, emana directamente de los principios de teóricos de esta 
aproximación.  Los resultados del presente trabajo, señalan que la posible influencia del 
cuerpo va más allá de lo que propone este modelo, sugiriendo que la ejecución de 
ciertos movimientos corporales puede tener efectos sobre otros procesos psicológicos 
(p.ej., la regulación anímica) que están relacionados con el desarrollo y mantenimiento 
de trastornos como la depresión. Por lo tanto, sin menoscabo a la posibilidad de que la 
simulación de incapacidad motriz pueda explicar los síntomas psicomotrices que son 
frecuentes en la depresión, parece que la influencia de los estados corporales en 
procesos cognitivos superiores relacionados con la depresión puede ir más allá y es un 
área en la que aún queda mucho por explorar. Igualmente, ciertos conceptos y nociones 
que tienen su origen en la corriente del embodiment pueden enriquecer modelos teóricos 
explicativos de los trastornos de ansiedad. Por ejemplo, se puede considerar la teoría de 
la incubación de Eysenck (1968) Esta teoría señala que, en ocasiones, la respuesta 
condicionada que se desencadena con la presencia del estímulo condicionado, aún 
cuando este se presente repetidamente sin la presencia del estímulo incondicionado, 
puede tener la suficiente fuerza como para impedir el fenómeno de la extinción. La 
simulación de los componentes modales, y en especial de los componentes somáticos, 
de las respuestas nocivas, puede predisponer a los individuos a un proceso de 
incubación, actuando como un marcador somático (Damasio, 1994) y sesgando o 
exacerbando la percepción de peligro. De acuerdo con los resultados obtenidos por 
Duclos y Laird (2001), que encontraron diferencias individuales en el impacto que 
mantener ciertas posturas corporales y gestos faciales tenía sobre el estado emocional, 
es posible que no solo la fuerza de la respuesta condicionada, sino también la 
sensibilidad del individuo a sus propios estados internos, sea parcialmente responsable 
de que el individuo desarrolle un proceso de incubación. El concepto de incubación 
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puede asímismo conectarse con la idea de que ciertas experiencias traumáticas pueden 
ser memorizadas como sensaciones corpóreas (Van der Kolk, McFarlane y Weisaeth; 
1996) una propuesta que es aceptada por distintos enfoques terapéuticos (p.ej., la 
psicoterapia sensoriomotriz, el psicodrama, el hakomi) que resaltan la importancia de 
intervenir en el plano somático con pacientes que han sufrido experiencias traumáticas. 
La corriente del embodiment sostiene que la reactivación de la información 
multimodal es lo que da lugar a los procesos cognitivos y emocionales superiores. Es 
una idea que está en consonancia con el funcionamiento cognitivo y emocional 
propuesto por los modelos multinivel de las emociones (Philippot, Baeyens, Douilliez, y 
Francart, 2004; Power y Dalgleish, 1997; 2008; Teasdale y Barnard, 1993). A pesar del 
interés teórico de estos modelos, el volumen de estudios que han generado ha sido más 
bien escaso, probablemente debido a la gran complejidad de los mismos. Estudios que 
utilicen paradigmas provenientes de la corriente del embodiment, como los incluidos en 
el presente trabajo, pueden ayudar a encontrar mayor evidencia a favor de los 
postulados de los modelos multinivel de emoción. 
Es importante resaltar que algunos de estos paradigmas han sido empleados con 
éxito en trabajos encaminados a la modificación del sesgo positivo hacia el alcohol que 
mantenían pacientes alcohólicos (Wiers y cols., 2011) y que su utilización en 
combinación con terapia cognitivo conductual mejoró la tasa de recaídas de estos 
pacientes. Este no es más que un primer paso que indica cómo la perspectiva del 
embodiment puede servir para enriquecer las intervenciones mediante la inclusión de 
elementos corporales en la terapia psicológica. Investigaciones futuras podrán estudiar 
si la manipulación de movimientos corporales asociados con aproximación o rechazo 
puede mejorar la eficacia de tratamientos cuyo componente principal sea la exposición. 
Además, estos resultados pueden servir para que se estudie la eficacia de las 
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intervenciones ya existentes que incluyen el cuerpo como un elemento fundamental en 
la terapia. 
En nuestra opinión, la mayor aportación que el embodiment puede hacer en el 
ámbito de la psicología clínica es la de haber recuperado el papel del cuerpo en los 
procesos psicológicos. El cuerpo no es únicamente la herramienta primaria que las 
personas utilizamos en nuestra interacción con el entorno, sino también una fuente de 
información y el sustrato en el que se originan los procesos cognitivos y emocionales 
más abstractos. Teniendo en cuenta la estrecha relación que existe entre estados 
corporales y estados emocionales y el vínculo que se ha sugerido entre estados 
corporales y sesgos cognitivos, parece sensato el incorporar el cuerpo a la práctica 
clínica, ya que se podría utilizar como una vía ascendente de intervención sobre los 
procesos psicológicos disfuncionales, que fuese complementaria a las más 
frecuentemente usadas vías descendentes emanadas de la psicología cognitiva.  La 
inclusión de un nivel de intervención somático como un elemento  común a todas las 
enfoques puede ser, en nuestra opinión, uno de los principales retos a los que se enfrente 










Within the present work, we will introduce the concept of embodied cognition, 
an approach that considers the role of the body in cognitive processing. General 
findings of this approach and particularly those studies that could have intersections or 
implications for applied clinical psychology will be reviewed. We will also focus on 
models which either have included the body as a significant factor in their explanation 
of psychological disorders or have been directly inspired by the embodied cognition 
account. Moreover, we will introduce some psychological interventions that include the 
body as a significant part of the therapy. This empirical work includes three experiments 
aimed to examine the role of the body on mood regulation processes that will be 
described and discussed. Finally, we draw some conclusions and assess the implications 
which these experiments and, more generally, embodied cognition may have for clinical 




1. - Basic concepts 
 
1.1. Embodied Cognition 
  
Traditional cognitive models (e.g., Chomsky, 1984; Fodor, 1983) suggest that 
cognition is computation on amodal symbols in a modular system that is independent 
from perceptual, proprioceptive and behavior modules. Contrary to this view, the 
embodied cognition approach proposes that modal information - as for example bodily 
states, physical position, movements…etc.  - are underlying cognition (Barsalou, 1999; 
2008). The following example will illustrate the notion of embodiment. As an 
experience occurs (e.g. lying in bed), the brain receives multimodal information (i.e., 
perceptual, proprioceptive and motor) and integrates it as a whole representation stored 
in our memory (e.g., what the bed looks like, how my back feels when I lie on it, the 
movements required for lying down). Then, when knowledge (e.g., a bed) has to be 
retrieved from our memory, multimodal representations are reactivated to simulate how 
the brain represented this category. In this theory, the body is not just a tool that we 
have to express symptoms or our mental or physical state, but it is also an inherent part 
of our knowledge and our thinking. The kinesthetic-tactile experiences and its 
regularities constitute the core of our self-concept and are in the base of high order 
cognition (Gibbs, 2006). Thus, bodily states can modify cognitive states and also 
cognitive states can affect specific bodily functions (Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, & 
Ruppert, 2003; Smith, 2005). 
  




 Findings in cognitive neuroscience strongly support the postulates of embodied 
cognition. In their research with nonhuman primates, Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, and 
Fogassi (1996) found a mechanism that accounts both for action and action’s intention 
understanding. This mechanism, baptized as mirror neurons, revealed that the same 
neural substrates are employed when actions are perceived as when actions are 
performed. Further research demonstrated that the activity of mirror neurons reflects the 
perceived action’s meaning rather than the mere visual description of motor actions 
(e.g., Kohler et al., 2002; Umiltà et al., 2001). Studies using sophisticated techniques of 
neuroimage, such as fMRI (e.g., Iacoboni et al., 1999), and also studies recording the 
activity of single neurons (Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, & Fried, 2010) have 
reported the existence of an analogous mechanism in the human brain, and more 
specifically, in the motor cortex (for a review, see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Thus, 
it seems that the motor cortex may play a crucial role in complex cognitive abilities, 
such as the understanding of the intentions and goals of actions (Gallese, 2010). These 
findings are crucial for understanding the notion of simulation, one of the key concepts 
of the embodied approach. 
  
1.3. - Simulation  
  
         Barsalou’s (1999) theory of Perceptual Symbol Systems (PSS) assumes that a 
single, multimodal representation system in the brain supports diverse forms of 
simulation across different cognitive processes, including high level perception, implicit 
memory, working memory, long-term memory, and conceptual knowledge. Barsalou 
suggests that abstract cognitive processes imply the reenactment of multimodal 
memories (i.e., perceptual, sensory and motor). This reenactment, which differs across 
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the different cognitive processes, both in the mechanisms re-enacted and in the degree 
of activation of these mechanisms (Barsalou, 2008), is defined as simulation (see 
Barsalou, 2009, and Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005 for 
further information about simulation and simulators). 
Similarly, Gallese (2010) proposes a common underlying functional mechanism 
- embodied simulation - which mediates the human capacity to share the meaning of 
actions, intentions, feelings, and emotions with others. The embodied simulation model 
challenges the notion that interpersonal understanding mainly lies on attributing other 
people’s beliefs and desires, and assumes that intercorporeality is the main source of 
knowledge about the other people. According to this model, humans reuse motor 
processes in order to directly understand other people’s actions, and emotion-related 
processes to understand other people’s emotions. The same cortical circuits at work 
when we act, sense or feel emotions are re-enacted when we witness other people’s 
actions, senses or emotions, though, these circuits neither completely overlap, nor show 
the same activation intensity in both cases. 
In accordance with both proposals, Gallese and Lakoff (2005) affirm that 
sensorimotor simulations are involved in the elaboration and comprehension of abstract 
concepts, and these simulations are often metaphorical. 
The concept of simulation and the findings concerning the mirror neurons’ 
circuitry give basis for reconsidering perceptual, sensory and motor information as 
constitutive of higher order cognitive processes. A similar idea is proposed by Antonio 
Damasio (1994). In his work, Damasio affirms that the process of thinking consists of 
the ability to internally represent and organize mental images. These images have an 
origin in the primary sensory cortex areas, an idea that supports the notion that multi-
modal representation underlies abstract cognitive processes. Evidence for an implication 
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of motor processes and bodily states in abstract cognitive processes, such as, for 
example, language comprehension, retrieval of information from memory, emotional 
recognition or attitude development, has been provided in studies originating from 
different research fields. Some of these studies are keystones in the embodied cognition 
theory, and some of them are especially relevant from a clinical point of view. In the 
following section we will describe these studies, with a special emphasis on those 




2. - Empirical studies relevant for embodied cognition. 
  
The number of studies concerning embodied cognition has increased 
enormously during the last decade. Their variety makes it possible to sum the studies up 
using different strategies, such as, for example, organizing them according to the area of 
knowledge (e.g., social psychology, social neuroscience, cognitive psychology, 
psycholinguistic), according to the cognitive processes they seem to affect (e.g., 
memory, persuasion, preference, emotional processing, emotional recognition) or 
according to the effectors that are sometimes manipulated, sometimes measured as 
output variables (e.g., arm movements, head movements, facial gestures, body 
postures). 
As one of the aims of the present work is to bridge the embodied approach and 
the clinical field, we will try to give an overview of the general results that support the 
embodied cognition account, with a special emphasis on those studies that could be 
particularly relevant for psychological disorders. Our summary of the results is neither 
exhaustive nor complete, for extension but also for practical reasons. Yet, we expect 
that this introduction suffices to provide a general overview of the ‘state of the art’ in 
embodied cognition. Whenever possible, we will indicate reviews on the included topics 
that may help the reader to complete the information included here. 
  
2.1. - Roots of embodiment in the classical literature. 
  
The interest in the relationship between body and higher order processes is not 
recent. In “The expression of emotion in man and animal” (1872), Charles Darwin 
defined attitude as “a collection of motor behaviors that reflect an organism’s evaluation 
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of an object”. In his article "What is an Emotion?" (James, 1884) and in his posterior 
book “Principles of psychology” (James, 1890), the American psychologist William 
James defended the idea that emotions are subsequent to bodily changes “bodily 
changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and our feeling of the same 
changes as they occur IS the emotion” (James, 1890, p. 449; italics and upper letters in 
the original). The stereotypical coordinated contraction of facial muscles and its 
relationship with emotion was already being studied in the XIX century. Guillaume 
Duchenne (1862) combined the electrical stimulation of facial muscles and the incipient 
technique of photography to show how the contraction of certain facial muscles 
determined the expressions of anger, fear, joy or sadness. More recently, Robert Zajonc 
(1980) commented on the non-cognitive nature of affect and preferences. In his work, 
Zajonc stresses the importance of the ties existing between the affective and the motor 
systems. For example, he wrote that “affect is not always transformed into semantic 
content but is instead often encoded in, for example, visceral or muscular symbols” 
(Zajonc, 1980, p. 158). In an experimental study, Zajonc and Markus (1982) argued that 
motor expressions of the affective response (visceral, physiological and facial) might 
also influence evaluative processes. 
  
2.2. - Facial gestures and their relation to emotion. 
 
Facial mimicry and gestures are probably one of the topics with longer tradition 
and more intensively researched looking for the influences of body on higher order 
processes. The almost universally shared links existing between facial gestures and 
emotions (e.g., Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983; Levenson, Ekman, Heider, & 
Friesen, 1992) , and the ability that human beings have to recognize other’s internal 
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states from their facial expressions, has made facial gestures one of the major pathways 
for studying the relation between sensorimotor processes and other cognitive and 
emotional processes. The relationship between facial muscles contraction and emotional 
expression was first studied in the XIX century by Duchenne (1862). Since then, many 
researchers have been interested in the relation between facial mimicry and other 
cognitive and emotional processes. For a review of the classical relevant studies about 
the facial feedback hypothesis, see Adelmann and Zajonc (1989). 
Research on this field put forward a controversy between those authors who 
proposed a cognitive, self-monitoring mechanism that underlies the influence of facial 
feedback on emotional experience (e.g. Laird, 1974) and those holding that cognitive 
mediation is not necessary for the facial feedback effect to occur and that physiological 
mechanisms (i.e., facial expression) may be sufficient to generate affective reactions, 
even when participants are not aware of them (e.g., Tomkins, 1962). One of the seminal 
studies that clarified this question was conducted by Strack, Martin and Stepper (1988). 
In this classical study, authors manipulated participants’ facial expressions with a 
methodology that avoided a cognitive interpretation of the facial action and measured 
how this manipulation affected participants’ judgments. Specifically, they asked 
participants to rate how funny they perceive a set of cartoons while either holding a pen 
with their lips only (a gesture that inhibited muscles involved in smiling), or with their 
teeth only (a gesture that activated muscles involved in smiling). In accordance with the 
authors’ hypothesis, subjects who held the pen with their lips perceived the cartoons as 
less funny than subjects who held it with their teeth. These results showed that even 




More studies along this line corroborated and extended these results (e.g., 
Larsen, Kasimatis, & Frey, 1992; Soussignan, 2002). Using the same manipulation, 
Havas, Glenberg and Rink (2007) found that facial mimicry affected language 
comprehension. In their experiments, participants were presented sentences with either 
pleasant or unpleasant content. Participants understood the sentences more quickly 
when their facial expression was congruent with the content of the sentence. Duclos et 
al. (1989) observed that manipulating the activation of facial muscles related to sadness, 
fear, disgust or anger led participants to report an increase of the specific emotion (in 
comparison with other emotions). Similar results have also been specifically reported 
for anger (see Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004). Niedenthal, Winkielman, Mondillon, 
and Vermeulen (2009) found that instead of being a side effect of being presented 
emotional information, facial mimicry plays a causal role in the processing of emotional 
concepts. When certain facial muscles were inhibited, participants showed less accuracy 
relating concepts to an emotion that engages those muscles. Analogously, Oberman, 
Winkielman and Ramachandran (2007) found that blocking facial muscles involved in 
mimicry impairs recognition of emotions that engage those muscles. Duclos and Laird 
(2001) reported that suppressing facial emotional expression influenced participants’ 
emotional intensity and complementary, Niedenthal, Brauer, Halberstadt and Innes-Ker 
(2004) found that the internal emotional states of participants affected their ability to 
detect changes in emotional faces. 
Of particular importance from a clinician point of view are the results of the 
study by Teasdale and Bancroft (1977). In this study the authors employed an 
electromyogram (EMG) to compare corrugator activity during happy and unhappy 
thoughts in a small sample of depressed participants. Unhappy thoughts increased both 
corrugator activity and depressed mood, and most importantly, corrugator activity was 
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highly related to depressed mood. Another important study from a clinician point of 
view was recently carried out by Kraft and Pressman (2012). In their study, participants 
were divided into three groups. While performing a stressful task, participants were 
asked to hold chopsticks in their mouths in a way that either a neutral face, a standard 
smile or a Duchenne smile were induced. The authors found that smiling may influence 
physical state. Participants who held chopsticks in a Duchenne smile or a standard smile 
reported a smaller decrease in positive affect than participants who held neutral facial 
expressions after recovery from the stressful activities. 
Perceptual and memory processes also seem to be affected by the activation of 
facial muscles. In a recent study, Susskind, Lee, Cusi, Feiman, Grabski and Anderson 
(2008) found that adopting a facial gesture of fear or disgust momentarily affected the 
sensory capacity of participants. In their study, participants were asked to either adopt a 
facial gesture of fear, disgust or a neutral one. While performing a facial gesture of fear, 
participants increased their nasal inspiratory capacity, speeded their saccadic 
movements and increased their visual field, whereas while performing a facial gesture 
of disgust, the nasal inspiratory capacity, saccadic movements and visual field were 
affected in an opposite way. The authors concluded that facial expressions are not only 
signals of the related emotions, but they can also modify preparedness for perception 
and action. Continuing with the influence of facial gestures on memory processes, 
Riskind (1983) found that smiling facilitated the recall of pleasant autobiographical 
memories. Zajonc, Pietromonaco and Bargh (1982; see also Graziano, Smith, Tassinary, 
Sun, & Pilkington, 1996) presented their participants with pictures of facial expressions 
and instructed them to either a) imitate the expression of the picture b) chew some gum 
c) squeeze a ball with their hand or d) judge the faces. In a following recognition task, 
participants who imitated the facial expression showed the highest accuracy, whereas 
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participants who chewed gum (the most incongruent condition) showed the lowest 
accuracy. More recently, Topolinski (2012) found that inhibiting the motor component 
of word processing (i.e., by asking them to chew some gum) affected familiarity and 
implicit memory, but did not affect the recall of the presented words. In this study, the 
author performs a series of 7 experiments aimed to test whether different interference 
motor tasks (e.g., chewing gum vs. kneading a ball) have a different influence on 
implicit memory, familiarity or recognition. The author found that performing 
interfering oral motor tasks (in contrast to hand motor tasks), systematically influenced 
familiarity and implicit memory (preference for already presented stimuli vs. newly 
presented ones), whereas recollection indicators remained unaffected. The author found 
a memory effect that is rather unusual (usually the explicit and not the implicit memory 
is the more affected one), and of special interest for the present study, considering that 
such an effect has only been previously reported in individuals with brain injuries or 
dissociative syndrome, such as Capgras syndrome (Topolinski, 2012) . These results 
indicate that sensorimotor input may play a role in implicit, but not in explicit memory 
mechanisms. 
         In sum, facial gestures can modulate the emotional experience of individuals, 
facilitate the appearance of congruent memories and emotional states and also seem to 
affect memory and perceptual processes. 
  
2.3. - Arm movements. 
 
One of the pioneering studies that revealed an influence which the body has on 
cognitive processes was carried out by Cacioppo, Priester and Bernston (1993). In this 
study, participants were presented with Chinese ideographs while they performed either 
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an arm flexion or an arm extension. The authors showed that participants evaluated 
stimuli as more positive when they performed an approach reaction (i.e., pulling 
something toward the body) than when they performed an avoidance reaction (i.e., 
pushing something away from the body). In a complementary study, Chen and Bargh 
(1999) examined inverse way of influence. Specifically, the authors tested whether the 
evaluation of a stimulus influences the behavioral predisposition toward this stimulus 
and they expected that a positive evaluation of a stimulus would lead to approach 
tendencies, whereas a negative evaluation would lead to avoidance tendencies. 
Additionally, they expected an automatic activation of these tendencies (i.e., without 
explicit stimulus evaluation). Results support both hypotheses. In Experiment 1, 
participants had to evaluate words as positive or negative in meaning by pushing a lever 
forward (away from the body) or pulling a lever backward (towards their body). Results 
show that participants’ RTs were faster when they have to push the lever in response to 
the negative stimuli (congruent condition) than in response to the positive stimuli 
(incongruent condition), whereas they responded faster when they pulled the lever in 
response to the positive stimulus (congruent condition) than in response to the negative 
stimulus (incongruent condition). In order to examine whether these behavioral 
predispositions were automatically activated, in Experiment 2 participants did not 
evaluate word valence. Specifically, participants always pushed (pulled) the lever as fast 
as possible when a word was presented. The result was the same as in Experiment 1.  
Other researchers have extended these results (e.g., Cretenet & Dru, 2008; Dru 
& Cretenet, 2004; 2005; Förster & Strack, 1997; 1998; Friedman & Foster, 2000; 2002; 
Maxwell & Davidson, 2007). Although some authors have discussed the automaticity of 
the link between affective evaluation and motor behavior (e.g., Rottevel & Phaf, 2004) 
or the direct association between actions and attitudinal effects (e.g., Centerbar & Clore, 
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2006), most results are in line with the notion that arm movements can influence 
evaluative processes and vice versa (for a review see, for example, Centerbar & Clore, 
2006; Maxwell & Davidson, 2007 or Phing, Dhillon, & Beilock, 2009). The study of 
Phing et al., (2009) for example, suggests that motor difficulty influences preference 
judgments. In their study, participants were presented with two identical objects that 
only varied in their orientation. One object was easy to grasp and the other hard to 
grasp. Results showed that participants were more likely to select an easy to grasp 
object when they were asked for the object they liked more, but not when they were 
asked for the object they disliked more. The authors concluded that we make preference 
judgments on a daily basis which are intimately tied to the motor system. Preference, as 
well as perception, seems to be grounded in action. 
Additional evidence of the influence of arm movements on cognition comes 
from the field of psycholinguistics. In a seminal study by Glenberg and Kaschak (2002), 
participants had to evaluate the sensibility of presented sentences by releasing a button 
and pressing one of two buttons located either closer to the body or farther away from 
the body. In some critical trials, the sentences included actions that involved movements 
towards or away from the body. The authors found that responses were faster when the 
action described in the sentence was congruent with the action that participants had to 
perform in response to the sentence than when the action was incongruent. This 
congruency effect has been named as the Action-sentence Compatibility Effect (ACE). 
Other researchers extended these results by observing that this effect emerges in 
dependence of the attention devoted to the action described in the sentence (Taylor & 
Zwaan, 2008), that actions involving rotation are better understood when participants 
have to rotate their hand in the same direction (Zwaan & Taylor, 2006), that lexical 
decisions to words denoting arm or leg actions are facilitated when arm or leg areas in 
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the left hemisphere are stimulated with transcranial magnetic stimulation (Pulvermüller, 
Hauk, Nikolin, & Ilmoniemi, 2005) or complementarily, that motor areas are activated 
in the brain when participants listened to action-related sentences (Tettamanti et al., 
2005). Thus, the ACE effect seems to be a very robust phenomenon (Zwaan, van der 
Stoep, Guadalupe, & Bouwmeester, 2012). 
Particularly relevant for the present work is the study conducted by Wiers, 
Eberl, Rinck, Becker and Lindenmeyer (2011). In order to modify the approach action 
tendencies of alcoholic patients towards alcohol, the authors included a module of 
Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM; MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & 
Holker, 2002) before the cognitive-behavioural treatment. Specifically, participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two experimental or one of two control conditions. 
Patients in the experimental conditions were trained to consistently make avoidance 
movements (i.e., pushing a joystick) in response to alcohol pictures and approach 
movements (i.e., pulling a joystick) in response to pictures of nonalcoholic drinks. The 
two experimental conditions varied only as to whether participants were explicitly 
trained to avoid alcohol pictures or not. Patients in the control conditions were either not 
trained to avoid alcohol at all or received sham training. The authors found that the 
experimental manipulation of action tendencies has an effect on alcohol approach 
tendencies, that is, patients in the experimental condition changed from a small 
approach bias to a strong avoidance bias for alcohol. Moreover, when they evaluated 
participants one year later, relapse rates within the experimental group (46%) were 
lower than within the control group (59%). This result suggests that this minimal 
intervention seemed to improve treatment outcome one year later and is a clear example 
of how involving motor processes in therapy can help to improve therapeutic outcomes 
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(for a discussion on implicit processes in therapy see Kazdin and Blase, 2011; see also 
Shalev and Bargh, 2011). 
  
2.4. - Embodiment research involving overt head movements. 
  
A seminal study on this field was carried out by Wells and Petty (1980). In this 
study, the authors tested whether head movements influenced the attitude towards 
presented information. Specifically, they asked participants to perform either vertical 
(covert head nodding) or horizontal (covert head shaking) movements of the head whilst 
listening to a simulated radio broadcast. Regardless of whether or not the broadcast 
content was in accordance with participants’ attitudes, participants agreed with the 
content more in the nodding condition than in the shaking condition. They also found 
that the content (attitudinal or counterattitudinal) interfered with the head movements, 
that is, incongruent head movements (i.e., head nodding when counterattitudinal and 
head shaking when attitudinal content was presented) were more difficult to perform 
than congruent head movements. 
Further research on the role played by overt head movements in persuasion have 
been carried out by Briñol and Petty (2003). These authors observed that when 
participants listened to strong arguments supporting a policy, they were more likely to 
agree with the policy if they performed nodding instead of shaking head movements. 
On the contrary, when the arguments presented were weak, shaking head movements 
increased the likelihood of them agreeing with the policy. These results show that overt 
head movements affected the confidence of participants on their own thoughts. 
Tom, Peterson, Lau, Burton and Cook (1991) observed that head movements 
can also influence participants’ preferences. The authors masked their study as a test for 
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a new pair of headphones that had been developed for use whilst practicing different 
sports. Consequently, participants were told to move their heads up and down, as if they 
were running, or to shake their heads left to right as if they were riding a bicycle. 
During the experiment, a pen was present on a table placed in front of the participants. 
After the experiment, participants were told that the company considered the possibility 
of giving a pen as a present with the purchase of the headphones. They asked 
participants to choose between the pen they had seen while performing the experiment 
or a new one never seen before. Two thirds of participants who nodded in the 
experiment did choose the presented pen, whereas two thirds of participants who shook 
their heads during the experiment preferred the new one. Forster and Strack (1996) 
found that overt head movements can also affect memory processes. In a series of three 
experiments, these authors observed that recall of positive concepts was facilitated when 
participants performed a congruent (i.e., nodding) rather than an incongruent (i.e., 
shaking) movement at encoding. 
Of higher relevance for the present study are the results obtained by Rahona, 
Ruiz Fernandez, Rolke, Vazquez and Hervas (2013). This study showed that overt head 
movements may play a role in the regulation of mood state. In the study, participants 
were induced into a negative mood state and subsequently engaged in an attentional task 
that involved either vertical (nodding) or horizontal (shaking) head movements. The 
results showed that head movements moderate the influence of depressive mood on 
emotional regulation. Head movements affected the ability of participants with high 
BDI scores to regulate their mood recovering their positive mood state, whereas they 
did not affect participants with low BDI scores. Specifically, participants with higher 
scores on BDI who nodded regulated as well as those with low BDI scores, whereas 
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participants with high BDI scores who shook their heads showed a diminished ability to 
regulate their mood states. 
  
2.5. - Body postures and body locomotion. 
 
Several studies on postural embodiment, following the terminology of 
Niedenthal et al. (2005), have found links between motor behavior and cognitive and 
emotional processes. One of the first studies that addressed the question of whether 
body posture may have an influence on other cognitive processes was carried out by 
Riskind and Gotay (1982). They found that body posture influenced participants’ mood 
reports as well as it affected task performance. In their study, participants who were in a 
slumped posture were more likely to abandon a task earlier when they were successful, 
whereas participants who maintained an upright posture were more likely to abandon 
the task earlier when they were unsuccessful. Thus, when the posture was congruent 
with the outcome, participants tended to keep performing the task for a longer time. 
Following this line, Wilson and Pepper (2004) found that maintaining an upright 
posture facilitates the access to positive thoughts in comparison to maintaining a 
slumped posture. 
In their second experiment, Duclos et al. (1989) tested the influence of postures 
on self reported emotions. In their experiment, participants were asked to adopt postures 
of fear, anger or sadness. Afterwards they had to report how much they felt of each of 
eight different emotions. The results show that adopting an emotional posture led them 
to feel the emotion they were expressing. Flack, Laird and Cavallaro (1999) replicated 
and extended these results. In particular, they asked participants to adopt facial 
expressions, body postures, or both simultaneously, that evoked anger, sadness, fear or 
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happiness. They found that the bodily and the facial expression of certain emotions 
increased the feeling of that specific emotion, and the emotions elicited by the 
combination of facial expression and posture were, in general, more intense than those 
elicited by either of the two alone. Analogously, adopting a posture incongruent with 
the information presented, reduce the neural emotional response (e.g., Harmon Jones & 
Peterson, 2009). The influence of bodily states in emotional states seems to be 
particularly true for those individuals who are more responsive to personal than to 
situational cues (Duclos & Laird, 2001). Studies on Interoceptive Awareness (IA) have 
explored more deeply the question of how the sensitivity of participants to their internal 
states can be related to different disorders and personality traits (e.g., Herbert & 
Pollatos, 2012). Several studies have provided evidence which suggests that IA is 
crucial for the intensity of emotional experience (e.g., Barrett, Quigley, Bliss-Moreau, 
& Aronson, 2004; Herbert, Herbert, & Pollatos, 2011; Herbert, Pollatos and Schandry, 
2007; Wiens, 2005). And more importantly for the present work, some authors have 
suggested that deficits in the ability to be aware of one’s internal states could be related 
to personality traits such as alexitimia (e.g., Herbert et al., 2011; Herbert & Pollatos, 
2012) or psychological disorders such as eating disorders (e.g. Pollatos et al., 2008; 
Herbert & Pollatos, 2012). 
An important study addressed the question of how body movements, and 
particularly coordinated body movements between patient and therapist, may influence 
therapy outcomes (Ramseyer & Tschacher, 2011). In this study, the authors adopted a 
neutral concept of movement coordination, focusing on the occurrence of coordinated 
dynamics and not on the appearance of specific gestures, postures or other movements. 
They recorded and digitized 104 psychotherapy sessions of 70 different dyads and 
performed a motion energy analysis on this sample. According to their results, 
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movement synchrony is found at a level above chance in psychotherapeutic interactions. 
Moreover, this nonverbal synchrony was found to be linked to personal characteristics 
in the domain of interpersonal behavior. Specifically, therapist pacing was 
predominantly related to patient’s self efficacy, whereas therapist leading was 
associated with better patient’s relationship rating. These results indicate that the 
psychological relationship, as well as the inner states of interacting persons, is reflected 
in their bodies, which play an important role in the development and maintenance of 
relationships. 
Convergent evidence comes from studies that examined how inhibition of body 
movements affected both internal states and social interaction. For example, a study by 
Butler et al. (2003) tested the personal and social consequences of suppressing 
emotional expressions during a conversation. Dyads of participants consisting of a 
regulator and a partner were assigned to either suppression or control conditions. 
Regulators in the suppression condition were instructed not to express their emotions 
whereas in the control condition they received no instructions. Compared to the control 
condition, expression suppression increased regulators’ distraction during conversation, 
regulators’ and partners’ blood pressure, and decreased partners’ feelings of rapport and 
willingness to develop a future friendship. These results indicate that suppressing 
expressive behavior affect not only the internal experience during a conversation, but 
also the likelihood of developing new social relationships. 
Further evidence of the influence of bodily states in higher order processes 
comes from studies which observed or manipulated gait patterns or body locomotion. 
For example, Michalak, Troje, Fischer, Vollmar, and Schulte (2009) carried out a study 
to examine whether clinically depressed individuals (Experiment 1) or sad induced 
individuals (Experiment 2) presented different gait patterns than never depressed 
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individuals or happy induced participants, respectively. Five features were found to be 
significantly different between depressed (sad induced) and never-depressed (happy 
induced) participants: speed, arm swing, lateral body sway, posture of the upper body 
and vertical up-down movements of the upper body, with a similar pattern of results in 
both experiments. Reduced velocity, vertical movements and arm swing, as well as an 
increase of slumped posture and stronger lateral body sway, characterizes depressed and 
sad gait patterns. These differences are attenuated with therapy (Michalak, Troje, & 
Heidenreich, 2010) and reciprocally, inducing participants to adopt sad or depressed 
gait patterns, affected memory processes. Compared to participants who adopted a 
“happy” gait pattern, those who were induced to adopt a “sad” gait pattern presented a 
more negative bias in a self-reference encoding task (Rohde, Troje, & Michalak, 2012). 
Gait direction also affects information processing. An interesting study by Koch, 
Holland, Hengstler and van Knippenberg (2009) observed that stepping backwards 
enhanced cognitive performance in a stroop task, compared to stepping forwards or 
sideways. 
In sum, studies on postural embodiment have found that body postures may 
affect emotional states, but also motivational, perceptual and memory processes (e.g., 
Niedenthal et al., 2005). The influence of body postures on emotional states seems to be 
reciprocal and is modulated by the responsiveness of participants to internal cues (e.g., 
Duclos & Laird, 2001). Moreover, body movements may also affect therapy (Ramseyer 
& Tschacher, 2011), as well as social competences (e.g., Butler et al., 2003), and also 
seemto be affected by therapy (Michalak, Troje, & Heidenreich, 2010). 
  




The last source of evidence of the influence of body on cognitive processes that 
we are going to mention in the present work refers to those studies that could be framed 
as conceptual metaphor studies. Conceptual metaphor is a term coined by Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980; 1999) and refers to the idea that abstract concepts are based on physical 
metaphors. Accordingly, metaphors are not only useful, but necessary to develop 
abstract thoughts, because they allow people to link abstract concepts (e.g., affect or 
time) to sensory experiences. These links are crucial for the development of abstract 
thought and for understanding other people. Without such links, concepts would lack 
reference to the physical world, and it would be impossible to share them with others. 
Part of these studies has focused on the association between abstract concepts 
and basic spatial dimensions (i.e., left-right, front-back, and up-down). For example, it 
has been found that numbers are represented along a mental number line that goes from 
left to right, with small numbers represented on the left and big numbers on the right 
(Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993; for a review see Fias & Fischer, 2005). This 
representation affects manual (e.g., Dehaene et al. 1993; Zorzi, Priftis, & Umiltà, 2002) 
verbal (e.g., Brysbaert, 1995) and oculomotor responses (e.g., Fischer, Warlop, Hill, & 
Fias, 2004; Ruiz Fernández, Rahona, Hervas, Vazquez, & Ulrich, 2011) and supports 
the idea that abstract concepts are grounded in concrete, spatial dimensions. In western 
cultures, concepts like time are also represented along a left to right spatial dimension 
(e.g., Boroditsky, 2000, Santiago, Lupiañez, Perez, & Funes, 2007), but they are also 
represented in a back to front spatial dimension, with the past at the back and the future 
at the front (e.g., Torralbo, Santiago, & Lupiañez, 2006). Some studies have also 
examined the metaphorical representation of affect in terms of space (see Crawford, 
2009, for a review). Studies by Wapner, Werner and Krus (1957), Meier and Robinson 
(2004) or Crawford, Margolies, Drake and Murphy (2006) have documented an 
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association of positive affect with upper regions of the physical space and negative 
affect with lower regions of the physical space. Among these studies, one of special 
relevance for the present work was carried out by Meier and Robinson (2006). In this 
study, the authors examined whether depressive symptoms were associated with shifts 
of attention towards lower regions of the visual space. The authors found that those 
participants who reported higher levels of depressive symptoms presented an attentional 
bias towards lower regions of the visual space. 
Apart from the studies that found an association between abstract concepts and 
spatial positions, there are many other studies providing evidence for an embodied 
representation of concepts, or at least providing evidence that some metaphors that are 
common in our language and involve physical sensations could actually be grounded in 
our bodies (for reviews see Gibbs, 2006; Isanski & West, 2010; Landau, Meier & 
Keefer, 2010; Meier et al., 2012). For example, some studies explored the commonly 
used metaphor that equals kindness or friendliness with warmth and social isolation or 
rudeness with coldness. In a study by Zhong and Leonardelli (2008), participants who 
were excluded from participating in a ball game tended to choose hot beverages after 
the game more so than the participants who played an active role in the game did. In 
another experiment, participants who were asked to recall their own experiences of 
social rejection perceived the room temperature as significantly colder than those 
induced to recall experiences of social inclusion. Complementarily, inducing physical 
sensations of warmth improved reports of participants’ perceived emotional relationship 
with friends and relatives (Ijzerman & Semin, 2009), and it led to target individuals 
being perceived as more friendly (Williams & Bargh, 2008). Other authors explored the 
metaphor which associates the importance of an argument with its heaviness (Jostman, 
Lakens & Schubert, 2009), the common association between brightness and goodness 
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(Meier, Robinson & Clore, 2004), or the experimental induction of feelings of elevation 
(e.g., watching inspirational positive videos) and feelings of warmth in the chest or 
being lifted (Schnall et al., 2010).  
Of special interest for the link between basic and clinical fields are the studies 
which explored the embodiment of morality or purity into experiences of physical 
cleanliness (see Schnall, 2011). In this line, it has been found that hand cleaning 
behaviors attenuate the guilt induced by one’s moral transgressions (Zhong & 
Liljenquist, 2006). Some studies have reported that priming cleanliness can sometimes 
soften the judgment of others’ misdeeds (Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008) and 
sometimes makes moral judgments become harsher (Zhong, Strejcek & Sivanathan, 
2010). A recent study by Lee & Schwarz (2010) found that the desire for cleanliness 
was related to the part of the body which actually committed the moral transgression. In 
their experiment, participants were asked to either perform an unethical or an ethical act 
by leaving a voice message or by sending an e-mail. Afterwards participants were asked 
to report how much they were willing to pay for some products. Hand sanitizer and 
mouthwash were included in the list of products. Participants who performed an oral 
(written) unethical act gave a higher value to the mouthwash (hand sanitizer) than 
participants who performed a written (oral) unethical act. These findings suggest that 
moral purity is embodied and is specific to some motor modalities involved in moral 
transgression. More authors have followed this line of research and found similar results 
(e.g. Gollwitzer & Melzer, 2012).  It is possible that although the desire for cleanliness 
evolved in a specific social evolutionary context, just like disgust evolved as a food-
specific emotion and achieved moral connotations (Schnall, 2001), a genuine desire for 
cleanliness and tidiness can go beyond the moral domain. Thus, for instance, Lee & 
Schwarz (2010) have found that cleanliness reduces the cognitive dissonance that is 
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associated with having made a difficult decision. Similarly, it is likely that there is a link 
between these particular embodied cognitions and some psychological disorders. One 
firm candidate is obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). A common feature of this 
disorder is that patients become worried about cleanliness and also moral purity (e.g., 
obsessive ideas of having committed involuntary moral mistakes or sins or unbearable 
feelings of physical or moral disgust) (e.g., Foa et al., 1995). Interestingly, there is 
preliminary evidence showing a deep connection between disgust and morality. For 
instance, Schnall, Haidt, Clore, and Jordan (2008) experimentally induced physical 
disgust by spraying an unpleasant odor, or by asking participants to use a dirty and 
messy desk. Participants exposed to disgust subsequently made more harsh moral 
judgments. This result has also been confirmed in similar studies (e.g., Horberg, Oveis, 
Keltner, Cohen, 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe & Bloom, 2009). Furthermore, an opposite 
relation (i.e., between purity and condescendence in moral judgments) has also been 
reported in experimental studies (Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008; Helzer & Pizarro, 
2011). These embodied representations can open some interesting avenues in the study 





3. - Psychological and psychopathological models that give a role to the 
body 
  
3.1. - Multilevel models of emotion 
  
The common feature of models reviewed in this section is that all are based on 
the premise that emotional information can be processed on different levels. A 
distinction that is common to all multilevel models is the proposal of a “schematic” 
system and a “propositional” system. The role of the body in these models is twofold; 
on the one hand it is basically conceived as an output or response system that 
implements reactions elicited by other systems. On the other hand, it is supposed to 
have automatic links with the perceptual system (corresponding with the concept of 
primary emotion proposed by Damasio, 1994) and be able to activate whole schemas. 
  
3.1.1. - Dual memory model (Philippot, Baeyens, Douilliez, & Francart, 
2004). 
  
The dual memory model is an attempt to integrate all previous multilevel models 
(Leventhal, 1984; Power & Dalgleish, 1997; 2008; Smith & Kirby, 2000; Teasdale & 
Barnard, 1993). It proposes the existence of five different interactive systems that play a 
role in cognition and emotion, and in the cognitive regulation of emotion. The five 
systems proposed by the model are the perceptual, body response, schematic, object 
recognition and propositional system: 
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a) The perceptual system analyzes and integrates raw sensory input from each 
perceptual modality and has innate and automatic connections to the body response 
system. 
b) The body response system performs body responses, such as facial 
expression, body postures and movements, as well as the whole range of visceral 
responses. These body responses are fundamental to emotion. 
c) The schematic system, as its name suggests, is based on schemata. A schema 
is an implicit representation, automatically built by abstracting communalities in the 
similar experiences lived by an individual, which integrates sensory, perceptual, 
semantic and motor information of these experiences. 
d) The object recognition system allows for the construction of discrete mental 
representations, which are the main input of the propositional system. 
e) The propositional system consists of declarative knowledge, and constitutes 
the basis for labeling emotions, communicating emotions, and for willful problem 
solving and coping in emotional situations. 
In the description of the processes operating on the schematic and propositional 
systems, authors suggest that the activation of any facet of a schema has the potential to 
activate the whole representation. A schema can activate body response systems and 
conversely, bodily states can trigger a related schema or activate concepts at an 
unconscious level that later on may have priming effects on the processing of 
information. 
According to this model, schemata are central for emotion and the regulation of 
emotion is mostly a question of modulation of the schema. Three mechanisms regulate 
the activation of the schemata: the elaboration of emotional information, the redirection 




3.1.2. - Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS, Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). 
  
In this model, the authors propose the existence of interacting subsystems that 
are specialized in the processing of certain types of information. These subsystems are 
organized, from more concrete to more abstract, into a hierarchical semantic model. 
With regard to the sensory model, the acoustic subsystem encodes information 
relative to sound, the visual subsystem encodes visual information and the body state 
subsystem encodes dimensions of internal sensory input, such as bodily sensations of 
pressure or pain, positions of parts of the body, as well as tastes and smells. 
At the intermediate level, the morphonolexical subsystem encodes the structural 
description of entities and relationships of sound space, whereas the object subsystem 
encodes the structural description of entities and relationships of visual space. 
At the meaning level, the propositional subsystem integrates the information of 
morphonolexical and visual subsystems into descriptive knowledge, whereas the 
implicational subsystem integrates both sensory/perceptual information with 
propositional knowledge, and the mental entities created from the regularities in the 
world and the body can be seen as schematic models of experience. 
Finally, this model proposes an effector level, with three subsystems, the 
articulatory, the limb and the somatic and visceral subsystems, that implements the 
output of the subsystems at the intermediate and meaning level. 
Of significant relevance for the present work is the fact that this model proposes 
that body states and body feedback directly influence cognition at the implicational 
level, which consists of schemata, concepts, values, norms and other implicit knowledge 




 3.1.3. - SPAARS (Power & Dalgleish, 1997; 2008). 
  
 In a similar way to other multilevel models of emotion, the SPAARS 
(Schematic, Propositional, Analogical, and Associative Representation Systems) model 
(Power & Dalgleish, 1997, pp. 415) addresses the role of cognition in emotion and 
proclaims the existence of four interactive systems hierarchically organized:  
a) The analogical representation system: at this level, the initial processing of 
sensory and motor information takes place. The representations from this system are the 
input of the other three ones (i.e., the associative, the propositional and the schematic) 
that operate in parallel.  
b) The associative system comprises of the innate and learned associations 
between these representations, and it is described as a connectionist, direct, and 
automatic system. 
 c) The propositional system is similar to those proposed in other models and its 
main characteristic is to be language-like. 
d) Finally, the highest level is called the schematic system, which is 
implicational, stores information in a flexible manner, and generates emotion through 
the process of appraisal (evaluations of events that cause specific reactions). 
According to this model, both the associative and the schematic system can elicit 
emotions and emotional disorders are constructed from the five basic emotions (i.e., 
fear, sadness, anger, disgust, and happiness). The simultaneous coexistence of two or 
more emotions (coupling), conflicts between emotions, or an interlocking of different 
representation systems can lead to an emotional disorder. 
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The authors suggest that treatments may take into account the pathway through 
which a given emotional disorder arose in order to enhance their effectiveness. 
  
3.2. - Phenomenological approaches 
   
Merleau-Ponty (1966) stated that the body is a “natural subject” and the basis of 
our existence. From a phenomenological perspective, Fuchs & Schlimme (2009) 
consider that embodiment is on its way to becoming a major paradigm in 
psychopathology. They define embodiment as “not only the embedding of cognitive 
processes in brain circuitry but also to the origin of these processes in an organism’s 
sensory-motor experience in relation to its environment”. These authors distinguish 
between subject body and object body. Subject body does not require explicit attention 
but is the medium and background of our experience and interaction with the 
environment. Basic body feelings are bodily experiences and ways of experiencing the 
world. It applies in particular to existential feelings, such as feeling at home, sense of 
belonging, sense of reality and so forth. According to these authors, disturbances of 
embodiment may be classified in two types: those affecting the subject body or the body 
schema, as depression or schizophrenia, and those affecting the object body or the body 
image, such as somatoform disorders or eating disorders. 
  
3.3. - Lindeman and Abramson model 
                      
Recently, Lindeman and Abramson (2008) have proposed a theoretical model 
describing the causal mechanisms that link cognitive and somatic elements of 
depression. Specifically, the authors summarize recent findings in embodied cognition, 
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suggesting that hopelessness is metaphorically conceptualized as motor incapacity and 
when the mental simulation of this mental incapacity is reenacted, it leads to the 
appearance of peripheral physiological effects, such as psychomotor retardation and low 
energy. 
In their revision of the literature, these authors found that imagining physical 
movements leads to the activation of the same areas of the brain that are active while 
motor planning and execution (see Jeannerod & Frak, 1999, for a review). 
Complementary, imaging movement suppression reduces the corticospinal excitability 
and attenuate twitching of the thumb induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(Sohn, Dang & Hallet, 2003). Moreover, neurological studies of depression give support 
to the notion that motor incapacity simulation may lead to psychomotor retardation. In 
concrete, the behavioural approach system (BAS) has been found to be associated with 
regions of the brain related to planning and execution of motor movements (Depue & 
Iacono, 1989). Therefore, a simulation of motor incapacity may inhibit the function of 
the BAS, leading to a deficit in approach motivation that is observed in depressed 
patients. Moreover, depressed individuals show slowed performance in mental rotation 
of objects (Rogers et al. 2002) and weaker finger force in response to TMS of the motor 
cortex (Oathes & Ray, 2006); results that could be both explained by arguing the 
simulation of a motor incapacity. Based on these results, Lindeman & Abramson (2008) 
conclude that imagining a lack of movement or inability to move may drastically reduce 
motor activity, creating a subjective experience of motor incapacity. 
The model proposed by the authors posits that some emotions may result as a 
consequence of the simulation of the bodily experiences in which the abstract meaning 
of a situation is metaphorically conceptualized (e.g., feel oppressed as a result of 
perceived social pressure), and that the peripheral physiological concomitants of these 
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emotions derive from these simulated sensorimotor experiences. When applied to 
depression, the metaphor simulation model suggests that incapacity to avoid negative 
outcomes or bring about positive events is metaphorically conceptualized as motor 
incapacity and the simulation of this mental incapacity becomes an integral component 
of hopelessness, leading to subjective feelings of lethargy and immobility and to 
objective physiological outcomes, such as low energy and retardation. The consequence 
of reenacting the motor incapacity experience is feeling down, trapped or paralyzed and 
simultaneously experiencing psychomotor symptoms. This model is also coherent with 
the notion that being depressed means feeling “down” or “low”. Specifically, the 
simulation of a motor inability to rise in the vertical space may be at the basis of these 
feelings. Congruent with this notion are the results from Meier & Robinson (2006), who 
found that participants with a higher level of depression symptoms showed a bias 
towards information presented at the bottom of the screen and also with results from 
Riskind and Gotay (1982), who found that participants in a slumped posture persisted 
less in a subsequently learned helplessness task. 
The model proposed by Lindeman & Abramson (2008) has important 
implications for clinical practice. On the one hand, central and peripheral activity could 
be considered as metaphorical, conceptual simulation of cognitions. This fact opens up 
new ways of identifying non-adaptive schemata, and suggests complementary ways of 
intervention less mediated by abstract cognitive processes (see Kazdin & Blase, 2011; 
Shalev & Bargh, 2011). On the other hand, it implies that real or imagined bodily 
experiences of motor capacity may be useful to alleviate depressive symptoms. 
Consistent with this later implication, it has been found that exercise (that can be 
considered as an experience of motor capacity) can reduce hopelessness (Hembree, 
2001), as well as negative cognitions associated with depression (Lash, 2000). 
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Moreover, exercises that imply a higher level of perceived motor capacity, such as 
martial arts, are found to increase positive affect and self efficacy in comparison to 
other forms of exercise, such as riding a stationary bike (Bodin & Martinsen, 2004). 
More effective interventions may thus involve the development of strong cues 
indicating motor capacity. Based on the perspective proposed by Barsalou (1999), the 
recall of sensory memories, rather than the mental imagery of successful motor acts, 
could be a more effective way of developing these cues. 
  
3.4. - Synergetics 
 
The synergetics account was initially proposed by Haken (1977) in the field of 
non-equilibrium physics. Recently, Haken and Tschacher have transferred some of its 
principles in order to provide a theoretical model which is able to account for intentional 
behavior and neural dynamics (Haken & Tschacher, 2010) brain activity (Haken, 1996) 
or cognitive functioning and human behavior (Haken & Tschacher, 2011). Specifically, 
they consider that behavior is one field in which organizing patterns arise spontaneously 
and they therefore apply the synergetics account to its explanation. According to their 
model, the environment, including body postures and states, constrains the possible 
amount of psychological states of a given individual and behavior can be seen as a 
function of changes in the personal space (cognitive and emotional variables of a 
person), which is affected by the environmental space. Important for this model is the 
idea that for the spontaneous emergence of organized patterns, those patterns cannot be 
prewired in a system, but they emerge when the same mechanisms are used by a system 
to perceive and to categorize events (in other words, cognition must be modal in order 
to solve the problem of intentionality in intelligent behavior). According to the 
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4. - Psychological interventions that involve the body in therapy 
  
4.1. - Body Oriented Psychotherapy 
 
Body Psychotherapy is considered as a mainstream branch of psychotherapy. 
The term is commonly used as a compendium of methods and techniques whose 
common denominator is that the body plays a significant role in the psychotherapeutic 
practice. Accordingly, it could be defined as “a holistic perspective within the 
therapeutic intervention strategy, explicitly working with body-oriented, nonverbal 
techniques” (Röhrich, 2009, p. 139). Under the umbrella of the label “Body 
Psychotherapy”, many different approaches and therapeutic interventions are collected. 
Although the terminological diversification and the differentiation in numerous schools 
is sometimes hard to justify, particularly considering the closeness of some theoretical 
concepts and therapeutic practices, methods and techniques could be generally divided 
into two main groups: On the one hand, those techniques and approaches aimed to 
modify behavior or to provide more insight to the client (e.g., Dance Movement 
Therapy, Bioenergetic Analysis, Feldenkreis), on the other hand those techniques and 
approaches whose main goal is physical relaxation and homeostasis (e.g., Functional 
relaxation, Hakomi). 
In the following lines we will describe two examples of techniques and 
interventions that could be included in the general category of Body Psychotherapy.  
4.1.1. - Dance Movement Therapy 
 
According to the British Association of Dance Movement Therapy, “Dance 
Movement Therapy is the psychotherapeutic use of movement and dance through which 
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a person can engage creatively in a process to further their emotional, cognitive, 
physical and social integration. It is founded on the principle that movement reflects an 
individual’s patterns of thinking and feeling”. 
         Dance is an art which is performed as a form of emotional expression, social 
interaction, and which is both involved in some sacred or seduction rituals in many 
different cultures worldwide. It is not known when dancing became a part of human 
culture, but some of the most ancient archeological vestiges of human civilizations (e.g., 
Bhimbetka rock shelters) show traces of the practice of dance in prehistoric times. Some 
of the benefits of dance include physical fitness, coordination, arts appreciation, 
improved rhythmic expression, confidence and improvement of social outlook (e.g., 
Alpert, 2011). Dance therapy is based on the notion that the body and the mind work 
together and evolved from the belief that dancing is a path of the expression of an 
individual’s innermost feelings, which allows the individual to become aware of 
feelings through sensations and movements. 
The evidence for the effectiveness of most Body Psychotherapies is actually 
very scarce. Only a relatively small number of evidence-based studies support the 
effectiveness of DMT for psychiatric patients with depression amongst other diagnoses. 
Ritter and Low (1996) elaborated a meta-analysis to review quantitative research on 
DMT and estimate the effect of DMT across studies. The authors concluded that DMT 
is an effective treatment for patients suffering from different symptoms and especially 
effective for the treatment of anxiety. The effect sizes were, in general, small to 
moderate and the authors suggested that studies including control groups and more 
reliable measures were necessary in this area. Some studies tried to overcome these 
methodological shortcomings. For example, Jeong, Hong, Lee, Park, Kim, and Suh 
(2005) evaluated psychological health and observed the changes in neuro-hormones of 
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twenty adolescents with mild depression who were treated during 12 weeks with DMT, 
compared to a control group. After 12 weeks in the DMT group, all indicators of 
psychological distress significantly decreased and plasma neurotransmitter 
concentration varied. Specifically, participants in the DMT group showed a higher 
concentration of serotonin in plasma and a lower dopamine concentration than control 
participants did. More efforts have been devoted recently to provide DMT with the 
necessary background of evidence-based studies, including a systematic review on the 
effects of DMT and dance on psychological outcomes performed by Strassel, Cherkin, 
Steuten, Sherman, and Vrijhoef (2011), and a recent meta-analysis ellaborated by Koch, 
Kunz, Lykou, and Cruz (2013), in which moderate effects of DMT were found for 
quality of life and clinical outcomes as well as small effects were noted for well-being, 
mood, affect, and body image. 
   
4.1.2. - Functional relaxation 
 
Functional Relaxation (FR) is a therapy based on enhancing body awareness, 
which is usually applied in a group-therapy setting and was initially developed by the 
physiotherapist Marianne Fuchs (1994). This technique involves directing the attention 
to breathing while exploring the smooth micromovements of the head, the hip, the 
chest, the neck and the shoulders that are involved in breathing, especially while 
expiring. The rationale of the technique is that traumatic experiences, as well as the 
maintenance of high stress levels, can alter an individual’s autonomic rhythms. As a 
result, the individual develops permanent muscular tension in different regions of the 
body that can finally become pathological. The frequent practice of this technique 
results in enhanced body awareness, which in turn helps to identify areas of the body 
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that are supporting tension, and to an earlier detection of bodily needs. In line with the 
idea of homeostasis and self-regulation, FR is not supposed to consciously influence 
autonomic rhythms. In contrast, the enhanced ability to identify bodily needs that the 
individual learns during the training phase facilitates autonomous respiration changes 
according to the actual physical needs of the body. Some studies have reported the 
efficacy of this intervention for physical disorders with important psychogenic 
emotional factors, such as tension headaches (Loew, Sohn, Martus, Tritt, & Rechlin, 
2000), irritable bowel syndrome (e.g., Lahman et al., 2010), or acute asthma (Lahman et 
al. 2009, Loew et al., 2001; Loew, Siegfried, Martus, Tritt, & Hahn, 1996). In contrast, 
there are practically no studies that explore the efficacy of this type of intervention in 
psychological disorders. A plausible reason for this lack of evidence is the fact that 
many multi-component structured psychotherapy protocols for the treatment of anxiety, 
emotional and somatoform disorders already include respiration exercises or other 
relaxation techniques (e.g., Edmund Jacobson’s progressive relaxation) that most 
probably contribute to the efficacy of these protocols but whose efficacy in isolation is 
still rather unknown. 
  
 4.2. - Mindfulness 
 
In simple terms, mindfulness is the act of deliberately focusing one’s attention 
on the present moment, trying not to make any judgments but just to 
acknowledge/accept thoughts, feelings or bodily sensations that arise in the attentional 
field. It is a state of consciousness that allows people to be aware of present (mental and 
bodily) experiences without judging them (note that there are several definitions of 
mindfulness; e.g., Kabat-Zinn, 1994, p. 4; Marlatt & Kristeller, 1999, p. 68). In 
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mindfulness, breathing is used to anchor our attention. As breathing occurs 
automatically, we can focus our attention on the body by simply observing our 
breathing without trying to control it. As breathing is something we do all the time, 
observing it allows us to come into the present moment. Breathing can also be focused 
upon during a daily life activity (e.g., focusing awareness on breathing whilst walking, 
listening to music, hanging out the laundry, waiting at red traffic lights, etc.). During 
such daily life routines, one can also focus on sensorimotor aspects of the body (e.g., 
noticing how strong you are grasping the glass when you are drinking, noticing how taut 
your leg muscles are whilst walking). In body scan exercises, the focus of attention is 
moved around the body, observing the bodily sensations and becoming aware of them. 
The regular practice of body scan allows us to become more aware of bodily sensations 
and thus to integrate this awareness in daily life activities. 
Over the last decades, mindfulness has gained more and more popularity as an 
intervention tool. Although mindfulness can be used as an autonomous intervention, 
many psychological approaches have included mindfulness practices to enrich their own 
methods or are even based on mindfulness (Baer, 2003; Germer, Siegel, & Fulton, 
2005). One of the interventions that uses mindfulness is Mindfulness-based Cognitive 
Therapy (MBCT; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002) which focuses on the prevention 
of a depressive relapse for people suffering recurrent episodes of depression (Bondolfi 
et al., 2010; Kuyken et al., 2008; Ma & Teasdale, 2004; Godfrin & van Heeringen, 
2010; Piet & Hougaard, 2011; Teasdale et al., 2000). Besides the cognitive-behavioral 
elements of the therapy, MCBT also uses mindfulness techniques that include the body 
in order to interrupt automatic cognitive processes that can trigger a new depressive 
episode (Burg & Michalak, 2011, see also Felder, Dimidjian, & Segal, 2012; Hofmann, 
Sawyer, & Fang, 2010). The efficacy of MBCT has been shown to be comparable to the 
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continuation of the medication with antidepressants (e.g., Kuyken et al., 2009; 
Barnhofer et al., 2009; Teasdale et al., 2000). Additionally, MBCT has been shown to 
have positive effects on anxiety disorders, such as panic disorder (e.g., Kim et al., 2009, 
Kabat-Zinn, et al., 1992), social anxiety disorder (e.g., Kocovski, Segal, & Battista, 
2009; Koszycki, Benger, Shlik, & Bradwejn, 2007) and generalized anxiety disorder 
(e.g., Craigie, Rees, Marsh, & Nathan, 2008; Evans et al., 2008). Another psychological 
intervention that uses mindfulness is Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR), 
established in 1979 by Jon Kabat-Zinn. MBSR focuses on stress reduction to improve 
physical and emotional well-being in a variety of diseases and disorders. Recent 
literature suggests that MBSR is effective in enhancing quality of life and physical well-
being, and that it is also effective for a broad range of disorders. Specifically, MBSR-
Training enhances the ability to cope with stress in everyday situations, but also in more 
serious stress disorders (Carroll, Lange, Liehr, Raines, & Marcus, 2008; Chang, 2004), 
addiction (Altner, 2002), anxiety disorders (Miller, Fletcher, & Kabat-Zinn, 1995) and 
also physical disorders (e.g., cancer see Carlson, 2004; Carlson, 2005; chronic pain see 
Kabat-Zinn, 1982; for a meta analysis of MBSR and health benefits see also 
Grossmann, Niemann, Schmidt, & Walach, 2004). 
  
4.3. - Psychodrama 
 
Psychodrama is an intervention approach developed by Jacob Levy Moreno 
(1946), whose main objective is for patients to gain insight into their lives, facilitating 
their personal growth. Psychodrama could be employed in non-clinical as well as 
clinical contexts. A person trained in this method (i.e., Psychodrama Director) guides 
the client’s dramatic action in order to explore the environments they live in through 
114 
 
these actions. Clients re-enact past real-life situations in the present, using techniques 
such as role-play, mirroring or sociodrama. These re-enactments are sometimes a 
reproduction of a real situation and sometimes the projection of how the situation was 
perceived by the protagonist (the principal actor). This technique uses the body in 
action as a way of recreating situations that are problematic for the client, giving them 
the opportunity to change their perspectives in order to better evaluate their behavior, to 
enhance or work at a specific stage of the motion and to recall the feelings and 
sensations evoked, and thereby more deeply understand a particular situation in their 
lives. 
As it occurs with other body oriented interventions, empirical data on the 
effectiveness of psychodrama is quite infrequent. Most of the information published on 
this topic is case illustrations, clinical or anecdotal experiences or information which 
has often been based on methodologically weak experimental designs. Empirical 
research, however, is considerably harder to find (Kipper & Ritchie, 2003). Despite the 
relatively small amount of controlled studies aimed at examining the efficiency of 
Psychodrama as a therapeutic intervention, the literature reviews performed during the 
last 30 years (D’Amato & Dean, 1988; Kellermann, 1982; Kipper, 1978; Kipper & 
Hundal, 2003; Rawlingson, 2000), and specially the meta-analysis performed by Kipper 
and Ritchie (2003), suggest that the overall effect size of most common psychodramatic 
interventions (i.e., role reversal and doubling) is similar and in some cases better than 
those reported by other group psychotherapy interventions. In particular, the overall 
treatment effect size found for the 25 studies included in the meta-analysis was .95, 
which could be considered as a large effect (Cohen, 1992). This result implies that 
psychodramatic techniques can be adopted in order to enrich other forms of group 
psychotherapy. As is the case with other body oriented psychotherapies (e.g., 
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sensorimotor therapy), some authors recommend the use of psychodramatic techniques 
for the treatment of traumatic experiences (Kipper, 1998) based on the explanation 
proposed by Van der Kolk, McFarlane and Weisaeth (1996), for the difficulties of 
recounting traumatic experiences. According to these authors, an exposure to a 
terrifying experience freezes the normal biochemical, physical, perceptual, cognitive, 
emotional, psychological and behavioral processes, leaving the sensorimotor memory 
unprocessed. These experiences are registered primarily at the sensorimotor level and 
have never been properly coded at the intellectual memory. They are stuck at the 
sensorimotor level and therefore methods of treatment that address sensorimotor 
memories, such as psychodrama, could be employed to retrieve the painful memories at 
the level they have been previously stored (Kipper, 1998). 
  
4.4. - Sensorimotor psychotherapy 
 
Sensorimotor psychotherapy is an intervention model developed by Pat Ogden 
and her collaborators (Ogden, Minton, & Pain, 2006) for the treatment of patients with 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Ogden & Minton, 2000; Van der Kolk, 
McFarlane, & Weisaeth, 1996). In comparison to other psychological interventions, the 
sensorimotor psychotherapy stresses the importance of intervening at the somatic level, 
because the underlying bodily sensations that are active during cognitive processing 
constitute a biased substrate that influences individual functioning, as well as processes 
related to decision making and especially those concerning the self, and when the 
altered sensorimotor patterns are firmly established, it is difficult for cognitive 
interventions to modify the reactions associated with high physiological activation. 
Among other skills, sensorimotor therapists are supposed to be able to scan and read the 
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body movements and other physical signals of changes in their patients’ autonomous 
activation or bodily sensations, and to verbally reflect these variations in the same way 
that they reflect the cognitions or emotional states of the patient. During the treatment of 
traumatized individuals, it is important to work with their defensive reactions in order to 
restore a flexible and adaptive functioning. Traumatized individuals have experienced 
how their defensive reactions were unsuccessful in guaranteeing their safety. During the 
traumatic experience, individuals are forced to interrupt active defensive reactions 
associated with movement and instead adopt immobilizing defensive reactions, 
paralyzing themselves. However, active defenses are still present in traumatized 
individuals, and can be rediscovered and revitalized by paying attention to their bodies, 
restoring their feeling of power and capacity. It is essential for the sensorimotor therapy 
to identify and resolve the sequence of defensive reactions that contribute to the 
maintenance of symptoms. During the therapy process, through observing what the 
body wants to do whenever the trauma is recalled, the possibility of a different response 
emerges. This response, incipient in the moment of trauma, is revitalized and develops 
into a more flexible and adaptive response to the present moment.  It is important that 
the therapist is able to identify those actions that are incomplete or not expressed, in 
order to help patients to complete these potential actions, facilitating the development of 
new capacities. 
 Sensorimotor psychotherapy is an intervention model which consists of three 
phases. The first phase of the treatment is aimed at identifying somatic reactions linked 
to physiological hyper-activation or hypo-activation, and at exploring existing somatic 
resources and developing new ones that help to maintain the physiological activation 
inside the tolerance window. During the second phase of the treatment, the traumatic 
situations are recalled and these somatic resources are implemented. The objectives of 
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this phase are, on the one hand, to reduce the patients’ avoidance and phobic reactions 
to the traumatic memories and, on the other hand, to explore and enact hidden 
tendencies of action and to implement the somatic resources that help to regulate the 
autonomous physiological responses produced by inadequate defensive reactions. The 
third phase is aimed at normalizing the daily functioning of the patient in those areas 
that could have been affected during the course of the disorder, using the strategies and 
knowledge developed during the two previous phases. 
 Sensorimotor therapy shares its structure and objectives with other 
psychological interventions (e.g., Cloitre, Koenen, Cohen & Han, 2002; Herman, 1992). 
The main contribution of this model is the inclusion of somatic interventions at the 
same level as emotional or cognitive ones, equaling the importance of the ascendant and 
descendent intervention paths. By including the body as a primary way of intervention 
in the reprocessing of trauma, therapists are able to directly act upon the sensations and 
the movements, influencing patients’ symptoms and facilitating changes in cognitions, 
emotions, beliefs and relational capabilities of the patients. 
  
   5. - Conclusions 
 
 The repercussion of embodied cognition on scientific research and the interest 
of authors of different fields on this topic have increased exponentially in the last ten 
years, especially in cognitive neuroscience, social neuroscience, cognitive psychology, 
social psychology, and developmental psychology, but also in robotics, cognitive 
ecology, psycholinguistics and cognitive linguistics (Barsalou, 2010). The embodied 
cognition account has revealed the enthusiasm of some researchers, up to a point that 
some authors have proposed that embodiment may be the appropriate framework for 
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unifying psychological science (Schubert & Semin, 2009), as well as the skepticism of 
some others (e.g., Adams, 2011). 
In our opinion, and according to all the evidence summarized in this overview, we 
consider that embodiment may actually enrich the knowledge we have about 
psychological processes. Concepts, ideas and experimental results of embodiment have 
had an impact on modern psychology. One of the most important outcomes derived 
from embodiment is that more researchers have directed their attention to the influence 
of bodily states on abstract cognitive and emotional processes. The role of the body has 
been restituted, and the importance and influence of sensorimotor processes and bodily 
states in cognition and emotion is increasingly attracting research. Some previously 
mentioned results can have potential implications, both theoretical and applied, but 
indeed, more research focusing on the influence of bodily states in mental processes 
involved in or partially responsible for psychological disorders is needed. We believe 
that there is a lack of studies addressing this question, and therefore revealing influences 
of bodily states in psychological processes related to mental disorders can be of interest 
for both experimental and clinical psychologist. For the former, this could form an 
interesting and highly unexplored field of research, for the later, this could increase the 
motivation of these psychologists to include the body in therapy, and to develop 
bottom-to-top intervention strategies complementary to the most employed top-to-
bottom, which could eventually improve the outcomes of psychotherapy. Moreover, it 
could help to bridge both disciplines, making results from experimental psychology 
more directly applicable for clinicians. Although it may be theoretically plausible to 
propose that bodily states can influence the course of a certain disorder, evidence of this 
influence on psychological processes crucial for the disorder is essential in maintaining 
this hypothesis. Therefore, the aim of the present study is to test whether some of the 
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motor processes that are reported in the revised literature as influencing cognitive or 
affective processes, may have an influence on psychological processes considered to be 
involved in the maintenance of disorders. 
We therefore looked for a psychological process that combines at least three 
important characteristics. First of all, as our interest is to link embodiment and clinical 
psychology, the target process, or a dysfunction on it, must have been 
transdiagnostically related in the literature with the onset or maintenance of one or more 
psychological disorders. Secondly, as a prerequisite of this dissertation is that the 
contribution to the field must be novel and original, the influence of bodily states on the 
target process has to date scarcely been explored. Finally, as there are several 
psychological processes that could fulfill the two previous requisites, we took into 
account the previous experience of our research group on the study of the target process 
and the advantage of providing a step forward in an existing line of research. Thus, for 
the aim of the present study and considering these three pre-requisites, we considered 
that mood regulation was a suitable target process, as it is a perfect intersection between 
the ultimate function of emotions (Koole, 2009) and a diversity of implicit and explicit 
operational modes (Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011). Thus, in the next sections of the 
present work, general information concerning mood regulation will be provided. In 
addition, three experiments, conducted to experimentally explore the influence of bodily 












 There is increasing evidence that a dysfunction in the regulation of negative 
mood states plays a significant role in the onset and maintenance of depression. 
Research has found that levels of depression are associated with the intensity of mood 
regulation deficit. The present study aimed to explore the role which the body plays in 
mood regulation processes. More specifically, we studied whether head movements 
could have an influence on mood regulation in dysphoric states. Participants were 
induced into a sad mood and then performed a mood regulation task in which they were 
presented with a set of positive pictures immediately after performing either vertical 
(i.e., nodding) or lateral (i.e., shaking) head movements. We considered changes in 
mood before and after the experimental task as an index of the effectiveness of mood 
regulation. As expected, the results showed that higher levels of dysphoria were 
associated with greater difficulty in regulating the participants’ mood. More 
importantly, this association was present in participants who shook their heads, but not 
in those who nodded. The implications these results have for the study of mood 
regulation processes and for the understanding and treatment of psychological disorders 
are discussed. 
 




Overt head movements and mood regulation 
 
 According to Thompson’s classical definition, “emotion regulation consists of 
the extrinsic and intrinsic processes responsible for monitoring, evaluating and 
modifying emotional reactions, especially their intensive and temporal features” 
(Thompson, 1994, pages 27-28). This regulation may imply the activation of emotional, 
cognitive or behavioral strategies (Hervas, 2011). Deficits in mood regulation 
characterize many different psychological disorders (Gross & Levenson, 1997). In 
particular, a dysfunction in the regulation of mood states may play a significant role in 
the onset of depression and contribute to the maintenance of depressive symptoms over 
time (Hervas & Vazquez, 2013). Using a longitudinal design, Beevers and Carver 
(2003) found that individuals who showed higher emotional persistence (i.e., slow 
recovery from a sad mood induction) were more likely to show an increase in 
depressive symptoms after a period of a few weeks. Other studies corroborate the 
relationship of deficits in mood regulation and depression. For example, Peeters, 
Nicolson, Delespaul, and deVries (2003), found that negative mood states associated 
with daily negative events lasted longer in depressed patients compared to non-
depressed control group. In another study, Gilboa and Gotlib (1997) found that after a 
negative mood induction, formerly depressed individuals, who were not currently 
depressed, remained in a negative mood for longer than never depressed controls did. 
The level of dysphoria (i.e., depressive symptoms in non-clinical samples) also has an 
impact on the regulation of positive mood. In a laboratory study, McMakin, Santiago, 
and Shirk (2009) found that dysphoric participants have difficulties in maintaining 
positive emotional states in response to positive stimuli (i.e., positive emotion eliciting 
video clips) compared to nondysphoric controls. Research has also found that the 
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severity of depressive symptoms is associated with an inability to regulate mood states 
(e.g., Williams, Fernández-Berrocal, Extremera, Ramos, & Joiner, 2004), which 
suggests a reciprocal relationship between mood regulation and depression. On one 
hand, impairments in the ability to regulate mood are considered to be a vulnerability 
factor of depression and, on the other hand, the more severe the symptoms are, the less 
able individuals are to regulate their mood states. 
 There is ample evidence on the role of cognitive factors in these emotional 
regulation deficits in depression (see Joorman & D’Avanzato, 2010). Mood regulation 
difficulties have been found to be associated with low self-esteem (Heimpel, Wood, 
Marshall & Brown, 2002), rumination (Joorman, 2010), or even attentional strategies 
(Sanchez, Joormann, Marker, LeMoult, and Vazquez, 2013) in depressed participants. 
Yet, the contributions of bodily factors to regulatory processes have received much less 
attention in the literature despite the fact that the notion that body states, postures and 
gestures can influence psychological processes is nothing new. William James (1890) 
was the first psychologist to suggest that body states precede higher order processes, 
such as affective ones. More recently, the embodiment approach has renewed the 
interest of researchers, inspiring them to analyze influences of the body on cognitive 
(e.g., Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Jostmann, Lakens, & Schubert, 2009), social 
(e.g., Briñol & Petty, 2003; Meier, Schnall, Schwarz, & Bargh, 2012) and affective 
processes (e.g., Niedenthal, 2007).  
Following this new embodiment literature, there is emerging evidence 
concerning the role of body signals on altered emotional states. A recent study by Kraft 
and Pressman (2012) has found that facial gestures can influence physical and 
psychological reactions to stress. In this study, participants were divided into three 
groups, two of them were asked to maintain a facial expression in which muscles 
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involved in smiling were active, whereas the third group was asked to maintain a neutral 
expression. Participants in the smiling groups showed lower heart rates during stress 
recovery and reported decreases in positive affect during the stressful task to a lesser 
extent than the neutral group. These results suggest that the activation of muscles 
related to facial expression moderate the impact of stress in terms of affective and 
physical reactions. 
Other sets of studies have addressed the issue of whether gestures involving 
parts of the body other than the face are related to attitudes towards presented material 
(e.g., Briñol & Petty, 2003; Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993; Tom, Pettersen, Lau, 
Burton, & Cook, 1991; Wells & Petty, 1980). For example, in a classic study, Tom et al. 
(1991) found that different head movements associated with approach or avoidance (i.e., 
nodding and shaking) influenced participants’ attitudes when making decisions or 
showing preferences during the task. Recent research has replicated and extended these 
findings with refined methodologies and through different manipulations (e.g., Briñol & 
Petty, 2007; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Ric & Krauth-Gruber, 2005) which allows us to 
conclude that “some forms of motor biases or their sensory consequences can subtly 
influence a person's attitude” (Cacioppo et al.,1993, p.15).  
From a theoretical point of view, Interacting Cognitive Subsystem (ICS) theory 
proposed by Teasdale & Barnard (1993) is a useful point of reference when considering 
the existing data. This theory emphasizes the importance of considering a multi-level 
model for adequately accounting for affective reactions (see also Philippot, Baeyens, 
Douilliez, & Francart, 2004; Power & Dalgleish, 1997; 2008). The ICS model 
specifically proposes that body states can directly affect the emotional experience 
without the mediation of verbal/propositional codes. This direct body-emotion pathway 
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has been advocated by these authors to account for a non-cognitive pathway to 
depression maintenance.  
Unfortunately, despite the interest of these theoretical considerations, empirical 
studies supporting this hypothesis (i.e., a direct influence of body signals in maladaptive 
psychological processes) are very scarce. We can find an exception in some classical 
studies. Riskind and his colleagues explored whether the posture (i.e., upright or 
slumped) affected participants’ emotional persistence (Riskind & Gotay, 1982) and their 
emotional reactions after negative feedback (Riskind, 1984). Duclos et al. (1989) 
explored whether facial gestures and bodily postures associated with anger, sadness or 
disgust affected participants’ emotional experience. The results of these studies 
confirmed the idea that bodily postures may have an impact on affective outcomes. 
Thus, based on prior research that showed that body movements can influence 
attitudes and emotional reactions, it is plausible to hypothesize that the body can also 
affect emotion-related processes with important implications for clinical disorders. 
Thus, the aim of the present study is to test whether body movements that are reported 
in the literature as somatic components of emotions (see Tom et al., 1991) may actively 
affect mood regulation. The approach of this research is relevant because it could open 
up new avenues in the treatment of emotional disorders. 
More specifically, in the present study we explore whether head movements, that 
have been shown to affect participants’ emotions in previous research, can modulate the 
influence of dysphoria on how efficiently participants regulate their mood after a sad 
mood induction. After a sad mood induction participants are assigned to one of two 
experimental conditions. In one condition, participants perform vertical head 
movements (i.e., nodding); in the other condition they perform lateral head movements 
(i.e., shaking). We measure dysphoria and anxiety levels at the beginning of the 
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experiment and the mood state prior to the mood induction, after the mood induction 
and after the experimental task. 
According to current literature, we first hypothesize that after the sad mood 
induction, participants with higher levels of dysphoria would show poorer mood 
regulation than participants with lower levels of dysphoria. Our second hypothesis is 
that performing nodding-like head movements accompanying the appearance of 
regulation-facilitating visual stimuli (i.e., positive emotional images) will help 





42 undergraduate students (24% men, M = 21.4 years) participated in this 20-
min experiment and received course credits for their participation. All participants 
reported to be right handed and to have normal hearing and normal or corrected-to-
normal vision.  
Stimuli and apparatus  
For the sad mood induction a 9-minute sad music piece (i.e., Prokofiev’s Russia 
under the Mongolian Yoke played at half speed) and three negative scenes (see Hervas 
& Vazquez, 2013) were used. A similar procedure has proved to be effective in 
inducing sad mood states (Clark & Teasdale, 1985; Hervas & Vazquez, 2013). 
A sample of 25 pictures1
                                                 
1 The 25 IAPS images used in the present study were 1440, 1463, 1540, 1720, 1810, 1811, 
2030, 2040, 2057, 2080, 2091, 2160, 2224, 2344, 2346, 2362, 2391, 4609, 4610, 4617, 4623, 
4640, 5270, 5480, 5628, 5660, 5820, 5830, 5890, 5982, 7200, 7260, 7410, 7570 and 7580. 
 with positive valence (M = 7.4) and medium arousal 
(M = 4.9) were selected from the International Affective Picture System database 
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(IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). Pictures were presented on a black 
background (0.23 cd/m2) in the middle of a 15-inch computer screen.  
Four visual references consisting of a green square (23 x 23 mm) in the middle 
of a yellow rectangle (38 x 51mm) were placed in the experimental room. Two of them 
were located in front of the participant; one situated at a height of 1.80 m and the other 
at a height of 0.8 m. The other two were placed to the left and right of the individual, at 
a height of approximately 1.2 m. 
Measures. Measures of positive and depressive mood state (Mood state 
assessment; EVEA; Sanz, 2001), dysphoria (Beck Depression Inventory-II; BDI-II; 
Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) and anxiety (Beck Anxiety Inventory; BAI; Beck, Epstein, 
Brown & Steer, 1988) were collected. In the present experiment the internal 
consistencies of the positive and depressive subscales of the EVEA, BDI-II, and BAI 
the, were α = .91, α = .88, α = .83, α = .93, respectively.  
Procedure and design. The design of the experiment and the format of a 
standard experimental trial are presented in Figure 1. Initially, participants read and 
signed the consent form at the beginning of the experiment. Subsequently, participants 
were asked to complete an initial set of questionnaires, consisting of EVEA (Time 1), 
BDI-II and BAI. These measures were considered baseline measures. Once the first set 
of questionnaires was completed, participants were induced into a sad mood state. 
Immediately after the mood induction, participants completed a second EVEA (Time 2). 
Once the questionnaires were completed, participants were randomly assigned to one of 
the two experimental conditions. Participants in the nodding condition were asked on 
two occasions to look at the visual references placed up and down in front of them, 
alternating between the two, whenever a cross appeared on the computer screen. In 
contrast, participants in the shaking condition were asked on two occasions to look at 
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the visual references placed at their left and right, alternating between the two, 
whenever a cross appeared on the computer screen. In both conditions participants were 
told to just look at the pictures, once they appeared on the screen. The instructions given 
to participants did not allow them to guess the real purpose of the experiment. It was 
presented as a study aimed to examine how directing foveal attention to peripheral 
regions may influence memory processes. In order to avoid participants moving only 
their eyes, participants were told that to ensure foveal vision, it was necessary to move 
their heads, so their eyes could remain centered in their orbit thus maximizing foveal 
attention. 
The experimental block consisted of 50 experimental trials. An experimental 
trial consisted of a blank screen (1,500 ms) which was followed by a fixation cross 
(4,000 ms), followed by one of the selected pictures (3,500 ms), and a blank screen 
(2,500 ms). Each one of the pictures appeared twice during the experimental block. At 
the end of the experimental block, participants were asked to complete a third EVEA 
(Time 3) questionnaire. 
 Finally, participants were fully debriefed and asked to guess the purpose of the 




Figure 1. The figure shows a graphic description of the procedure (upper timeline) and of a 
standard experimental trial (lower timeline) in the mood regulation task. BDI-II: Beck 
Depression Inventory- II; BAI: Beck Anxiety Inventory; EVEA: Escala de Evaluación del 
Estado de Ánimo [Mood State Assessment Scale]. 
 
Statistical analyses.  
All statistical analyses were performed using the software package SPSS 15.0 
for Windows (SPSS Inc., Chicago, Illinois). 
A series of t-tests were performed on baseline measures (BDI-II, BAI, positive, 
negative and total EVEA at Time 1) in order to ensure that both groups did not 
significantly differ in terms of the relevant variables at the beginning of the experiment. 
Similarly, a t-test comparing EVEA scores at Time 1 and Time 2 was performed, in 
order to test the effectiveness of the mood induction procedure.  
Changes in the EVEA mood scores obtained after the mood induction procedure 
served as the main dependent variable. As variability among initial scores is a problem 
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common to many pre-post comparisons, we constructed residualized EVEA change 
scores using a simple linear regression model in which post-movement EVEA scores 
(Time 3) were predicted by post-induction EVEA scores (Time 2). This procedure 
allows the variability to be separated from the residuals from the EVEA scores in Time 
2. A set of three different residuals (positive, depressive and total EVEA scores) were 
used as criteria in the subsequent regression analyses. 
Subsequently, we centered (Holmbeck, 2002) the continuous predictor variable 
(i.e., dysphoria, as measured by BDI scores) and encoded the categorical variable (i.e., 
the experimental condition) as a dummy (0 = nodding; 1 = shaking) (Calvete, 2008; 
Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 2004). Then, following standard requirements for moderation 
analyses (e.g., Baron & Kenny, 1986), stepwise multiple regression was performed to 
test whether head movements moderate mood changes from Time 2 to Time 3, using 
residualized EVEA change scores as dependent variables (including centered dysphoria 
in the first step, type of movement in the second step, and their interaction in the third 
step).  
Finally, we conducted tests of simple slopes by comparing at Time 3 the slopes 
of the regression line predicting changes in mood state from dysphoria levels for 
participants who nodded vs. participants who shook their head. These analyses and their 
correspondent graphs are recommended to better understand the interaction between 
variables in moderation analyses that include a categorical and a continuous variable 





 Participants in the nodding experimental condition did not significantly differ at 
Time 1 from participants in the shaking experimental condition in any of the relevant 
variables (BDI-II, BAI, positive, negative and total EVEA, all p> .11). 
 The sad mood induction procedure produced a significant decrease in positive 
(MT1-T2 = -8.90, p<.001) and total mood (M T1-T2 = -16.57, p<.001), as well as a 
significant increase in depressive mood (M T1-T2 = 7.56, p<.001). 
 The results of the stepwise regression analyses are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 Stepwise regression analyses predicting changes in positive, negative and total 
mood state at T3. 
  β t ΔR2 
Negative 
mood (T3) 
    
 Step 1   .10* 
 Dysphoria .32 2.10*  
     
 Step 2   .00 
 Dysphoria .31 2.04*  
 Movement -.05 -.32  
     
 Step 3   .07† 
 Dysphoria .11 .59  
 Movement -.04 -.29  
 Dysphoria*Movement .33 1.78†  
Positive 
mood (T3) 
    
 Step 1   .01 
 Dysphoria -.11 -.68  
     
 Step 2   .01 
 Dysphoria -.12 -.73  
 Movement -.10 -.62  
     
 Step 3   .13* 
 Dysphoria .16 .82  
 Movement -.11 -.72  
 Dysphoria*Movement -.45 -2.36*  
Total mood 
(T3) 
    
 Step 1   .10* 
 Dysphoria -.31 -2.05*  
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 Step 2   .00 
 Dysphoria -.31 -2.02*  
 Movement -.002 -.01  
     
 Step 3   .13* 
 Dysphoria -.04 -.20  
 Movement -.01 -.08  
 Dysphoria*Movement -.45 -2.48*  
 * p < .05; † p < .10 
As can be seen in Table 1, dysphoria was a significant predictor of change in 
depressive and total mood, but not in positive mood. Type of movement was not 
associated with changes in mood state. Yet, most importantly, the interaction between 
dysphoria and the type of movement was the only significant predictor of changes in 
positive and total mood state, and was a marginally significant predictor of changes in 
depressive mood state. This result indicates that the type of movement performed 
moderated the influence of dysphoria levels on mood state changes, as can be seen in 
Figure 2. 
Simple slope analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) clarified this moderation. Dysphoria 
was not a statistically significant predictor of changes in residual negative (β=.14, 
p=.54), positive (β=.17, p=.47), or total mood (β=-.04, p=.87) after the experimental 
task when participants nodded. Yet, dysphoria did predict changes in residual negative 
(β=.50, p=.02), positive (β=-.52, p=.02), and total mood (β=-.69, p<.001) when 
participants shook their heads. As expected, among participants who shook their heads, 
the severity of dysphoria was associated with a worsened mood after the mood 
regulation task. However, among participants who nodded their heads, the effect of 





Figure 2. Interaction effects Dysphoria x Type of Movement when the 
change in negative (upper graph) positive (middle graph) and total 





 The aim of the present work was to examine whether body movements may have 
an impact on mood regulation processes. Specifically, we examined whether overt head 
movements may moderate the relationship between dysphoria and mood regulation. In 
line with previous results, and confirming our first hypothesis, dysphoria severity was 
associated with difficulties in regulating mood after a sad mood induction. In general, 
participants with higher levels of dysphoria showed poorer mood regulation when 
exposed to a set of positive stimuli than participants with lower levels of dysphoria. 
More importantly, overt head movements moderated this relationship thus confirming 
our second hypothesis. Specifically, the association between levels of dysphoria and 
mood regulation deficit was only present among those participants who performed 
lateral head movements. The act of nodding the head seemed to counteract the effect of 
dysphoria, improving participants’ ability to regulate mood. 
 Earlier research has found that facial gestures moderate the influence of stress in 
affective and physical reactions (Kraft & Pressman, 2012) and also that body postures 
and movements affect emotion reactions (e.g., Duclos et al., 1989; Riskind & Gotay, 
1982). Our study expands these findings in two directions. First, it demonstrates that 
besides facial gestures, which are physiologically more directly linked to emotional 
neural circuitry, overt head movements affect mood regulation. This finding suggests 
that body movements, other than facial gestures, can influence the recovery from sad 
mood in dysphoric individuals, which could have important clinical implications. 
Secondly, the present study shows that the influence of body movements on emotional 
processes is not restricted to stress, but also to sad mood, extending implications 
eventually to the field of mood disorders.  
Moreover, our results can help to explain, from a different perspective, some 
results found in previous studies. For example, previous research has reported that some 
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strategies which are efficiently used by non-depressed participants to regulate their 
mood, as recalling positive information when they are in a sad mood (Joorman, Siemer, 
& Gotlib, 2007) or watching a positive clip (McMakin et al., 2009), are not equally 
effective when used by individuals with high levels of depressive symptoms. There is 
not a clear explanation for this null effect of standard strategies of mood regulation in 
depressed individuals. In light of our results, a plausible hypothesis is that body 
movements, gestures or facial expressions present in the sample of dysphoric 
individuals might be incongruent with the mood-enhancing task, preventing its 
effectiveness.  
The present results support the theoretical principles that guided ICS theory, 
since modifying body states affected the efficacy of mood regulation. Actually, ICS 
theory suggests that body signals directly affect the implicational level (i.e., schematic 
models of experience) in maintaining mood states. Specifically, this theory proposes 
that schematic models related to affect have to be continuously “regenerated” in order to 
maintain mood (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993, p. 100). Two interacting loops contribute to 
this continuous feeding of affect-related schematic models (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993, 
p. 127). The first one is a verbally loaded ruminative loop (Propositional  
Implicational  Propositional); whereas the second one can be considered as a somatic 
loop (Body states  Implicational  Somatic-Visceral-Body effects  Body states).  
Thus, two different pathways can feed implicational meanings. Whereas much effort 
has been devoted to analyze and modify the influence of ruminative loops on the 
maintenance of negative schemata (e.g., Vanderhasselt & De Raedt, 2012), research 
aiming to test the somatic loop is much scarcer. The present study provides initial 
evidence of the influence of this somatic loop in dysphoric states. Future research 
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should assess more directly whether changes in body states may induce changes at the 
implicational level.  
Finally, the present study gives further support to the embodiment approach and 
underscores its potential clinical implications (for a review see Rahona, Ruiz Fernández, 
Hervas, Rolke & Vazquez, 2013). Although levels of dysphoria were not as high as in 
clinical samples, our results suggest that positive movements could easily be employed 
as a successful coping strategy after a negative event in life. In this sense, if this line of 
research is extended to clinical population and consolidated, it could help to enrich 
therapeutic approaches, making them more comprehensive and effective (e.g., 
refractory cases) by involving therapy motor and corporal components aimed at 


































Previous studies have found an influence of bodily states on higher order 
cognitive processes involved in psychological disorders. For example, an influence of 
facial gestures on the recovery of stressful tasks was reported in a recent study by Kraft 
& Pressman (2012). Rahona, Ruiz Fernández, Rolke, Vazquez and Hervas (2013) found 
that overt head movements can moderate the effect of dysphoria on mood regulation 
processes. The present study was carried out parallel to Study 2.1, and aimed to test 
whether the results obtained in Study 2.1 could be extended to other movements that 
have been associated with approach and avoidance. Specifically, the design of Rahona 
et al. (2013; Study 2.1) was replicated, in this occasion manipulating arm movements 
(i.e., arm flexion vs. arm extension) as the independent variable. The results obtained in 
the present study suggest that, contrary to our hypotheses, arm movements do not play a 




Evidence of an effect of overt head movements on regulatory processes was 
found in Study 2.1. This result makes a new question arise regarding what kind of 
movements may have a similar effect on mood regulation. The literature on 
embodiment is rich in postures and gestures that may have an influence on high-order 
cognitive processes (e.g., Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, & Krauth-Gruber, 2005; 
see also Rahona, Ruiz Fernández, Hervas, Rolke & Vazquez, 2013). Among bodily 
postures with an influence on cognitive processes, probably one of the most studied is 
the bodily posture involving arm flexions and extensions. For example, in the study by 
Cacioppo, Priester and Bernston (1993), participants had to evaluate Chinese 
ideographs while pulling or pushing on a table. Under these conditions, participants 
evaluated stimuli as more positive when they pulled than when they pushed the table. 
These results are interpreted by the authors as an embodiment of approach and 
avoidance reactions. Whereas people are habituated to attract objects that they desire by 
flexing their arms, they are used to rejecting objects that are undesired by extending 
their arms. In the opinion of these authors, these arm movements are stored as motor 
components of approach/avoidance behaviors. In congruency with the results of 
Cacioppo et al., a complementary study by Chen and Bargh (1999) showed that the 
content of evaluated stimuli could facilitate or inhibit arm movements. Specifically, 
after watching positive stimuli, participants were faster at performing arm flexions than 
arm extensions, whereas the opposite was true when participants watched negative 
stimuli. Other researchers provided further information about the influence of arm 
movements on higher order cognitive processes (Centerbar & Clore, 2006; Cretenet & 
Dru, 2008; Dru & Cretenet, 2004; 2005; Förster & Strack, 1997; 1998; Friedman & 
Foster, 2000; 2002; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Maxwell & Davidson, 2007; Rottevel 
& Phaf, 2004; Taylor & Zwaan, 2008; Zwaan, van der Stoep, Guadalupe, & 
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Bouwmeester, 2012) and, most importantly, arm movements have been successfully 
used in a program aimed at modifying psychological processes involved in disorders. 
To be specific, in the study carried out by Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker and Lindenmeyer 
(2011), arm movements have been successfully employed as part of a module of 
Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM; MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & 
Holker, 2002), aiming to modify approach tendencies towards alcohol among alcoholic 
patients. In this study, participants were randomly assigned either to an experimental or 
a control condition. Patients in the experimental condition were trained to consistently 
push a joystick in response to alcohol pictures and pull a joystick in response to pictures 
of nonalcoholic drinks, whereas patients in the control conditions were either not trained 
to avoid alcohol at all or received sham training. Only the patients in the experimental 
condition showed a modified bias for alcohol, changing from a small approach bias to a 
strong avoidance bias for alcohol. Additionally, when those participants were evaluated 
one year later, the authors found that relapse rates among the experimental group were 
lower (46%) than among the control group (59%). 
Therefore, we consider that arm movements could be an adequate candidate to 
continue testing the influence of bodily states in mood regulation. Specifically, we 
replicated the design of Study 2.1, but in this case, instead of overt head movements, 
participants were asked to either push (i.e., avoid condition) or pull (i.e., approach 
condition) on a lever placed to the right at the front of the experimental desk. Our 
hypotheses were identical to these formulated in Study 2.1. Specifically, we first 
hypothesized that after the sad mood induction, participants with higher levels of 
dysphoria would show poorer mood regulation than participants with lower levels of 
dysphoria. Our second hypothesis was that performing an arm flexion accompanying 
the appearance of regulation-facilitating visual stimuli (i.e., positive emotional images) 
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would help participants to recover from a sad mood state more effectively than when 
performing an arm extension. 
Method 
Participants. 40 students (35 women, 5 men) from the Complutense University 
of Madrid participated in this 20-min experiment and received course credits for their 
participation. On average participants were aged 22.3 years, and all of them were right 
handed and reported normal hearing and normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
Stimuli and apparatus. The stimuli used for the mood induction, as well as the 
sample of 25 IAPS pictures, were identical to those used in Study 2.1. A slider identical 
to the one used in the study by Ulrich, Eikmeier, de la Vega, Ruiz Fernández, Alex-Ruf, 
and Maienborn (2012) was used to allow participants to perform arm flexions or 
extensions. 
Measures. Measures were identical to the ones used in Study 2.1. 
Procedure and design. The procedure and design were identical to those used in 
Study 2.1, with the only exception of the instructions given to participants. Participants 
in the arm-flexion condition were asked to pull the lever towards them whenever a 
fixation cross appeared on the computer screen, and keep the lever at the endpoint of the 
slider until the presented picture disappeared. Participants in the arm-extension 
condition were asked to push the lever away from them whenever a fixation cross 
appeared on the computer screen, and keep the lever at the endpoint of the slider until 
the presented picture disappeared. Once the picture disappeared from the computer 
screen, participants in both conditions took the lever back to the middle point of the 




Statistical analyses.The only difference between Studies 2.1 and 2.2 was the 
independent variable manipulated (i.e., arm movements instead overt head movements). 
Consequently, all statistical analyses performed on Study 2.2 were identical to those 
performed in Study 2.1. 
Results 
Participants in the arm flexion condition did not significantly differ at Time 1 
from participants in the arm extension condition in any of the relevant variables (BDI-II, 
BAI, positive, negative and total EVEA, all p> .31). 
The sad mood induction produced significant decreases in positive (MT1-T2 = -
10.05, p<.001) and total mood (M T1-T2 = -20.27, p<.001) as well as significant increases 
in depressive mood (M T1-T2 = 10.22, p<.001). 
Regression analyses revealed results that contrast with those obtained in Study 
2.1. First of all, we could not confirm our first hypothesis, as the level of dysphoria did 
not significantly predict changes in depressive mood (β=.18, p=.26) and only marginally 
predicted significant changes in positive (β= -.28, p=.08) and total mood (β=.-29, 
p=.07). It may be possible, however, that this absence of significance was due to an 
interaction between Dysphoria and Type of movement. If this was the case, the level of 
dysphoria could be, for example, a significant predictor of mood changes among those 
individuals who performed arm extensions, but not among those who performed arm 
flexions. Moderation analyses on residualized mood changes were performed by 
introducing Dysphoria (i.e., BDI-II scores) as predictor in Step 1, Type of movement 
(i.e., arm extension=0, arm flexion = 1) as categorical predictor in Step 2, and 
Dysphoria x Type of movement as a predictor in Step 3. As can be observed in Table 2, 
143 
 
neither the Type of movement performed, nor the interaction Dysphoria x Type of 
movement, proved to be a significant predictor of changes in mood state. Thus, the 
second hypothesis, which proposed that arm movements may moderate the influence of 
dysphoric states on mood regulation, could not be confirmed. 
Table 2. Stepwise multiple regression analyses predicting changes in positive, negative and total 
mood state at T3. 
  β T ΔR2 
Negative mood 
(T3) 
    
 Step 1   .03 
 Dysphoria .18 1.16  
     
 Step 2   .04 
 Dysphoria .18 1.15  
 Movement -.19 -1.21  
     
 Step 3   .00 
 Dysphoria .24 1.14  
 Movement -.11 -.41  
 Dysphoria*Movement -.12 -.41  
Positive mood 
(T3) 
    
 Step 1   .08† 
 Dysphoria -.28 -1.81†  
     
 Step 2   .00 
 Dysphoria -.28 -1.78†  
 Movement .03   .20  
     
 Step 3   .01 
 Dysphoria -.19 -.93  
 Movement .17 .64  
 Dysphoria*Movement -.19 -.65  
Total mood 
(T3) 
    
 Step 1   .08† 
 Dysphoria -.29 -1.86†  
     
 Step 2   .01 
 Dysphoria -.29 -1.85†  
 Movement .12   .75  
     
 Step 3   .00 
 Dysphoria -.27 -1.30  
 Movement .15 .56  
 Dysphoria*Movement -.04 -.13  





 This experiment aimed to extend the results obtained in Study 2.1, (i.e., overt 
head movements may moderate the influence of dysphoria on mood regulation 
processes) to other body movements (i.e., arm movements). The results obtained, 
however, do not allow us to confirm our hypotheses. According to the first hypothesis, 
we expected that the level of dysphoria would be a predictor of mood regulation 
abilities, that is, participants with higher levels of dysphoria at T1 should be less able to 
regulate their mood states after the sad mood induction. In contrast with the findings 
obtained in Study 2.1, in the present study only a tendency in the expected direction was 
found. The characteristics of the sample may account for this result. Although a similar 
sample size was used in both experiments (42 participants in Study 2 vs. 40 participants 
in Study 3), both samples differed in dysphoric/non-dysphoric ratio at T1. Whereas in 
Study 2.1 almost a half of the participants (i.e., 47.6 %) scored 10 or higher in BDI-II, 
in the present study less than a quarter (i.e., 22.5%) reported scores 10 or higher. 
Therefore, it seems that dysphoric individuals were underrepresented in the present 
study in comparison to the previous one, and this fact could explain the absence of 
statistical significance supporting hypothesis 1. 
 The second (and the most important) hypothesis of the present study did not 
receive any support from the present data. Arm movements did not play any role in 
mood regulation. Although it is always difficult to explain null experimental effects, 
there are some potential factors that might explain them. First, it may be possible that 
the association of arm extension and arm flexion with avoidance and approach is not 
universal and cannot be found, or it is less pronounced, in some cultures. To our 
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knowledge, no findings similar to those by Cacioppo et al. (1993) have ever been tested 
in Spanish samples. Secondly, it could be that contextual changes in the design may 
affect the perceived valence of the movement. For example, in a series of three 
experiments, Centerbar and Clore (2006) found that the valence of stimuli being 
approached or avoided affected the attitudinal impact of approach-avoidance action. 
Their results suggest that movements are situated acts, and that changing contextual 
conditions may affect how the movement affects attitude. In their experiment, the 
authors used both mild negative and mild positive stimuli and found an interaction 
between arm movement and stimulus valence. In our experiment, only positive stimuli 
were used, and this modification of the setting may have affected the influence of arm 
movements on mood regulation. Thirdly, it might be argued that vertical and lateral 
head movements, but not arm movements, are strongly associated with positive and 
negative attitudes. Independently of the context, in western cultures lateral head 
movements usually imply refusal or negative attitude, whereas vertical head movements 
imply approval or positive attitude (e.g., Fusaro, Harris, & Pan, 2012). However, the 
arm flexion and extension association with approach and avoidance may not be as 
univocally associated with attitudes. For example, one may flex an arm to avoid the 
pain produced by a hot object or to protect the face from a ball shot, and one can extend 
an arm to reach a juicy piece of fruit, to give a present or to express joy and success. In 




 The present study aimed to test whether arm movements may have an influence 
on mood regulation. Contrary to what was hypothesized, dysphoria levels did not affect 
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participants’ ability to regulate their mood. Nevertheless, a trend in the expected 
direction was found, and the observed differences between both samples could account 
for this result. Most importantly, the data do not allow us to suggest any influence of 
arm movements on mood regulation. A closer look at some previous studies suggests 
that contextual factors may affect the meaning of performed actions. The overall 
discussion and implications of these findings, within the context of the rest of the 










Rahona, Ruiz Fernández, Rolke, Vazquez and Hervas (2013; Study 2.1) found 
that overt head movements can moderate the effect of dysphoria on mood regulation 
processes. In Study 2.1, however, only an indirect influence and not a direct influence, 
of overt head movements on mood regulation was found. It is possible that the 
regulatory task (i.e., watching positive images) conditioned this result, producing a 
ceiling effect that could have masked a direct influence of overt head movements on 
mood regulation. The present study aimed to examine this question by introducing some 
changes regarding Study 2.1. Specifically, the design of Study 2.1 was replicated, this 
time including neutral images (instead of positive ones) in the experimental task. 
Additionally, some possible shortcomings of the previous studies are taken into account 
in the design of the present study. In order to enhance the power of statistical analyses, a 
greater sample (N=52) is used and additional measures of positive and negative affect 
(Positive and Negative Affect Scales, PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) are 
collected. The results obtained in the present study suggest that overt head movements 
do not have a direct influence on mood regulation processes. Additionally, our results 
show that levels of dysphoria do not predict the participants’ ability to regulate mood 
when the task only includes images with neutral content. These results and their 








Most of the research devoted to examining the influence of overt head 
movements on cognitive processes has been carried out in the field of persuasion and 
attitude change (e.g., Briñol & Petty, 2003; 2007; Briñol, Petty, & Wagner, 2011; 
Förster, 2004; Förster & Strack, 1996; Neumann, & Strack, 2000; Tom, Petersen, Lau, 
Burton, & Cook, 1991; Wells & Petty, 1980). Most of these studies have suggested 
indirect paths of influence of overt head movements, but some have also suggested a 
possible direct path. For example, Briñol and Petty (2007, p. 3) proposed five 
alternative mechanisms where performing bodily responses may facilitate attitude 
change: “(a) affecting the amount of issue-relevant thinking that occurs, (b) producing a 
bias to the thoughts that come to mind, (c) affecting structural properties of the 
thoughts, such as thought confidence, (d) serving as persuasive evidence (i.e., 
arguments), and (e) serving as simple peripheral cues to change”. Among these 
proposed paths of influence, the first three seem to be indirect, whereas the last two 
seem to be more direct paths of influence. Similarly, Wells & Petty (1980) suggested 
that nodding (shaking) head movements indirectly affect attitude change by facilitating 
the appearance of positive (negative) thoughts, and inhibiting the appearance of 
negative (positive) thoughts. In comparison, Tom et al. (1991) suggested that under 
certain conditions, head movements may act as a simple cue for attitude change, a more 
direct mechanism of influence in attitude change. Although it is not possible to directly 
extrapolate results from research on persuasion to the study of mood regulation, it is 
plausible to hypothesize that some of the paths of influence of bodily states on 
persuasion are broad enough to affect other psychological processes, such as mood 
regulation. In study 2.1, an indirect influence of bodily states on mood regulation 
processes was found. To be more specific, dysphoric participants in the nodding 
condition showed that, similar to non-dysphoric participants, they were able to regulate 
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mood states. On the contrary, dysphoric participants in the shaking condition presented 
a diminished ability to regulate their mood states. This result indicates that bodily states 
could act as a moderator between levels of dysphoria and an individual’s efficiency of 
mood regulation, but in study 2.1 a direct influence of overt head movements on mood 
regulation was not found. Some studies suggest that the variation of some parameters of 
the experiment (e.g., the valence of the information presented to participants) modulates 
the influence of bodily states in attitudes (e.g., Briñol & Petty, 2003; Centerbar & Clore, 
2006). In study 2.1, positive pictures were presented to participants while they 
performed either vertical or lateral head movements. Under these conditions, an indirect 
influence, but not a direct one, of overt head movements in mood regulation was found. 
But it is generally accepted that paying attention to positive information is a strategy 
that facilitates mood regulation (e.g., Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998; Sanchez, 
Joormann, Marker, LeMoult, & Vazquez, 2013). Therefore, it is possible that the 
improvement of mood regulation ability due to the visualization of positive material has 
produced a ceiling effect, thereby masking a direct influence of bodily states on mood 
regulation. The aim of the present study is to try to reveal more information about the 
path of influence of overt head movements on mood regulation. In the present study, the 
positive pictures included in the experimental task of Studies 2.1 & 2.2 were replaced 
by pictures of neutral faces from the FACES database (Ebner, Riediger, & 
Lindenberger, 2010).  
To overcome one limitation that arose in the previous two studies, in the present 
study we collected a 30 percent greater sample size (N = 52) because the number of 
dysphoric individuals might be too small in a sample of around 40 participants (as was 
the case in Study 2.2).  
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Moreover, in order to have a more reliable measure of participants’ mood states, 
additional measures of positive and negative affect (Positive and Negative Affect 
Scales, PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) were collected. 
We hypothesize that the conditions of the present study may facilitate the 
appearance of a direct influence of bodily states on mood regulation. Additionally, we 
expect that participants with higher levels of dysphoria would show poorer mood 
regulation than participants with lower levels of dysphoria. An interaction between 
levels of dysphoria and the movement performed similar to the one obtained in 




52 undergraduate students (40 women, 12 men) with an average age of 20.8 
years participated in this 30-min experiment. Participants were recruited at the 
Complutense University of Madrid in exchange for course credits. Due to a technical 
problem, one participant could not complete the study and was excluded from the 
analyses. Additionally, three participants guessed the real aim of the experiment, and 
were also excluded. Therefore, analyses were performed on the 48 valid cases. 
Stimuli and apparatus.  
The sad mood induction was identical to the one used in Studies 2.1 & 2.2. 
Instead of the 25 positive images from the International Affective Picture System 
database (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008), 25 pictures of neutral faces from the 
FACES database (Ebner, Riediger, & Lindenberger, 2010) were used in this 




As in study 2.1, measures of positive and depressive mood state (Mood state 
assessment; EVEA; Sanz, 2001), dysphoria (Beck Depression Inventory-II; BDI-II; 
Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) and anxiety (Beck Anxiety Inventory; BAI; Beck, Epstein, 
Brown & Steer, 1988) were collected. Additionally, measures of positive and negative 
affect (Positive and Negative Affect Scales, PANAS Watson et al., 1988) were also 
collected. All scales reported high to very high internal consistencies. In the present 
study, the internal consistencies of the positive and depressive subscales of the EVEA, 
BDI-II, BAI and the positive and negative affect scales, were α = .94, α = .81, α = .85, α 
= .87, α = .88, α = .89, respectively. 
Procedure and design. 
The procedure and design were identical to those used in Study 2.1, with the 
only exception of the images used in the experimental task and the inclusion of the 
PANAS (Watson et al., 1988). 
Statistical analyses. 
All statistical analyses performed in Study 3 are identical to those performed in 
Study 2.1.  
Results 
Participants in the nodding experimental condition did not significantly differ at 
Time 1 from participants in the shaking experimental condition in most of the relevant 
variables (BDI-II, BAI, positive and negative affect, and depressive and total EVEA, all 
p> .23). Both groups significantly differed at Time 1 in their positive EVEA scores with 
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a higher mean score in the nodding (27.52) than in the shaking (22.52) group [t(46)= 
2,38; p= .02]. 
The sad mood induction procedure produced a significant decrease in positive 
affect [MT1-T2 = -7.46; t(46)= 6.49; p<.001], as well as positive [MT1-T2 = -10.88; t(46)= 
9.76;  p<.001] and total mood [M T1-T2 = -20.94; t(46)= 9.97;  p<.001]. The sad induction 
also produced a significant increase in depressive mood (M T1-T2 = 10.06; t(46)= -7.65; 
p<.001) and negative affect (M T1-T2 = 6.46; t(46)= -5.91; p<.001). 
The results of the stepwise regression analyses are presented in Table 3. In 
contrast to the results of experiment 2.1, in the present study, dysphoria levels (i.e., 
BDI-II scores at the beginning of the experiment) did not predict participants’ changes 
in affect or mood (all β ranged between .14 y -.08, all p> .33). Similar to what was 
found in experiment 2.1, but contrary to our second hypothesis, the movement 
performed did not seem to directly affect mood regulation or affective change (ps> .19). 
The movement performed did not interact with the initial levels of dysphoria (all ps > 
.69), except for negative affect, where a marginally significant interaction [t(46)= -1,75, 
p= .09] arose. Since no moderation effect was found, simple slope analyses were not 
performed in the present study.  
Table 3 
  β t ΔR2 
Negative mood 
(T3) 
    
 Step 1   .02 
 Dysphoria .14 .97  
      
 Step 2   .02 
 Dysphoria .15 1.01  
 Movement -.15 -1.04  
     
 Step 3   .00 
 Dysphoria .13 .63  
 Movement -.15 -1.03  





    
 Step 1   .00 
 Dysphoria -.01 -.08  
      
 Step 2   .04 
 Dysphoria -.01 -.04  
 Movement -.20 -1.33  
     
 Step 3   .004 
 Dysphoria .05 .26  
 Movement -.20 -1.32  
 Dysphoria*Movement -.08 -.41  
Total mood (T3)     
 Step 1   .01 
 Dysphoria -.10 -.65  
     
 Step 2   .002 
 Dysphoria -.09 -.63  
 Movement -.04 -.27  
     
 Step 3   .003 
 Dysphoria -.04 -.19  
 Movement -.04 -.27  
 Dysphoria*Movement -.08 -.37  
Negative affect 
(T3) 
    
 Step 1   .005 
 Dysphoria .07 .46  
     
 Step 2   .004 
 Dysphoria .07 .47  
 Movement -.06 -.41  
     
 Step 3   .07† 
 Dysphoria .32 1.57  
 Movement -.06 -.41  
 Dysphoria*Movement -.36 -1.75†  
Positive affect 
(T3) 
    
 Step 1   .006 
 Dysphoria -.08 -.54  
     
 Step 2   .003 
 Dysphoria -.08 -.55  
 Movement .05 .35  
     
 Step 3   .002 
 Dysphoria -.04 -,18  
 Movement .05 ,35  
 Dysphoria*Movement -.06 -,30  





In Study 3, no influence of the level of dysphoria on the ability to regulate mood 
was found. Dysphoric participants recovered from a sad mood in the presence of neutral 
information just as well as non-dysphoric participants did. This is a very interesting 
result, as it suggests that whatever the influence of dysphoric states on the ability to 
regulate mood, it only affects the incremental effect due to the presence of positive 
information. It suggests that the mechanisms involved in mood recovery facing neutral 
information are, to some extent, different to the ones involved in mood regulation. 
Moreover, it seems that only the latest are affected in subclinically depressed 
individuals. 
No direct influence of overt head movements in mood regulation was found. In 
combination with previous results from studies 2.1 and 2.2, this result suggests that the 
path of influence of bodily states in mood regulation is indirect, rather than direct. 
Finally, no significant interaction between head movements and dysphoria levels 
was found. This result suggests that, whatever the influence of overt head movements, 
only the mechanisms involved in the incremental effect due to the presence of positive 
information are affected. In combination with the results of Study 2.1, this result 
suggests a link between bodily states and attention or interpretation biases towards 
positive information (Hertel & Mathews, 2011) and/or functioning of the BAS system 
(Hervas & Vazquez, 2013), supporting the notion that bodily states affect mood 






In the previous sections of this work, we have introduced the theoretical 
framework of embodiment, the scientific research that this approach has motivated and 
we have described three experiments aimed to examine the influence of bodily states on 
mood regulation processes. 
In this final section, our intention is to highlight the implications that the results 
of the experiments conducted, in particular, and the implications of the embodiment 
account, in general, can have for clinical psychology. 
In our opinion, the results of the studies conducted could be easily connected to 
previous literature concerning emotion regulation, cognitive and attention biases and 
depression, adding new findings and perspectives to the current state of the art.  
 
Discussion of the results of Study 2.1. 
 
In Study 2.1, we confirmed our hypotheses. On the one hand, symptoms of 
dysphoria related to a difficulty to regulate sad mood states were found. Although 
emotional regulation problems in depression were suggested many years ago (e.g., 
Teasdale, 1988), they have been consistently supported in the empirical literature in 
recent years (see a review in Joorman & Gotlib, 2010). For example, Peeters, Nicolson, 
Delespaul, and deVries (2003), found that in comparison to a non-depressed control 
group, depressed patients remained in a negative mood state produced by daily negative 
events for a longer period of time. Additionally, the study by McMakin, Santiago, and 
Shirk (2009) showed that dysphoric participants have difficulties in maintaining 
positive emotional states in response to positive stimuli (i.e., positive emotion eliciting 
video clips), compared to nondysphoric controls. In Study 2.1, we found that higher 
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levels of dysphoria were related to participants’ difficulties to regulate mood. Thus, the 
results of Study 2.1 add more evidence in favor of the existence of mood regulation 
deficits on individuals with higher levels of dysphoria. 
The most relevant result of Study 2.1 was the finding that overt head movements 
moderate the relationship between dysphoria and the participants’ ability to regulate 
their sad mood states. Whereas head movements did not affect the ability to regulate sad 
mood states among participants with lower levels of dysphoria, the movements of the 
head affected the ability to regulate sad mood of participants reporting higher levels of 
dysphoria. Among dysphoric participants, those who performed nodding head 
movements while watching positive pictures showed a similar ability to regulate mood 
than non-dysphoric individuals. On the contrary, only dysphoric participants who 
performed shaking head movements showed a diminished ability to regulate sad mood 
states. Whether the performance of nodding head movements boosts the ability of 
dysphoric participants to regulate mood, or, on the contrary, the performance of shaking 
head movements inhibits the regulatory process is a question that could not be answered 
with the present results. We will comment on this point further in the limitations 
section.  
Another line of research that could be explored refers to the mechanism through 
which bodily cues influence processes related to psychological disorders. For example, 
in Study 2.1 we found a moderation effect of overt head movements on the relationship 
between dysphoria levels and the participants’ ability to regulate mood, but the 
movement performed was not directly associated with the ability to regulate mood. 
However, it is still possible that overt head movements may have a direct influence on 
mood regulation. In particular, in this study participants were exposed to positive 
images, and there is evidence which suggests that paying attention to positive 
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information has regulatory effects (Joorman, Siemer, & Gotlib, 2007; McMakin et al., 
2009). Thus, the effects on mood regulation produced by watching positive pictures 
could have improved participants’ mood in a way that left no room for the influence of a 
motor component, thus producing a ceiling effect. Therefore, it could not be discarded 
that a direct influence of overt head movements on mood regulation was masked in 
Study 2.1. Study 3 was aimed to further explore the possible direct influence of overt 
head movements on mood regulation. 
Nevertheless, the implications of these results are interesting from a clinical 
point of view and are original and novel contributions to the current literature. However, 
it represents only a small step in the study of the contributions of the body to mood 
regulation processes. There is still a whole line of research that could be followed 
starting from this milestone. For example, future studies should examine whether the 
moderation effect of overt head movements could be generalized to other 
approach/avoidance movements (Study 2.2), or whether an influence of bodily states 
(e.g., facial gestures, body postures) could be found in cognitive or emotional processes 
related to psychological disorders other than mood regulation.  
 
Discussion of the results of Study 2.2. 
 
 In Study 2.2 we found a trend in the expected direction supporting the notion 
that symptoms of dysphoria are related to an inability to regulate sad mood states. The 
fact that dysphoric individuals were underrepresented in Study 2.2, in comparison to the 




 The second and most relevant hypothesis of Study 2.2 did not receive any 
support from the present data. Arm movements neither directly affected mood 
regulation, nor moderated the influence of dysphoric states in the participants’ ability to 
regulate mood. Yet, this lack of significance can shed some light on the role of different 
bodily components on mood regulation. In contrast with overt head movements, arm 
movements did not affect the influence of dysphoria on mood regulation ability. This 
result may indicate that only those movements of core elements of the body (e.g. the 
head), rather than peripheral parts (e.g., the right arm) are successful in altering affect. 
Interestingly, a review of previous research is in accordance with this view. There are 
more examples of influences in cognitive or emotional processes of core elements of the 
body, such as overt head movements (e.g., Briñol & Petty, 2003; 2007, Förster & 
Strack, 1996; Tom et al., 1991, Wells & Petty, 1980), upright versus slumped body 
posture (e.g., Riskind & Gotay, 1982; Wilson & Pepper, 2004), seated versus supine 
body posture (Harmon Jones & Peterson, 2009), facial gestures (e.g., Niedenthal, 2007; 
Niedenthal et al., 2009; Strack et al., 1988; Susskind et al., 2008), combined facial and 
musculoskeletal elements (e.g., Duclos et al. 1989, Flack et al., 1991, Duclos & Laird, 
2001) or body movements that require the combined action of several parts of the body 
(e.g., gait patterns, Koch et al., 2009; Michalak et al., 2009), than from peripheral 
elements of the body, such as arm movements (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 1993; Cretenet & 
Dru, 2008; Dru & Cretenet, 2004; 2005; Förster & Strack, 1997; 1998; Friedman & 
Foster, 2000; 2002; Maxwell & Davidson, 2007). Importantly, none of the studies 
referred to involving arm movements observed an influence on emotional or affective 
processes and, in addition, among them, results are not always univocal (e.g., Centerbar 
& Clore, 2006; Rottevel & Phaf, 2004). An alternative interpretation is that only those 
body movements that are tightly linked to feelings or emotions (e.g., facial gestures, 
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upright or slumped posture) or those movements that are univocally associated with 
acceptance (approach) or refusal (avoidance), such as overt head movements, are more 
likely to affect, at least indirectly, mood regulation processes. Movements are situated 
acts, and changing contextual conditions may affect how the movement affects attitude 
(Centerbar & Clore, 2006). Vertical and lateral head movements are, at least in our 
culture, unambiguously associated with positive and negative attitudes. No matter what 
the context, in western cultures lateral head movements imply refusal or negative 
attitude, whereas vertical head movements imply approval or positive attitude. Arm 
flexion and extension associated with approach and avoidance are not as unambiguous. 
For example, Cacioppo et al., (1993) posit that people flex their arms to attract a desired 
object towards them. Nevertheless, one may also flex an arm to avoid the pain produced 
by a hot object or to protect the face from a ball shot. Similarly, these authors posit that 
arm extensions are performed in order to push an undesired object away from the 
person, but it is not less true that one can extend an arm to reach a juicy piece of fruit, to 
give a present or to express joy and success. In this case, the influence of the context is 
much greater than in the case of head movements. 
 Study 2.2 was unable to extend results from Study 2.1 to other body movements. 
Yet, this fact does not preclude the potential importance of embodiment for studying 
processes related to mood and anxiety disorders in particular and clinical psychology in 
general. Many other movements, alone or in combination, may have the same potential 
to affect mood regulation as overt head movements have (e.g., upright vs. slumped 
posture, gait patterns, facial gestures) –e.g., Peper and Lin (2012). Moreover, mood 
regulation is only one of the processes related to clinical disorders that may be used as a 
target process to see the influences of bodily states. In fact, according to the literature of 
embodiment and the implications of some theoretical models (e.g., ICS, SPAARS), an 
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influence of bodily states could be expected on, for example, the maintenance of 
dysfunctional schemas, the awareness of cardiac reactivity (Herbert et al., 2010), or  the 
facilitation of peaks of anxiety that lead to panic attacks (Hagenaars, Stins, & Roelofs, 
2012). In our view, the amount of possible research in experimental clinical psychology 
that the present work could motivate is immense, as the body can have an influence on 
many different aspects of the emotional experience (i.e., elicitation, intensity, and 
differentiation) – see Moors (2009). 
 
Discussion of the results of Study 3. 
 
 Study 3 aimed to test whether changing the experimental conditions may help to 
reveal a direct influence of overt head movements on mood regulation. Whereas in 
Study 2.1 overt head movements were juxtaposed to the visualization of positive 
images, in Study 3 the positive images were replaced by pictures of neutral faces 
extracted from the FACES database (Ebner, Riediger, & Lindenberger, 2010), ceteris 
paribus all other experimental settings. 
The first hypothesis of Study 3 expected symptoms of dysphoria to be related to 
difficulties in regulating sad mood states. In comparison to what we obtained in studies 
2.1 and 2.2, where a significant and a marginally significant influence in the expected 
direction were found, respectively, in Study 3 no influence of the level of dysphoria on 
the ability to regulate mood was found. Previous studies have found evidence that 
indicates that paying attention to positive information helps participants to regulate their 
sad mood states (e.g., Joorman et al., 2007; Sanchez et al., 2013, Rahona et al., 2013). 
Additionally, some of them found that the level of depressive symptoms affected the 
regulatory ability of participants (e.g., Joorman et al., 2007, Rahona et al., 2013). The 
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absence of influence of dysphoria levels on the regulatory ability of participants 
observed in Study 3 indicates that when participants are presented with neutral 
information, no differences can be found between dysphoric and non-dysphoric 
participants in their ability to regulate mood. This is an interesting result which, in 
combination with the results from Study 2.1,  suggests a link between the diminished 
ability to regulate mood present in dysphoric participants and attention or interpretation 
biases towards positive information (Hertel & Mathews, 2011) and/or low functioning 
of the BAS system (Hervas & Vazquez, 2013). That is, both dysphoric and non-
dysphoric participants seem to have their automatic mood repair system preserved, as 
they effectively recover from a sad mood in presence of neutral information. The 
presence of positive information, however, seems to boost the ability to regulate sad 
mood mainly in non-dysphoric participants. This result suggests a different internal 
disposition of participants depending on the kind of information presented and their 
mood condition. A similar result was found by Joorman, Seemer and Gotlib (2007). In 
their study, these authors examined the ability of currently depressed, formerly 
depressed, and never- depressed participants to regulate sad mood through the recall of 
positive memories or through distraction. Whereas distraction was effective in all 
participants, the recall of positive memories improved mood only in the never-
depressed participants group. Formerly depressed participants’ sad moods remained 
unchanged and the mood of depressed participants worsened after they were asked to 
recall positive memories. Therefore, the processing of positive information to regulate 
mood may not have a direct and uniform effect on participants’ mood, as it may interact 
with their current mood or clinical condition (see also similar findings with subclinical 
dysphoric and nondysphoric participants in Joorman & Siemer, 2004).  
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The fact that mood regulation deficits in dysphoric participants only appear in 
the presence of positive information, but not with neutral information, reinforces the 
notion of a low functioning of the BAS system among dysphoric individuals (e.g., 
Hervas & Vazquez, 2013). This result has a second implication that could be relevant 
from a clinical point of view. In our design, mood states were assessed at three different 
moments: at the beginning of the experiment, after a sad mood induction and after an 
experimental task that lasted approximately 10 minutes. The experimental task included 
watching neutral images and performing overt head movements. Both dysphoric and 
non-dysphoric participants showed a significant mood recovery after the experimental 
task (which lasted exactly the same amount of time), not differing in the amount of their 
mood repair. This result indicates that, in regulating their mood, all participants profited 
to the same extent from available information neutrally valenced. Yet, only non-
dysphoric participants and dysphoric participants who nodded seemed to benefit from 
the use of positively valenced information. It is possible that cognitive biases present in 
non-dysphoric participants may explain this differential ability. For instance, Grafton et 
al. (2012) have shown that inducing a cognitive positive bias in participants through a 
standard dot-probe methodology, boosts positive emotional affectivity after 
experiencing successful outcomes in an experimental task. Thus, it may be possible that 
some previous cognitive biases present in our non-dysphoric participants could enhance 
their abilities to regulate their mood when processing positive information.  
The second hypothesis of Study 3 explored the potential direct influence of overt 
head movements on mood regulation. We expected a moderation effect similar to the 
one obtained in Study 2.1. Neither the hypothesis of a direct influence of overt head 
movements on mood regulation nor the moderation of overt head movements on the 
relationship between dysphoria and mood regulation obtained support in the results of 
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Study 3. In combination with the results of Study 2.1, this pattern of results strongly 
suggests that no direct influence of overt head movements on mood regulation 
processes is to be expected, as it was neither found when positive or neutral images 
were used. It is possible, though, that a different result may be found when manipulating 
bodily states that spontaneously appear when individuals are in a sad mood (e.g., facial 
expressions, slumped posture). Nevertheless, the answer to this question is still 
unknown and it is crucial that future research ought to address this important issue.  
 
Embodiment and mood regulation: Possible underlying mechanisms 
 
We propose three alternative, non-exclusive paths of influence that could explain 
the present results. First of all, according to the multilevel models of emotion (Philippot, 
Baeyens, Douilliez, & Francart, 2004; Power & Dalgleish, 1997; 2008; Teasdale & 
Barnard, 1993), and in particular to the ICS model (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993), there is 
a somatic path of maintenance of depressive symptoms (Body states  Implicational 
System Somatic-Visceral-Body effects  Body states; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993, p. 






Schematic model of the cognitive and sensory loop responsible for the maintenance of depression 
 
 Supporting this notion, there is ample evidence suggesting that physical activity 
can be effective as a treatment for many symptoms and disorders. For example, in the 
treatment of anxiety, some meta-analyses have revealed the effectiveness of physical 
exercise for subjects with high anxiety (Petruzzello, Landers, Hatfield, Kubitz, & 
Salazar, 1991; Sarris et al., 2012). Other studies have reported that patients suffering 
from somatic disorders can also benefit from physical exercise to reduce their anxiety 
(Herring, O’Connor, & Dishman, 2010). In the field of depression treatment, there is 
metaanalytic evidence showing that behavioral activation increases well-being both in 
clinical and subclinical depressed participants (Mazzuchelli et al., 2010). More 
specifically, the effectiveness of aerobic and nonaerobic exercise is comparable to first-
choice treatments for depression, such as pharmacological therapy or cognitive-behavior 
therapy (Ahmadi, Samavat, Sayyad, & Ghanizadeh, 2002; Dunn, Trivedi, Kampert, 
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Clark, & Chambliss, 2005; Lawlor & Hopker, 2001; Jacka and Berk, 2012). Some other 
studies have found that exercise can reduce the negative cognitions associated with 
depression (Lash, 2000), as well as hopelessness (Hembree, 2001).  
Although the evidence of the positive impact of physical exercise in several 
psychopathologies is consistent, the physiological and psychological mechanisms that 
underlie its anxiolytic, anti-panic and anti-depressant effects remain unclear (Hovland et 
al., 2013). Some authors suggest that one possible mechanism through which physical 
activity can reduce anxiety is by exposing the individual to bodily sensations, which is 
known to be highly relevant in the treatment of panic disorders (Chambless, Caputo, 
Bright and Gallagher, 1984). Other authors suggest that the experience of motor 
capacity is partially responsible for the antidepressant effects of exercise (Bodin & 
Martinsen, 2004; Lindeman & Abramson, 2008). An alternative (or integrative) 
explanation in line with the ICS model is that engaging in physical activity interrupts 
the physical loop that maintains symptoms of depression and anxiety, and the bodily 
sensations produced by an active body are incongruent with the information stored at 
the implicational level. Going back to the results of Study 2.1, it is possible that the 
different proprioceptive information originating from the different head movements 
performed by participants may have interrupted (or activated) the somatic loop, leading 
to the regulation of (or to the persistence of) a sad mood state.  
A second possible pathway of influence is through the repercussion of head 
movements, or their physiological correlates, on the Behavioral Approach System 
(BAS). Activation of the BAS is associated with behaviors of approximation to 
desirable outcomes, feelings of euphoria, and reward seeking (Hervas & Vazquez, 
2013). The tripartite model of anxiety and depression (Clark & Watson, 1991) proposed 
that low BAS is specific to depression disorder. In addition, Depue and Iacono (1989) 
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also suggested that symptoms such as depressive mood, psychomotor retardation, 
anhedonia, or fatigue are consequences of an abnormally low functioning of the BAS. 
Several studies have confirmed that depressed individuals present significantly lower 
levels in the BAS scale (Kasch, Rottenberg, Arnow, & Gotlib, 2002; Pinto-Meza et al., 
2006), as well as reduced reactivity to positive stimuli in general (e.g., Berenbaum & 
Oltmanns, 1992; Rottenberg, Kasch, Gross, & Gotlib, 2002) and to rewards in particular 
(Henriques & Davidson, 2000; Henriques, Glowacki, & Davidson, 1994; McFarland & 
Klein, 2008), and also longitudinal studies have reported the ability of BAS scores to 
predict better recovery of depressed patients (Kasch et al., 2002; McFarland, Shankman, 
Tenke, Bruder, & Klein, 2006; Rottenberg et al., 2002). Indeed, there is increasing 
evidence that a lack of interest in positive experiences, or a diminished reactivity to 
them, might be the basis of mood dysregulation which, in turn, would perpetuate 
anhedonia (Hervas & Vazquez, 2013). In Study 2.1, participants performed either a 
head nodding or a head shaking movement while watching positive pictures. Although 
the individuals who participated in the study were not clinically depressed, low 
reactivity of the BAS system were also observed among non-clinical dysphoric 
individuals (e.g., Hervas & Vazquez, 2013). Performing nodding head movements is 
generally associated with acceptance or approach behaviors, whereas performing 
shaking head movements is associated with rejection or avoidance behaviors (e.g., 
Fusaro, Harris, & Pan, 2012). It is therefore plausible to suggest that the proprioceptive 
information produced by head nodding, could have activated the low functioning BAS 
on dysphoric participants, and this activation led to a better mood regulation in response 
to positive pictures.  
The third possible path of influence that we consider plausible in explaining the 
moderation effect that overt head movements had on the influence of dysphoria on 
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participants’ ability to regulate mood, is through the modification of participants’ 
cognitive biases.  
Prior evidence of this issue is still anecdotic. For example, studies in the field of 
embodiment have demonstrated that performing movements related to avoidance 
(approach) in response to alcoholic (non-alcoholic) images could modify the bias 
towards alcohol cues in alcoholic patients (Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker, & 
Lindenmeyer, 2011). Furthermore, in that study, patients under this cognitive and bodily 
modification bias procedure had lower relapse rates than the control group. More 
generally, results from studies by Tom, Petersen, Lau, Burton and Cook (1991) or by 
Briñol and Petty (2003) indicate that performing overt head movements can influence 
participants’ attitudes. The results of Study 2.1 could reflect the modification of 
attentional biases present on dysphoric participants. It is possible that dysphoric 
participants, who in general, tend to pay less attention to positive cues (e.g., Joormann 
& Gotlib, 2007), modified their attentional pattern as a consequence of the approach 
(i.e., nodding) movement performed, either paying more attention to the positive 
images, or changing their attitude towards the positive images, or both. According to the 
'embodied validation' hypothesis (Briñol, Petty, & Wagner, 2011, p. 1043), "the 
confidence that emerges from one’s body and its position or movements can magnify 
the effect of anything that is currently available in people’s minds, including [...] 
cognitions, emotions, goals, and so forth. That is, confidence applies to whatever mental 
contents are salient and available at the time”. This theory may help to explain how 
performing body movements can moderate the influence of positive content in people’s 
mood state through cognitive bias (e.g., interpretative bias). 
If an influence of movements on cognitive biases was demonstrated, it would 
have important implications. It is generally recognized that emotional biases in 
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attention, interpretation, and memory contribute to emotional disorders (Hertel & 
Mathews, 2011; Mathews & MacLeod; 2005; Matt, Vazquez & Campbell, 1992). When 
participants pay attention to emotional stimuli, healthy individuals show a tendency to 
look especially to positive but also to negative cues in comparison to neutral ones. In 
contrast, those participants prone to anxiety or depression tend to direct their attention 
to negative cues, particularly when such cues are related to individual emotional 
concerns (Hertel & Mathews, 2011) and these attentional biases seem to be causally 
related to the onset and maintenance of mood disorders (e.g., Clasen et al., 2012). For 
example, in comparison to non anxious individuals, participants prone to anxiety tend to 
direct their attention more towards threatening than to neutral cues (for a meta-analysis 
see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Baker-mans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007). 
Similarly, whereas non-depressed controls are more likely to attend to positive stimuli, 
depressed individuals show attentional biases towards stimuli more related to 
depression (e.g., Hankin, Gibb, Abela, & Flory, 2010; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007). A 
new line of research aims to study whether procedures designed to change these 
negatively biased styles of cognitive processing could be used to benefit patients. The 
studies on cognitive bias modification (CBM) use systematic practice in alternative 
processing styles (Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009), in order to change biases that 
contribute to undesirable emotional reactions in participants vulnerable to emotional or 
anxiety disorders (Hertel & Mathews, 2011). Recent metaanalytic reviews of these new 
procedures suggest that these procedures can be useful not only in reducing cognitive 
biases but also in significantly reducing symptoms in participants with anxiety or 
depression (Hallion and Ruscio, 2012; Todd, Cunningham, Anderson & Thompson, 
2012). These procedures are also a source of evidence of the role of cognitive factors in 




Implications for the role of distraction in mood regulation 
 
Concerning the expected moderation of overt head movements on the influence 
of dysphoria on mood regulation, this hypothesis did not receive support in the results 
of Study 3. Therefore, in Study 3, neither a direct influence of dysphoria on mood 
regulation, nor a moderation of overt head movements on this influence could be found. 
These results, in combination with those of Study 2.1, suggest that whatever the path of 
influence of head movements on the relationship between dysphoria levels and mood 
regulation might be, it seems that it takes place only under certain conditions.  In order 
to explain these results, we built on previous research that found different regulatory 
outcomes when participants performed a distractory task, than when the task performed 
involved the recall of positive information (Joorman et al., 2007). In this study, it was 
discovered that distraction was effective in all participants, whereas the recall of 
positive memories only improved mood in the group of never-depressed participants. 
Distraction strategies lead to an automatic repair of mood states that is mainly due to 
stop attention being directed to negative information. In comparison, strategies that 
involve the processing of positive information combine the effects of stop attention 
being directed to negative information, with additional ones due to addressing attention 
towards positive information. This distinction is in line with the model proposed by 
Gyurak, Gross, and Etkin (2011). This model suggests that two different kinds of 
regulatory mechanisms exist. Some mechanisms would be automatic and implicit, 
whereas others would be more controlled and explicit.  
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We suggest that effects from both distraction and positive information 
processing appeared in Study 2.1. On the contrary, in Study 3, only effects due to 
distraction arose. 
According to the results obtained in Study 2.1 and Study 3, it seems that overt 
head movements had an influence on the effects due to positive information processing, 
but not on the effects due to distraction strategies. As we have already discussed, a 
normal-functioning BAS system in the presence of positive information, leads to 
regulated mood states and this is also supported by evidence showing that positive 
cognitive biases boost positive emotional reactions when processing positive outcomes 
(Grafton et al., 2012). The proprioceptive information could be tied to the BAS system 
through three different proposed channels. Internal proprioception could affect the BAS 
directly or indirectly, influencing either an individual’s attitudes or cognitive biases. 
Interestingly, our results are in line with the somatic marker hypothesis. Damasio states 
that “when different somatic markers are juxtaposed to different combination of images, 
they modify the way the brain handles them, and thus operate a bias” (Damasio, 1994, 
p.199). Similarly, from the field of embodied persuasion, Briñol, Petty and Wagner 
(2011, p.1043) state that "...the confidence that emerges from one’s body and its 
position or movements can magnify the effect of anything that is currently available in 
people’s minds, including […]  cognitions, emotions, goals, and so forth. That is, 
confidence applies to whatever mental contents are salient and available at the time". 
Both accounts suggest that bodily states can modify the influence that some information 
has on cognition and emotion. According to our results, the movement performed 
interacts with the kind of information presented and participants’ emotional state, 






Some limitations present in the three studies must be acknowledged. One of 
these limitations refers to the absence of a no-movement control condition in the three 
experiments. Without a no-movement control condition, it is impossible to know which 
movement is more responsible for the interaction obtained in Study 2.1. It could be that 
the nodding effect is equivalent to a control (no-movement condition) and the effect lies 
in what the shaking movement is doing in order to undermine the normal mood 
regulation. Although most of the embodiment studies do not include a control condition 
(e.g., Briñol & Petty, 2003; Cacioppo et al., 1993; Tom et al., 1991), to exemplify the 
specific effectiveness of head movements more convincingly, it would be necessary to 
examine whether the interaction pattern obtained persists when comparing a nodding 
with a no-movement condition.  
Another limitation of the present study is that it does not reveal information 
about the mechanisms involved in the moderation pattern. As suggested by Briñol & 
Petty (2007), bodily movements can influence mental processes by affecting some 
underlying processes (e.g., producing a bias, serving as peripheral cues for change). 
Similarly, in the discussion section we have proposed some alternative paths of 
influence, through which bodily states generated by the performance of different overt 
head movements may be affecting the mood regulation process. Nonetheless, our design 
does not allow conclusions about the mechanisms involved to be extracted and this is a 
question that future research may address. 
A third limitation which should be acknowledged concerns the sample included 
in the three experiments. Results were obtained in student samples. Therefore, the 
possible clinical implications of the present work must be considered with caution. To 
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infer clinical implications of the present study, it is necessary to presume the existence 
of a continuum among subclinical and clinical depressive states. Nonetheless, it is also 
possible that differences between clinical and subclinical depression are not only 
quantitative, but also qualitative. In any case, it would be recommendable to examine 
whether the pattern of results obtained in Study 2.1 holds up when comparing clinically 
depressed individuals with never depressed euthimic controls.  
Finally, it is important to mention that in all the three experiments a cover story 
was used to hide the real aim of the experiment. Consequently, movements were 
performed without a deliberate intention to modify mood states. It is possible that 
intentionality does not modify the effect of performing overt movements in whatever 
process they may have an influence, but it is also possible that a different result could be 
obtained when movements are deliberately performed in order to, for example, modify 
mood states. In fact, there is some evidence, from the field of attention bias 
modification, that when participants are aware of the contingencies aimed at modifying 
their mood, the effects on anxiety scores are lower than in the standard implicit learning 
condition (MacLeod et al., 2009; as cited in McLeod and Mathews, 2012).This should 
be taken into account for future research, as well as for drawing conclusions for its 
application in psychological interventions.  
Another limitation concerns the fact that our studies have only focused on the 
regulation of sadness. Yet, other clinical conditions, such as addictions, bipolar 
disorders (Stange et al., 2012), or anxiety disorders (Cisler and Olatunji, 2012), may 
follow different mood regulation mechanisms. Furthermore, given the relatively 
neglected study of positive emotions in clinical disorders (see a review in Carls et al., 
2013), it would be interesting to differentiate, in dysphoric participants, mechanisms 
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involved in reducing negative moods from mechanisms involved in enhancing positive 
moods, which may act jointly or separately.  
Finally, the cognitive and emotional processes by which regulation is achieved 
will also be important to analyze in future research. It would be interesting to analyze 
the role that different emotion regulation strategies (e.g., reappraisal, suppression, 
rumination, or distraction), which are used by healthy participants (see metaanalysis by 
Miles, Sheeran, & Webb, 2013), have in different clinical conditions.  
 
Contributions of embodiment to applied psychology. 
 
As we have seen within the present work, the embodiment account could have 
important theoretical and practical implications in the field of clinical psychology. On 
the one hand, considering the role of bodily states on mental processes could help 
psychologists to have a more holistic view of individuals’ cognitive and emotional 
functioning, as stated by Damasio (1994, p.118) “the separation between mind and body 
is probably just fictional. The mind is embodied, in the full sense of the term”. The 
Lindeman and Abramson (2008) model suggests that simulation of motor incapacity 
could be responsible for motor symptoms of depression. This model has directly 
emerged from some theoretical principles of the embodiment account, and represents an 
example of how embodiment could help to enrich the way we understand psychological 
disorders. Although Lindeman and Abramson’s model only refers to symptoms of 
motor incapacity, providing theoretical basement in support of their hypotheses, it does 
not constrain the possible influence of bodily states on motor symptoms of depression. 
In fact, the results obtained in the present work suggest that the influence of bodily 
states goes beyond symptoms of motor incapacity. At least in subclinical samples, 
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vertical head movements in combination with positive images seem to improve the 
mood regulation ability of dysphoric individuals. Bodily states could interact with 
internal and external information influencing other emotional processes related to 
depression (e.g., emotional processing of bereavement). Thus, the simulation of motor 
incapacity could account for the motor symptoms of depression, but the contribution of 
bodily states to other higher order processes involved in depression is still rather 
unexplored.  
Similarly, concepts and ideas based on the embodiment approach could help to 
enrich some theoretical models of anxiety and fear disorders. For example, Eysenck’s 
incubation theory (Eysenck, 1968), contrary to what classical conditioning models 
would expect, proposes that fear and anxiety reactions to conditioned stimuli eventually 
increase even when the conditioned stimuli are presented repeatedly without 
reinforcement. This model suggests that the conditioned response that follows the 
conditioned stimulus could eventually be strong enough to counteract the decremental 
effects of extinction. The simulation of the different modal components of the nocive 
responses, and specially their somatic components, could predispose individuals to an 
incubation process, acting as a somatic marker (Damasio, 1994) and biasing or 
exacerbating the perception of danger. In light of the results obtained by Duclos and 
Laird (2001), who found individual differences in the impact that performing facial 
gestures and body postures has on individuals’ emotional state, it is also possible that 
not only the strength of the conditioned response, but also the sensitivity of individuals 
to their internal states could underlie the incubation process.  
The embodiment account reflects the idea that multimodal information is 
reenacted producing higher order cognitive and emotional processes. This is a notion in 
line with the cognitive and emotional functioning proposed by multi-level models of 
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emotion (Philippot, Baeyens, Douilliez, & Francart, 2004; Power & Dalgleish, 1997; 
2008; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). According to these models, different interacting 
subsystems are specialized in the processing of certain kinds of information. The 
interaction of these subsystems accounts for the cognitive and emotional functioning of 
individuals. Some of these models focus on how the multimodal information processed 
by the different subsystems lead to the maintenance of depressive states (e.g., ICS, 
Teasdale & Barnard, 1993), whereas others mainly focus on anxiety disorders (e.g., 
SPAARS, Power & Dalgleish, 1997). Despite their interest, these models have 
generated a small amount of research, probably due to their complexity. Studies based 
on paradigms with an origin on the embodiment approach, such as those included in this 
work, could help to add more evidence in support of the notions proposed by multi-level 
models of emotion. 
It is important to note that some of these paradigms have been successfully 
employed to modify bias towards alcohol (Wiers et al., 2011) and that the combination 
of cognitive bias modification based on approach and avoidance movements with CB 
interventions improved the percentage of relapse in alcoholic patients. This is an initial 
step that signals how the embodiment approach can help to enrich interventions by 
including the body in therapeutic practice. Future research may also address the 
question whether bodily states that are associated with approach or avoidance could be 
manipulated in order to improve treatments in which exposure is the main component. 
Moreover, these results may also encourage us to devote more efforts to the study of the 
efficacy of psychological interventions that include somatic elements as central in 
psychological therapy. 
In our view, the most important contribution of the embodiment approach is the 
restitution of the role of the body in psychological processes. The body is not only the 
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primary tool that individuals have to interact with the environment, but also a source of 
information and the substrate in which abstract cognitive and emotional processes have 
their origin. Taking into account the tight link existing between bodily states and 
emotion and also the suggested link between bodily states and cognitive processes, it 
seems that incorporating the body into clinical practice may open a bottom-up way of 
intervening in dysfunctional psychological processes, complementary to the more 
frequent top-bottom interventions, emanating from traditional cognitive approaches. 
The inclusion of the somatic path as a research topic common to all psychological 
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